Morgan v. Reel
| Decision Date | 30 October 1905 |
| Docket Number | 100 |
| Citation | 62 A. 253,213 Pa. 81 |
| Parties | Morgan v. Reel, Appellant |
| Court | Pennsylvania Supreme Court |
Argued May 23, 1905
Reargued October 9, 1905
Appeal, No. 100, Oct. T., 1905, by defendants, from decree of C.P. No. 2, Allegheny Co., April T., 1905, No. 186, on bill in equity in case of James W. Morgan v. Mary Olive Morgan Reel et al. Affirmed.
Bill in equity for partition.
The case was heard by OVER, J., a judge of the orphans' court of Allegheny county, specially presiding at the request of the judges of the common pleas under the provisions of the act of April 18, 1905.
From the record it appeared that on March 24, 1870, Conrad Reel died seized in fee-simple of certain real estate, and that on May 31, 1886, his widow died seized also of certain real estate in her own right. They left to survive them as heirs at law four children, Jacob G. Reel, Annie E. McGuire, John A. Reel and William H. Reel. John A. Reel died on January 24 1893, leaving to survive him, as his heirs at law, a widow and seven children, all named as defendants in the bill. William H. Reel died on May 26, 1901, intestate, seized of the undivided one-fourth of the real estate of his father and mother. He left to survive him as his heirs at law, a widow Catherine T. Reel, and two daughters, Stella C. Reel and Catherine Pauline Matthews, and two grandchildren, James W Morgan and Mary Olive Morgan. These two grandchildren were the children of William H. Reel's deceased daughter, Rosanna C. Morgan. On November 14, 1885, William H. Reel and his wife, Catherine T. Reel, by proper proceedings in the court of common pleas No. 1, at No. 578, December Term, 1885, adopted his said granddaughter, Mary Olive Morgan, under the name of Mary Olive Reel, she being then a minor about four years old. James W. Morgan filed this bill for the partition of the lands of his grandfather, Conrad Reel, and his grandmother, Rosanna Reel.
The court held that Mary Olive Reel, who was named as one of the defendants, was entitled only to a child's share of the estate of her adopted father, and was not entitled to share with her brother in the portion which their deceased mother would have taken if she had lived. The court also decided that Judge OVER had a right to hear the case.
Error assigned was the decree of the court.
Decree affirmed.
George H. Quaill, for appellant. -- The act of assembly under which the judge held court and exercised judicial functions in this case is unconstitutional.
Under our statutes of adoption and inheritance, when a person adopts his own grandchild, the minor child of his deceased daughter, the grandchild thus adopted shares in his estate, in case of intestacy, in the dual capacity of adopted child and grandchild: Clarkson v. Hatton, 143 Mo. 47 (44 S.W. Repr. 761); Com. v. Powel, 16 W.N.C. 297; Daisey's Est., 15 W.N.C. 403; Rowan's Estate, 132 Pa. 299; Wagner v. Varner, 50 Iowa 532.
In the absence of a statute to the contrary, an adopted child may inherit both from its adoptive parent and from or through its natural parent: Humphries v. Davis, 100 Ind. 274; Clarkson v. Hatton, 143 Mo. 47 (44 S.W. Repr. 761); Wagner v. Varner, 50 Iowa 532.
William H. McClung, with him Thomas D. Chantler and William M. McGill, for appellee. -- Express power is given to the legislature to enlarge or curtail the jurisdiction of the different courts established by the constitution: Com. v. Green, 58 Pa. 226; Com. v. Zephon, 8 W. & S. 382; Kilpatrick v. Com. 31 Pa. 198; Application of the President Judges, 64 Pa. 33.
The same person cannot, as to the legal descendants of his adopting parent, stand in the position of his son, and at the same time claim to inherit a portion of his property as his grandson: Delano v. Bruerton, 148 Mass. 619 (20 N.E. Repr. 308).
Before MITCHELL, C.J., FELL, BROWN, MESTREZAT, POTTER, ELKIN, and STEWART, JJ.
1. The important public question in this case is the constitutionality of the Act of April 18, 1905, P.L. 208, "to authorize the judges of separate orphans' courts to hear and determine proceedings in equity at the request of the judges of the common pleas." Section 1 provides that Other sections provide that the service shall not be compulsory on the judges of the orphans' court, and supply the necessary details for the working of the act.
A number of sections in the judiciary article of the constitution are referred to as being contravened by this act. Such as refer to the orphans' court may be dismissed without detailed notice. Notwithstanding the phraseology of the title and the first section that "the judges of the orphans' court are authorized," etc., the act has no bearing on the court itself. No interference or change is made in any way in the organization, jurisdiction, powers or practice of that court. There is merely a special grant of authority to the judges individually, not compulsory on them but to be exercised voluntarily under certain circumstances. The cases in which they sit by invitation remain in the common pleas where they were brought, and the records of the orphans' court take no notice of them. We must disregard, therefore, all suggestions of infringement on the constitutional province of the orphans' court.
Section 4 of art. V, the judiciary article of the constitution, provides that "until otherwise directed by law the courts of common pleas shall continue as at present established." This act is not an infringement of that section, for so far as it makes any change it is one "directed by law."
Section 6 directs that in Philadelphia and Allegheny counties each court "shall have exclusive jurisdiction of all proceedings at law and in equity commenced therein." There is no infringement of this provision, for as already said the common pleas retains the record and the jurisdiction of the cases and whatever is done by the special judge is done in that court.
The same consideration answers the citation of section 26 of the judiciary article prohibiting the creation of other courts "to exercise the powers vested by this constitution in the judges of the courts of common pleas and orphans' courts." No other or new court is created by the act.
Stress was laid in the argument on section 20 of the judiciary article that "the several courts of common pleas, besides the powers herein conferred, shall have and exercise, within their respective districts, subject to such changes as may be made by law, such chancery powers as are now vested by law in the several courts of common pleas of this commonwealth or as may hereafter be conferred upon them by law." But it is not apparent how the act contravenes this section. It takes away no jurisdiction from the common pleas, nor vests any in the orphans' court, and if it did either or both, it would be within the proviso "subject to such changes as may be made by law." Indeed, the act may be wholly justified and sustained upon the equity feature of it. Subject to the constitutional guarantee of trial by jury, the jurisdiction, powers, practice and procedure in equity are inherently matters of legislative control, and are expressly recognized as such in the section quoted of the judiciary article. It is conceded that the legislature might confer a general jurisdiction in equity, concurrent with the common pleas, upon the orphans' courts. And if it might do so in general, as a whole, it is certain that it could do the same pro tanto as to cases it thought proper. As already shown no such change of jurisdiction in either court is in fact made by the act, though it might have been. But a settled and unquestionable part of the procedure in equity from its earliest days is the authority of the chancellor to avail himself of the assistance of examiners, masters and other quasi judicial officers in the disposition of cases pending before him. Until quite recently that was the general practice in Pennsylvania, and for the taking of evidence, investigation of facts, and report upon the law, cases were sent ordinarily and regularly to such officers. Except for the general equity rules now in force the court of common pleas might have referred this case to the judge of the orphans' court, with his consent, as examiner and master, and what the court might have done by rule or order the legislature might do by statute. In substance it has done nothing more by this act. The case remains in the common pleas, and the decree is the decree of the common pleas, sitting in banc after hearing upon exceptions to the report of the judge who conducted the trial. Had this been an action at law with a charge to a jury a larger question would have arisen on the right of the judge to sit, which will be considered under the next head, but the act is confined to cases in equity and as to them is clearly within the constitutional powers of the legislature.
The last provision to be noticed, and the only one...
To continue reading
Request your trial