Morgan v. Sproat

• Citation: 432 F. Supp. 1130
• Decision Date: 18 April 1977
• Docket Number: Civ. A. No. J75-21(N).
• Parties: Kenneth MORGAN et al., Plaintiffs, v. Douglas SPROAT et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Mississippi

432 F. Supp. 1130

Kenneth MORGAN et al., Plaintiffs, v. Douglas SPROAT et al., Defendants.

Civ. A. No. J75-21(N).

United States District Court, S. D. Mississippi, Jackson Division.

April 18, 1977.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Barry H. Powell, Charles H. Ramberg, Jackson, Miss., for plaintiffs.

P. Roger Googe, Jr., Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., Jackson, Miss., for defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

NIXON, District Judge.

This case challenges the conditions of confinement at the Oakley Training School (hereafter OTS), a state institution for delinquent boys, located near Raymond, Mississippi. The case arises under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the United States Constitution. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1343.

At the time of the filing of his complaint, the named plaintiff, Kenneth Morgan, was 16 years old and was confined under an order of the Chancery Court of Rankin County, Mississippi finding him to be delinquent. On April 1, 1975, the Court certified the case as a class action under Rule 23(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The class consists of all present and future students confined at OTS, which at the time of filing consisted of approximately 350 boys between the age of 15 and 20. Defendants, who are sued in their individual and official capacities, are the Superintendent and two Assistant Superintendents of OTS, the Director of the Mississippi Department of Youth Services, and the five members of the Board of Trustees of the Department of Youth Services.

This cause was submitted for decision on the basis of an agreed record consisting of the depositions of a number of expert witnesses,¹ the pretrial order and numerous other depositions and exhibits introduced by the parties.²

On November 22, 1975, the Court entered an agreed Order relating to plaintiffs' claims that the discipline procedures at OTS violate the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Under the Order, defendants agreed to provide procedural safeguards, including prior notice and an impartial evidentiary hearing, to all OTS students who are accused of violating the school's rules and regulations. Defendants have also promulgated a new code of rules governing student conduct, approved by the plaintiffs, and adopted by Order of this Court on November 26, 1976. The effect of these Orders is to remove from consideration at this time plaintiffs' claims involving the constitutionality of the rules and regulations which govern student conduct at OTS.

Before reaching the specific claims made by plaintiffs, we will describe the Mississippi juvenile justice system under which plaintiff and the members of his class have been committed to OTS, and will discuss the two principal legal theories under which plaintiffs attack the conditions at OTS.

I. THE MISSISSIPPI JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM.

Under the Mississippi Youth Court Act, Miss.Code Ann. §§ 43-21-1, et seq.,³ any child between ten and eighteen years of age may be adjudicated a delinquent upon the petition of "a reputable person." § 43-21-11. A delinquent child is defined as any child "whose occupation, behavior, environment or associations are injurious to his welfare or the welfare of other children," and includes children who have run away from home, who are "habitually disobedient to or beyond the control" of their parents, who violate school rules or are willfully truant, or who deport themselves so as to injure or endanger the morals or health of themselves or any other person. § 43-21-5. The conduct for which juveniles may be incarcerated need not constitute a violation of any of the state's criminal laws.

After a delinquency petition is filed, a hearing is held before the Youth Court. The hearing is not a criminal proceeding but is "of a civil nature concerned with the care, protection, and rehabilitation of the child in question. . . ." § 43-21-17. The rules of evidence are not applicable, except as required by "applicable constitutional standards." Id. The juvenile is not entitled to a jury, and the hearing is not open to the public. Id. Finally, in addition to the juvenile and his or her parent or guardian, any other person who is interested in the case may appear and be represented by counsel. Id.

After the hearing, the Youth Court may enter an order adjudicating the juvenile a delinquent child. The order may not recite any of the facts or circumstances upon which the adjudication is based, and it may not recite that the child has been found guilty of any offense. § 43-21-19. The adjudication does not impose the civil disabilities ordinarily imposed for criminal convictions, and the child may not be deemed a criminal by reason of the adjudication. Id.

Any child between the ages of 10 and 18 who is adjudicated a delinquent may be committed by the Youth Court to the custody of a state-supported training school, which may retain custody of the child until he or she reaches the age of 20. However, the superintendent of the training school may parole the child "at any time he may deem it to be to the best interest and welfare" of the child. § 43-21-19.

