Morgan v. North Ms Medical Center, Inc.

• Decision Date: 02 December 2005
• Docket Number: No. CIV.05-0499-WS-B.,CIV.05-0499-WS-B.
• Citation: 403 F.Supp.2d 1115
• Parties: Brenda L. MORGAN, Plaintiff, v. NORTH MISSISSIPPI MEDICAL CENTER, INC., Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Alabama

403 F.Supp.2d 1115

Brenda L. MORGAN, Plaintiff, v. NORTH MISSISSIPPI MEDICAL CENTER, INC., Defendant.

No. CIV.05-0499-WS-B.

United States District Court, S.D. Alabama, Southern Division.

December 2, 2005.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Mark D. Ryan, Bay Minette, AL, for Plaintiff.

Charles J. Potts, Jacob Bartlett McNiel, Alford, Clausen & McDonald, Mobile, AL, for Defendant.

ORDER

STEELE, District Judge.

This matter is before the Court on defendant North Mississippi Medical Center, Inc.'s Motion to Dismiss (doc. 5). The Motion has been briefed and is now ripe for disposition.

I. Background.

On August 26, 2005, plaintiff Brenda L. Morgan ("Morgan") filed the instant Complaint (doc. 1) in this District Court against defendant North Mississippi Medical Center, Inc. ("NMMC"), alleging a state-law claim for outrage, as well as a cause of action for violation of the Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd ("EMTALA"). The wellpleaded allegations of the Complaint assert that on August 22, 2003, decedent Thomas Henry Morgan, Sr. ("Mr.Morgan") sustained serious injuries (including fractured ribs and vertebrae, a dislocated shoulder, and a pulmonary contusion) in a fall from a tree stand at a hunting camp near Calhoun City, Mississippi. (Complaint, ¶ 4.) Mr. Morgan, who did not have medical insurance, was rushed to NMMC's hospital in Tupelo, Mississippi (the "Hospital"), where he received emergency trauma care and was admitted as a patient. (Id., ¶ 5.) Immediately following Morgan's arrival at the Hospital, Hospital personnel notified her that she would need to make financial arrangements right away for her husband's treatment. (Id.) After several stalled attempts commencing within a day after his admission, the Hospital discharged Mr. Morgan on August 31, 2003 (nine days after he was admitted), without conducting an MRI scan of his badly injured back, and despite his serious ongoing medical difficulties. (Id., ¶¶ 6-10.) An ambulance owned and/or controlled by the Hospital transported Mr. Morgan to his home in Foley, Alabama, where ambulance attendants physically carried him inside the house to his bed on a stretcher. (Id., ¶¶ 10-11.) Approximately 12 hours later Mr. Morgan died from untreated injuries relating to his fall on August 22. (Id., ¶ 12.)¹

In its Motion to Dismiss, NMMC contends that dismissal of the Complaint is warranted on three distinct grounds. First, defendant maintains that this District Court lacks personal jurisdiction over it because NMMC does not possess the requisite minimum contacts with the State of Alabama to reasonably anticipate being haled into court here. Second, defendant argues that venue does not properly lie in this District Court. Third, defendant states that the EMTALA claim is not actionable, as a matter of law, and that in the absence of a viable EMTALA cause of action there is no federal subject matter jurisdiction. Plaintiff contests each of these objections.

II. Analysis.

A. Personal Jurisdiction.

NMMC first contends that Morgan's claims must be dismissed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(2), Fed.R.Civ.P., because personal jurisdiction is nonexistent. In particular, defendant argues that it is a non-profit Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in Tupelo, Mississippi, and that it lacks the requisite minimum contacts with the State of Alabama to support exercise of personal jurisdiction over it here in a manner consistent with constitutional and statutory guarantees.

1. Legal Standard.

Where a district court in its discretion decides a personal jurisdiction issue without an evidentiary hearing, it is the plaintiff's burden to establish a prima facie case of personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant. Meier ex rel. Meier v. Sun Int'l Hotels, Ltd., 288 F.3d 1264, 1269 (11th Cir.2002); S.E.C. v. Carrillo, 115 F.3d 1540, 1542 (11th Cir.1997). Such a showing requires the presentation of evidence sufficient to withstand a motion for directed verdict. Id. In considering the adequacy of a plaintiff's proffer, district courts accept as true all facts alleged in the complaint, to the extent they are uncontroverted by a defendant's affidavits. Id. If the complaint and the defendant's affidavits conflict, then all reasonable inferences must be construed in the plaintiff's favor. Id. A dispositive motion alleging lack of personal jurisdiction must be denied if the allegations of the complaint state a prima facie case of jurisdiction. Ruiz de Molina v. Merritt & Furman Ins. Agency, Inc., 207 F.3d 1351, 1356 (11th Cir.2000).

