Morgan v. Stanley Works

• Decision Date: 16 September 1988
• Docket Number: No. 87-1865,87-1865
• Citation: Morgan v. Stanley Works, 857 F.2d 1475, 1988 WL 96582 (6th Cir. 1988)
• Parties: Unpublished Disposition NOTICE: Sixth Circuit Rule 24(c) states that citation of unpublished dispositions is disfavored except for establishing res judicata, estoppel, or the law of the case and requires service of copies of cited unpublished dispositions of the Sixth Circuit. Coy A. MORGAN, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. The STANLEY WORKS, a foreign corporation, and Stanley Magic-Door Systems, Inc., a foreign corporation, Defendants-Appellants.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit

Page 1475

857 F.2d 1475

Unpublished Disposition

NOTICE: Sixth Circuit Rule 24(c) states that citation of unpublished dispositions is disfavored except for establishing res judicata, estoppel, or the law of the case and requires service of copies of cited unpublished dispositions of the Sixth Circuit.

Coy A. MORGAN, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. The STANLEY WORKS, a foreign corporation, and Stanley Magic-Door Systems, Inc., a foreign corporation Defendants-Appellants.

No. 87-1865.

United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit.

Sept. 16, 1988.

Before ENGEL, Chief Circuit Judge, MILBURN, Circuit Judge, and DAVID D. DOWD, Jr., District Judge ^*.

PER CURIAM.

Defendants-appellants The Stanley Works and Stanley Magic-Door Systems, Inc. ("defendants") appeal the judgment of the district court denying defendants' motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV), for a new trial, or to alter or amend the jury verdict in favor of plaintiff-appellee Coy A. Morgan ("plaintiff") in this age discrimination and breach of contract action under the Michigan Elliott-Larsen Act, Mich.Comp.Laws Ann. Sec. 37.2101 et seq., and under Michigan employment contract law. No cause of action under federal law has been alleged by plaintiff. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the judgment of the district court.

I.

In this diversity action, plaintiff filed a complaint against defendants on November 7, 1985, alleging that defendants discriminated against plaintiff because of his age in violation of the Michigan Elliott-Larsen Act, Mich.Comp.Laws Ann. Sec. 37.2202(1)(a). ¹ Plaintiff was employed with defendants in the parking division of defendants' Madison Heights, Michigan, plant but was terminated on September 30, 1984, when defendants closed the Madison Heights facility and transferred the work from that plant to another plant in Hartford, Connecticut. Thereafter, on August 8, 1986, plaintiff filed an amended complaint adding a second count, alleging that plaintiff's termination was also in breach of an employment contract between the parties. Plaintiff alleged that this oral employment contract was breached by defendants when he was terminated without cause on September 30, 1984.

When trial began on April 28, 1987, defendants moved in limine for the exclusion of testimony regarding statements made by plaintiff's former supervisor, James Martin. Defendants sought to exclude these statements on the ground that Martin died in July 1985, and, therefore, under Michigan's dead man's statute, Mich.Comp.Laws Ann. Sec. 600.2166, the statements were inadmissible. ² The district court, however, admitted this testimony, reasoning that Michigan's dead man's statute had been superseded by the Michigan Rules of Evidence.

By special interrogatory, the jury found that there was an implied employment contract providing that plaintiff's employment was terminable only for just cause and, further, that plaintiff was terminated without just cause. The jury also found that defendants discriminated against plaintiff because of his age and, accordingly, awarded the plaintiff $407,100.00 as past and future earnings and benefits lost as a result of defendants' breach of the employment contract and age discrimination, as well as $50,000.00 for mental anxiety and emotional distress on the age discrimination claim. On May 8, 1987, the district court entered judgment on the jury's verdict.

On May 20, 1987, defendants moved for JNOV, for a new trial, or to alter and amend the judgment of the district court, but on August 26, 1987, the district court entered its judgment denying defendants' motion. The district court reasoned that as to plaintiff's age claim, plaintiff presented sufficient evidence at trial to raise a factual issue whether he was discriminated against because of his age. As to the implied contract claim, the district court held that the evidence presented was also sufficient to raise a factual issue whether plaintiff was under an implied contract only to be terminated for just cause, and as to whether plaintiff was actually terminated without cause. Finally, the court rejected defendants' argument that it erroneously instructed the jury and also denied defendants' request for reduction of the jury's damage award. The defendants' timely appeal followed.

II.

A.

