Morgan v. Mortgage Discount Co.
| Decision Date | 01 July 1930 |
| Citation | 100 Fla. 124,129 So. 589 |
| Parties | MORGAN et al. v. MORTGAGE DISCOUNT CO. |
| Court | Florida Supreme Court |
Action by the Mortgage Discount Company against Adeline E. Morgan and husband. Decree for plaintiff, and defendants appeal.
Affirmed. Appeal from Circuit Court, Dade County; Paul D Barns, Judge.
H. Pierre Branning, J. R. B. Clemons, and Cecil C Curry, all of Miami, for appellants.
Graham Magee, of New York City, and George T. Clark, of Miami, for appellee.
Adeline E. Morgan and C. R. Morgan, her husband, executed their joint promissory note on May 17, 1927, for the sum of $6,760 payable to the order of Nelson B. McLain on or before one year after date with interest at the rate of 8 per cent. per annum from date, interest payable semiannually. The note contained a clause which provided that the deferred interest payments should bear interest from maturity at 8 per cent per annum payable semiannually.
On the same day a mortgage was executed by the makers of the note and delivered to McLain to secure the payment of the note and interest. The mortgage was upon certain lands described and contained covenants for the payment of the debt and interest, taxes and assessments, and all costs, charges, and expenses including lawyers' fees reasonably incurred because of the failure of the mortgagors to comply with the agreements on their part to be performed.
The note and mortgage were assigned by McLain to the Mortgage Discount Company, which began a suit to foreclose on August 23, 1928.
The bill alleged that on November 17, 1927, the sum of $669.90 was paid on the note leaving a balance of $6,090.40 unpaid; that neither the semiannual interest accruing of $243.62 nor any part of the principal balance due has been paid. The defendants named were the makers of the note and mortgage.
The defendants appeared but failed to answer or demur. A pro confesso order was entered against them and the matter referred to a master, whose report was filed on October 18, 1928. The report showed that the principal sum of $6,090.40, together with interest amounting thereon to $454.76, were due and unpaid and the sum of $677.26 was a reasonable sum to be allowed for attorneys' fees.
A final decree was entered on October 28, 1928, based upon the report. The chancellor ordered the sums to be paid within twenty days and in default thereof that the property be sold and the proceeds of the sale applied to the payment of the debt, interest, costs, charges, and attorneys' fees. Within thirty days the defendants filed a petition for a rehearing upon the ground that the computation of interest was incorrect; that it should be $446.60 instead of $454.76, as decreed by the Court. The petition was denied, and the defendant appealed.
From the date of the partial payment, which was on November 17, 1927, to the date of the master's report, eleven months and one day intervened. The interest upon the balance of $6,090.40 for that period at 8 per cent. would amount to the sum of $447.95, but if calculated to the 17th of May, 1928, when the interest payment of $243.62 was due, and that amount added to the principal and interest calculated for the remaining period of five months and one day, the interest would amount to $456.13, the difference being $8.18, or the interest upon $243.62 due as interest on May 17, 1928, to the date of the report.
In behalf of the appellant it is contended that the decree allowed compound interest for the period intervening from the 17th day of May, 1928, and the date of the decree. The appellee replies that the note provides for it.
The question here presented is: Is an agreement made before interest becomes due that it shall bear interest if unpaid valid in this state? The note and mortgage were both executed in this state.
The general rule is that in stating or settling accounts it is not permissible to make periodical rests striking a balance...
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...internal law; this is expressly conceded by the Government. Panama City v. Free, Fla. Sup.Ct., 52 So.2d 133; Morgan v. Mortgage Discount Co., 100 Fla. 124, 129 So. 589. Thus, we conclude that if we applied a federal rule or if we determined what result the courts of Florida would reach, the......
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...Byrd v. Lbr. Co., 118 Miss. 179, 79 So. 100; Cutler v. Board, etc., 56 Miss. 115; Bank v. Caston, 97 Miss. 309, 52 So. 633; Morgan v. Discount Co., 129 So. 589. holding of the trial court deprived appellant of a vested right contrary to section 16 of the constitution of Mississippi, and sec......
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Pitts v. Pastore
...of the extension on the overdue note, it is unclear when interest was due and what interest was "deferred." See Morgan v. Mortgage Discount Co., 100 Fla. 124, 129 So. 589 (1930). Thus, the Pastores are entitled to only simple interest. Accordingly, we reverse the final judgment's award of p......