Just as Youth Court hearings are not criminal, the purposes of juvenile incarceration under Mississippi law are therapeutic, not punitive. Thus, the State Department of Youth Services, which operates the state's training schools, is authorized

to develop and implement diversified programs and facilities to promote, enhance, provide and assure the opportunities for the successful care and treatment of delinquent children . . .

§ 43-27-10(d); and the training schools are to be operated so as

to properly diagnose, care for, train, educate and rehabilitate children and youth . . ., being careful to employ no discipline, training or utilization of time and efforts of such youth that shall under any condition or in any way interfere with such rehabilitation and reformation objectives.

§ 43-27-22(b)(1) and (2).⁴

II. THE JUVENILE'S RIGHT TO TREATMENT AND TO BE FREE FROM CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT.

In addition to their rights under Mississippi law, juveniles who are involuntarily committed to the Oakley Training School have a constitutional right to individualized care and treatment to enable them to become productive members of society. This right is supported by two equally sound theories.

First, where, as in Mississippi, the purpose of incarcerating juveniles in a state training school is treatment and rehabilitation, due process requires that the conditions and programs at the school must be reasonably related to that purpose. The Supreme Court made this clear in Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 92 S.Ct. 1845, 32 L.Ed.2d 435 (1972), where the Court held that a mental retardate committed to a state mental institution as incompetent to stand trial could not be confined indefinitely without treatment for his condition:

At the least, due process requires that the nature and duration of commitment bear some reasonable relation to the purpose for which the individual is committed.

406 U.S. at 738, 92 S.Ct. at 1858. More recently, in Morales v. Turman, 383 F.Supp. 53 (E.D.Tex.1974), rev'd on other grounds, 535 F.2d 864 (5th Cir. 1976),⁵ a case involving the incarceration of juvenile delinquents, the court stated:

This basis for commitment — to rehabilitate and re-establish the juvenile in society —is clearly grounded in a parens patriae rationale. Thus, under the parens patriae theory, the juvenile must be given treatment lest the involuntary commitment amount to an arbitrary exercise of governmental power proscribed by the due process clause.

383 F.Supp. at 71. Similarly, in Martarella v. Kelley, 349 F.Supp. 575 (S.D.N.Y.1972), the court stated, "Where the State, as parens patriae, imposes such detention, it can meet the Constitution's requirement of due process and prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment if, and only if, it furnishes adequate treatment to the detainee." 349 F.Supp. at 585. See also Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305, 1312-1313 (5th Cir. 1974); Pena v. New York State Division for Youth, 419 F.Supp. 203 (S.D.N.Y.1976); Welsch v. Likins, 373 F.Supp. 487, 496-497 (D.Minn. 1974).

Second, the State of Mississippi incarcerates juveniles without affording the full panoply of due process safeguards for delinquency adjudication hearings as are provided for adult criminal offenders. Miss.Code Ann. §§ 43-21-5, -17, -19. This denial of due process safeguards would be constitutionally impermissible unless the incarceration of juveniles serves beneficent, rather than punitive, purposes. See McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 547, 91 S.Ct. 1976, 29 L.Ed.2d 647 (1971).

For these reasons, the courts have held that due process requires that the incarceration of juveniles be for rehabilitation and treatment. For example, in Nelson v. Heyne, 355 F.Supp. 451 (N.D.Ind.1972), aff'd, 491 F.2d 352 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 976, 94 S.Ct. 3183, 41 L.Ed.2d 1146 (1974), the court reviewed the decisions of the Supreme Court which have delineated the procedural rights of juvenile offenders and concluded:

The procedural rights now accorded a juvenile are patterned in large part by their impact upon the parens patriae underpinning of the juvenile justice system. The Court has sought to balance the juvenile's procedural rights against the dictates of regenerative treatment, and where the asserted procedural right impinges upon the basic and unique premises of the juvenile system, the right is denied. In effect, the juvenile offender is not fully protected by all of those rights secured to an adult, and the measure of the juvenile's protection is in large part determined by treatment interests.

355 F.Supp. at 459 (citation omitted). And in Morales, supra, the court similarly stated:

The three central limitations on the government's power to detain are: (1) that detention be retribution for a specific offense; (2) that it be limited to a fixed term; and (3) that it be

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