Morgan v. Ocean Warrior Fisheries, LLC
| Decision Date | 04 May 2021 |
| Docket Number | 1:20-cv-00069-JDL |
| Citation | 537 F.Supp.3d 30 |
| Parties | Randy MORGAN, Plaintiff, v. OCEAN WARRIOR FISHERIES, LLC, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Maine |
Stephen W. Koerting, Kelly, Remmel & Zimmerman, Portland, ME, for Plaintiff.
Joshua A. Randlett, Brent A. Singer, Rudman & Winchell, Bangor, ME, for Defendants.
ORDER ON PLAINTIFF'S OBJECTION TO MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER ON PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR EXPEDITED TRIAL ON CLAIM FOR MAINTENANCE AND CURE
Plaintiff Randy Morgan brings this maritime personal injury action against defendants Ocean Warrior Fisheries, LLC; Lighthouse Lobster & Bait, LLC; and David Pottle for alleged injuries Morgan suffered aboard the commercial fishing vessel Ocean Warrior ("the Vessel") (ECF No. 1). On May 29, 2020, Morgan moved that three of his claims—all of which are related to his demand for maintenance and cure—be bifurcated and tried expeditiously to the bench (ECF No. 14). Magistrate Judge John H. Rich III issued a memorandum decision and order denying Morgan's motion (ECF No. 32), and Morgan subsequently filed an objection to that order (ECF No. 34). I held a hearing on the objection on March 9, 2021. For the reasons that follow, I deny Morgan's objection.
Morgan's complaint alleges that on August 30, 2019 he was working aboard the Vessel loading and unloading equipment, bait, and the Vessel's catch when a crane containing twenty to thirty unsecured lobster crates collapsed onto him. Morgan claims that he suffered a fractured and crushed C-2 vertebra; a torn rotator cuff in his left shoulder; nerve damage; and other neck, arm, and musculoskeletal injuries
as a result. Morgan further alleges that Defendants Pottle and Ocean Warrior Fisheries (together, the "Vessel Owners") have refused to pay him maintenance and cure1 without a legal or factual basis, obliging Morgan to retain counsel and file suit.
Morgan filed a six-count complaint on March 2, 2020. Counts One and Two allege Jones Act negligence and unseaworthiness, respectively, against the Vessel Owners. Count Three is a maritime tort claim against Defendant Lighthouse Lobster & Bait, LLC. Counts Four through Six are claims against the Vessel Owners for maintenance and cure, wrongful withholding of maintenance and cure, and punitive damages as a result of the refusal to pay maintenance and cure, respectively (together, "the maintenance and cure claims"). Morgan's complaint contains a jury trial demand for all six counts.
On May 29, 2020, Morgan filed a motion for an expedited bench trial on the maintenance and cure claims, which at that time allegedly totaled $19,383 for maintenance (plus $497 per week going forward) and $41,730.53 in medical bills and expenses, with additional bills and expenses expected to accumulate. He contends that immediate payment of maintenance and cure is necessary to allow him to obtain medical treatment and reach maximum medical improvement.
The Magistrate Judge denied Morgan's motion for two reasons. First, he concluded that "the requested severance would not preserve the defendants’ right to a jury trial on the maintenance and cure claims." ECF No. 32 at 1. Next, he found that severance "would not promote judicial economy." Id. Morgan objects to both of the Magistrate Judge's conclusions.
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(a), a party may serve and file an objection to a nondispositive order of a magistrate judge within fourteen days of being served with a copy of the order. Doyle v. Municipality of Scarborough , No. 2:19-CV-00469-JDL, 2020 WL 4332998, at *1 (D. Me. July 27, 2020) (citing Patton v. Johnson , 915 F.3d 827, 832-33 (1st Cir. 2019) ). In re IDC Clambakes, Inc. , 727 F.3d 58, 64 (1st Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
A court's decision to bifurcate pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 42(b) is subject to a "limited standard of review." Gonzalez-Marin v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y of U.S. , 845 F.2d 1140, 1145 (1st Cir. 1988). Because "[a] Rule 42(b) motion is a matter peculiarly within the discretion of the trial court," a reviewing court will reverse a decision for failure to bifurcate only for abuse of discretion. Id.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 42(b) instructs a court "ordering a separate trial" to "preserve any federal right to a jury trial." Meanwhile, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 38(b) provides that "[t]he right of trial by jury as declared by the Seventh Amendment to the Constitution—or as provided by a federal statute—is preserved to the parties inviolate." As the First Circuit has explained, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 38(b) allows "[a]ny party [to] preserve its right to a jury by making a timely demand for a jury trial," and once the demand is made, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 38(d) and 39(a) require both parties to consent before that demand "can be withdrawn." Concordia Co. v. Panek , 115 F.3d 67, 69 (1st Cir. 1997) (emphasis omitted).