"[T]he Sixth Circuit [adheres] to the minority rule that in federal court diversity cases state law governs the standard for granting directed verdict and judgment notwithstanding the verdict motions." Lewis Refrigeration Co. v. Sawyer Fruit, Vegetable & Cold Storage Co., 709 F.2d 427, 430 n. 3 (6th Cir.1983). See also Fitzgerald v. Great Central Ins. Co., 842 F.2d 157, 159 (6th Cir.1988); Moran v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 691 F.2d 811, 813 (6th Cir.1982); Warkentien v. Vondracek, 633 F.2d 1, 6 (6th Cir.1980).

In Matras v. Amoco Oil Co., 424 Mich. 675, 385 N.W.2d 586 (1986), the Supreme Court of Michigan has explained the standard under Michigan law for a review of a motion for JNOV as follows:

In reviewing a trial court's failure to grant a defendant's motion for ... a judgment notwithstanding the verdict, we examine the testimony and all legitimate inferences that may be drawn in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. If reasonable jurors could honestly have reached different conclusions, the motion should have been denied. If reasonable jurors could disagree, neither the trial court nor this Court has the authority to substitute its judgment for that of the jury.

Id. at ----, 385 N.W.2d at 588 (footnotes omitted). Thus, under Michigan law, this court's review "is limited ... to the question of whether the party opposing the motion offered evidence about which reasonable minds could differ." Dabrowski v. Warner-Lambert Co., 815 F.2d 1076, 1078 (6th Cir.1987) (quoting Perry v. Hazel Park Harness Raceway, 123 Mich.App. 542, 332 N.W.2d 601 (1983)).

B.

Defendants assert that the court erred in denying defendants' motion for JNOV because plaintiff failed to produce sufficient evidence from which a jury could reasonably disagree as to whether age was a determining factor in plaintiff's termination. In Matras, supra, the Supreme Court of Michigan discussed the burden of proof for an age discrimination claimant, concluding that a plaintiff must "present[] evidence 'which, when viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, would permit a reasonable jury to find that he was discharged because of his age.' " 424 Mich. at ----, 385 N.W.2d at 589 (quoting LaGrant v. Gulf & Western Mfg. Co., 748 F.2d 1087, 1090 (6th Cir.1984)). The court noted that an age discrimination plaintiff must only show that age was a factor which affected his termination "even if age was not the sole factor." Id.

"[A]ge does not have to be the only reason, or even the main reason, but it does have to be one of the reasons which made a difference in determining whether or not [to discharge] the plaintiff." Another formulation would be that age is a determining factor when the unlawful adverse action would not have occurred without age discrimination. Alternative expressions of the determining factor concept are "but for causation" or "causation in fact."

Id. (quoting Mich. Standard Jury Instructions 2d Sec. 1502) (emphasis supplied and footnotes omitted). The court also explained that where employees are terminated in the context of a work force reduction, the burden of proof requirements articulated in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), are inapplicable.

To establish a prima facie case of age discrimination when an employer lays off employees for economic reasons, the courts have required the employee to present sufficient evidence on the ultimate question--whether age was a determining factor in the decision to discharge the older protected employee. Accordingly ... the McDonnell Douglas prima facie case approach folds into the traditional directed verdict/judgment notwithstanding the verdict standard.

Matras, 424 Mich. at ----, 385 N.W.2d at 590 (footnote omitted).

This court recently analyzed the Matras opinion in Dabrowski, supra, wherein we noted that under the Michigan Act, "[e]vidence that a competent older employee was terminated, and the younger employee was retained, is insufficient standing alone to establish a prima facie case when the employer reduces his workforce because of economic necessity." 815 F.2d at 1079 (quoting Matras, 424 Mich. at ----, 385 N.W.2d at 590). We further noted:

The recent decision of the Michigan Supreme Court in Matras teaches that where a company is in the process of restructuring its work force because of economic problems, an unsuccessful older employee who brings suit for age discrimination must show more than a mere age difference between himself and those employees who better weather the storm.

Id. at 1080 (emphasis supplied). Thus, under the Michigan Act, an age discrimination plaintiff in a reduction-in-force case must come forward with evidence on the ultimate question of whether age was a reason which made a difference in his termination. "Age discrimination 'may of course be proved under ordinary principles of proof by any direct or indirect evidence relevant to and sufficiently probative of the issue ... without resort to any special judicially created presumptions or inferences related to the evidence.' " Matras, 424 Mich. at ----, 385 N.W. at 589 (quoting Lovelace v. Sherwin-Williams Co., 681 F.2d 230, 239 (4th Cir.1981)).

Plaintiff in the present case presented essentially three types of evidence regarding age discrimination. First, evidence was presented as to statements of plaintiff's supervisor regarding the company's efforts to hire a younger individual for plaintiff's position in the Connecticut plant who could make a "long-term commitment" to the company. Plaintiff testified that James Martin, the then-plant supervisor at Madison Heights, called plaintiff into his office and informed him that a final decision...