"When a defendant challenges personal jurisdiction, the plaintiff has the twin burdens of establishing that personal jurisdiction over the defendant comports with (1) the forum state's long-arm provision and (2) the requirements of the due-process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution." Lasalle Bank N.A. v. Mobile Hotel Properties, LLC, 274 F.Supp.2d 1293, 1296 (S.D.Ala. 2003) (citations omitted); see also Horizon Aggressive Growth, L.P. v. Rothstein-Kass, P.A., 421 F.3d 1162, 1166 (11th Cir. 2005) (similar). In Alabama, however, this two-pronged inquiry collapses into a single question because Alabama's long-arm provision permits its courts to exercise personal jurisdiction to the full extent permitted by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Molina, 207 F.3d at 1356; Lasalle Bank, 274 F.Supp.2d at 1296; Reliance Nat'l Indemnity Co. v. Pinnacle Cas. Assur. Corp., 160 F.Supp.2d 1327, 1332 (M.D.Ala.2001). Accordingly, the critical question here is whether the exercise of personal jurisdiction over NMMC conforms with constitutional safeguards.

Due process authorizes the exercise of personal jurisdiction when "(1) the nonresident defendant has purposefully established minimum contacts with the forum;" and "(2) the exercise of jurisdiction will not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice." Carrillo, 115 F.3d at 1542 (quoting Francosteel Corp., Unimetal-Normandy v. M/V Charm, Tiki, Mortensen & Lange, 19 F.3d 624, 627 (11th Cir.1994)); see also Horizon, 421 F.3d at 1166; Molina, 207 F.3d at 1356; Lasalle Bank, 274 F.Supp.2d at 1296-97.

The minimum contacts analysis varies depending on whether the type of jurisdiction asserted is general or specific. Indeed, facts supporting "[p]ersonal jurisdiction may be general, which arise from the party's contacts with the forum state that are unrelated to the claim, or specific, which arise from the party's contacts with the forum state that are related to the claim." Nippon Credit Bank, Ltd. v. Matthews, 291 F.3d 738, 747 (11th Cir.2002). Under general jurisdiction, there must be a showing of "continuous and systematic" contacts between the defendant and the forum state even if those contacts are unrelated to the plaintiff's claims. Id. By contrast, specific jurisdiction is proper where (i) the defendant's contacts with the forum state are related or give rise to the plaintiff's cause of action, (ii) the contacts involve some act by which the defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum, and (iii) the defendant's contacts with the forum are such that the defendant should reasonably anticipate being haled into court there. See, e.g., McGow v. McCurry, 412 F.3d 1207, 1214 (11th Cir.2005); Carrillo, 115 F.3d at 1542; Vermeulen v. Renault, U.S.A., Inc., 985 F.2d 1534, 1546 (11th Cir.1993); Lasalle Bank, 274 F.Supp.2d at 1297.

2. Application of Jurisdictional Analysis to NMMC.

Plaintiff argues that, notwithstanding NMMC's lack of a business presence in Alabama, this Court may properly exercise specific jurisdiction over it.² To that end, the Complaint may be fairly read as alleging that when NMMC discharged Mr. Morgan, it placed him in an NMMC ambulance operated by NMMC personnel. (Complaint, ¶ 10.) That NMMC ambulance is alleged to have driven Mr. Morgan from the Hospital in Tupelo, Mississippi to his home in Foley, Alabama, at which time NMMC ambulance attendants removed Mr. Morgan from the ambulance, carried him into his home by stretcher, and deposited him in his bed where he died just hours later. (Id., ¶ 11.) Plaintiff's opposition brief contends that these allegations adequately establish the elements of specific jurisdiction over NMMC.

Curiously, defendant's reply brief utterly ignores the ambulance allegations and makes no attempt to rebut plaintiff's invocation of specific jurisdiction principles.³ Defendant adopts this strategy at its peril, inasmuch as this Court will not formulate a party's arguments for it. See Resolution Trust Corp. v. Dunmar Corp., 43 F.3d 587, 599 (11th Cir.1995) ("There is no burden upon the district court to distill every potential argument that could be made based upon the materials before it."); Pinto v. Universidad De Puerto Rico, 895 F.2d 18, 19 (1st Cir.1990) ("The court is under no duty to exercise imagination and conjure what a plaintiff might have alleged, but did not, and do counsel's work for him or her.").⁴

Applying the three specific jurisdiction criteria to the facts asserted in the Complaint, it is clear that plaintiff has sufficiently pleaded a basis for the exercise of personal jurisdiction over NMMC in Alabama. First, NMMC's alleged contacts with the forum state (namely, its acts of transporting Mr. Morgan to his home in Foley, Alabama, physically carrying him inside the house on a stretcher, and leaving him there) are unquestionably related to plaintiff's causes of action herein. Ultimately, this case is factually centered on the propriety of the Hospital's discharge decision and the ramifications of that decision for Mr. Morgan. The Hospital's actions in transferring the decedent from the Hospital to Alabama are inextricably intertwined with, substantially related to, and ultimately form the factual predicate for plaintiff's theories of recovery. Second, when NMMC personnel traveled into Alabama in an...