The Magistrate Judge concluded that "the [P]laintiff is entitled to a trial by jury pursuant to statute" and cited the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C.A. § 30104 (West 2021). ECF No. 32 at 6. He further determined—based on Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 38 and 39 —that this right to a jury trial extended to the Defendants. Accordingly, because Morgan made a demand for a jury trial on all claims—and because the Defendants have not consented to a withdrawal of that demand—the Magistrate Judge determined that he could not order a separate trial on the maintenance and cure claims, as doing so would "run afoul of the [D]efendants’ right to a jury trial." Id. at 7.
While "[g]enerally, there is no constitutional right to jury trial for admiralty claims," Panek , 115 F.3d at 70 (citing Fitzgerald v. U.S. Lines Co. , 374 U.S. 16, 19, 83 S.Ct. 1646, 10 L.Ed.2d 720 (1963) ), the Jones Act allows seamen injured in the course of their employment to "bring a civil action at law, with the right of trial by jury, against the employer," 46 U.S.C.A. § 30104. A claim for Jones Act negligence, however, is a "separate and distinct cause[ ] of action" from a claim for maintenance and cure, Ferrara v. A. & V. Fishing, Inc. , 99 F.3d 449, 452 (1st Cir. 1996), which as a traditional admiralty remedy does not carry a right to a jury trial, Fitzgerald , 374 U.S. at 17, 83 S.Ct. 1646.
In Fitzgerald , the United States Supreme Court held that "a maintenance and cure claim joined with a Jones Act claim must be submitted to the jury when both arise out of one set of facts." 374 U.S. at 21, 83 S.Ct. 1646. However, the Court also noted that "the Seventh Amendment does not require jury trials in admiralty cases." Id. at 20, 83 S.Ct. 1646. Moreover, the Jones Act itself does not create a right to a jury trial in traditional admiralty claims such as claims for maintenance and cure. See 46 U.S.C.A. § 30104 ; Ferrara , 99 F.3d at 452 (). The Court's holding in Fitzgerald was driven by its "responsibility for fashioning the controlling rules of admiralty law," and by its recognition that trying related claims to separate fact-finders is "so cumbersome, confusing, and time consuming that it places completely unnecessary obstacles in the paths of litigants seeking justice in our courts." 374 U.S. at 20-21, 83 S.Ct. 1646.
While in Fitzgerald the Supreme Court ruled that "plaintiffs who assert both a Jones Act claim ... and closely related admiralty claims for ... maintenance and cure are entitled to a jury trial on both kinds of claims," Panek , 115 F.3d at 70, it did not conclude that there is a statutory or constitutional right to a jury trial in maintenance and cure cases. Rather, it drew its holding from its inherent responsibility to create the rules of admiralty law, and from its concern for judicial economy and reducing confusion for litigants. Meanwhile, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 38 —which is titled "Right to a Jury Trial; Demand"—specifically preserves the right to a jury trial to all parties "as declared by the Seventh Amendment to the Constitution" or "as provided by a federal statute." Fed. R. Civ. P. 38(a). Because there is no constitutional or statutory right to a jury trial on a claim for maintenance and cure, I conclude that Morgan's initial demand for a jury trial on the maintenance and cure claims does not entitle the Defendants to a jury trial on those claims. While Fitzgerald entitles Morgan to have his maintenance and cure claims heard by a jury alongside his Jones Act claims, neither federal statute nor the Constitution extend that right to the Defendants.
Accordingly, because the Defendants do not have a statutory or constitutional right to have this case tried to a jury, their consent is not required for Morgan to withdraw his jury trial demand. See FN Herstal SA v. Clyde Armory Inc. , 838 F.3d 1071, 1089 (11th Cir. 2016) (); Kramer v. Banc of America Sec., LLC , 355 F.3d 961, 968 (7th Cir. 2004) ; United States v. Keller , 142 F.3d 718, 722 (4th Cir. 1998).
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