Morgan v. State

• Decision Date: 02 July 1997
• Citation: Morgan v. State, 90 N.Y.2d 471, 662 N.Y.S.2d 421, 685 N.E.2d 202 (N.Y. 1997)
• Parties: , 685 N.E.2d 202 Sean MORGAN et al., Appellants, v. STATE of New York, Respondent. Robert BECK et al., Appellants, v. Lenny SCIMECA, Doing Business as Hwrang-Do Center--Long Island Hwa Rang Do Karate Academy, Respondent. Alison CHIMERINE, Appellant, v. WORLD CHAMPION JOHN CHUNG TAE KWON DO INSTITUTE et al., Respondents. Sheldon SIEGEL et al., Appellants, v. CITY OF NEW YORK et al., Respondents.
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

Page 421

662 N.Y.S.2d 421

90 N.Y.2d 471, 685 N.E.2d 202

Sean MORGAN et al., Appellants, v.STATE of New York, Respondent.

Robert BECK et al., Appellants, v.Lenny SCIMECA, Doing Business as Hwrang-Do Center--Long

Island Hwa Rang Do Karate Academy, Respondent.

Alison CHIMERINE, Appellant, v.WORLD CHAMPION JOHN CHUNG TAE KWON DO INSTITUTE et al., Respondents.

Sheldon SIEGEL et al., Appellants, v.CITY OF NEW YORK et al., Respondents.

Court of Appeals of New York.

July 2, 1997.

McPhillips, Fitzgerald & Meyer, L.L.P., Glen Falls (Joseph R. Brennan, of counsel), for appellants in the first above-entitled action.

Dennis C. Vacco, Attorney General, Albany (Frank K. Walsh, Barbara G. Billet and Peter H. Schiff, of counsel), for respondent in the first above-entitled action.

Gregory V. Bitterman, New York City, for appellants in second above-entitled action.

Chesney, Murphy & Moran, Baldwin (Sarah A. Jarosak and James K. O'Sullivan, of counsel), for respondent in the second above-entitled action.

DiJoseph, Portegello & Schuster, New York City (Arnold E. DiJoseph, III, of counsel), and Cardali & Cardali, P.C., for appellant in third above-entitled action.

Chesney, Murphy & Moran, Baldwin (Sarah A. Jarosak, James K. O'Sullivan and Thomas J. Dargan, of counsel), for respondents in the third above-entitled action.

Profeta & Eisenstein, New York City (Fred R. Profeta, Jr., of counsel), and Babitch & Babitch, for appellants in the fourth above-entitled action.

Feder, Connick & Goldstein, P.C., Mineola (Steven F. Goldstein and Morton H. Feder, of counsel), for respondents in the fourth above-entitled action.

OPINION OF THE COURT

BELLACOSA, Judge.

The common question, with factual and legally nuanced variations among the four cases, centers on the duty of care owed by an owner or operator of an athletic facility to participants who are injured on premises while engaged in voluntary sports activities.Each case is before us by leave to appeal granted to the respective plaintiffs by this Court.We agree with the Appellate Division that the defendants in the Morgan, Beck and Chimerine cases owed the respective plaintiff athletes in those cases no duty of care, because the injured parties there assumed inherent risks as part of their particular participatory activities under their pertinent fact patterns.We thus affirm the orders in those cases.On the other hand, we reverse the order in the Siegel case because a distinctive, separate duty continues to be operative, precluding a grant of summary judgment to defendants in that case.

Morgan v. State of New York

Claimant sustained severe physical injuries from an accident which occurred as he was driving a two-person bobsled during a national championship race at the Mt. Van Hoevenberg Bobsled Run in the Town of North Elba near Lake Placid in 1986.Morgan was an experienced amateur bobsledder who had competed in the Olympic Games and had been bobsledding at Mt. Van Hoevenberg for over 20 years prior to the accident.Morgan and his teammate, who handled the brake, completed their first run down the course uneventfully.At the start of the second run, the bobsled tipped over due to a steering error by Morgan.As a result, the teammate fell out, leaving Morgan alone in the sled as it slid down the course on its side.Morgan managed to negotiate the course despite the sled's instability, which was due, in part, to the loss of weight in the rear.The sled was righted by the time it crossed the finish line, but Morgan was unable to reach the brakes or otherwise slow the rate of speed.This caused the sled to ride up onto the left wall of the exit run, where it ran through a 20-foot opening in the wall and crashed into a concrete abutment at the far end of the opening.

At the time of the accident, the Mt. Hoevenberg course was the only bobsled run in North America.It was originally constructed in 1932.In 1979, in preparation for the 1980 Lake Placid Olympic Games, the course was renovated.The reconstruction was overseen and approved by the Federatione Internationale de Bobsleigh et de Tobaganning (FIBT), the organization regulating the sport.The course changes included refrigeration and recasting the formerly wood and ground stone track with concrete.

The exit chute of the track where Morgan's crash occurred was also substantially modified.Prior to the reconstruction, the course was configured so that a bobsled would cross the finish line and then enter a five-foot wide chute about 80 yards in length.That began at a level area just past the finish line, which gained elevation in order to slow the sleds.The three-to-four-foot high wooden walls of the chute were continuous with no openings.Bobsleds emerged from the chute into an open snow-covered area and once stopped would be pulled onto a loading ramp, placed on a truck and taken back to the top of the run.

As part of the reconstruction, a new, longer, exit chute with concrete walls was built.Past the finish line, the sleds would traverse a short, level chute, proceed up a snow-covered hill, traverse another flat area, and then, if necessary, proceed up a second hill.On the flat stretch between the first and second upgrades, a 20-foot opening was created in the left concrete wall.Bales of hay were placed on both sides of the concrete abutments framing the opening to provide protection to any sled which happened to come into contact with the wall.The placement of this opening in the chute was to facilitate the rapid removal of the sleds during competition, as required by the FIBT.At the conclusion of an ordinary competitive run, a bobsled was supposed to stop by the time it reached the opening and would be removed.

Morgan sued in the Court of Claims.He claimed that the negligent design of the opening in the exit ramp was the proximate cause of his injuries.DefendantState of New York owns and operates the Mt. Van Hoevenberg Run through its Department of Environmental Conservation and the Olympic Regional Development Authority.The State asserted that Morgan had assumed the risks inherent in the dangerous bobsledding sport activity and was himself the proximate cause of the accident by his mishandling of the sled.

The Court of Claims, after trial, held that the State was liable for Morgan's injuries and ordered a trial on damages (162 Misc.2d 984, 618 N.Y.S.2d 967).The Appellate Division modified on the law and facts and dismissed the claim (229 A.D.2d 737, 645 N.Y.S.2d 614).We affirm.

Beck v. Scimeca

This plaintiff was injured in 1992 while participating in a class at defendant's karate school.Thirty years old at the time of the accident, he had been a student at the school for approximately 15 months, attended classes two or three times a week and had achieved the level of orange belt.Beck was injured attempting to perform a "jump roll" tumbling technique over an obstacle.He had executed the tumble on prior occasions, but the obstacles had been set at a lower height than at the time of the accident and injury.

The defendant instructor-owner was present when class began but he left the classroom after awhile, as was his usual practice, and placed the highest-ranking student in charge.That student, who was 15 years old, raised the height of the obstacle.When plaintiff attempted a "jump roll,"he landed awkwardly and suffered a spinal injury.

Defendant moved for summary judgment to dismiss the ensuing action.Supreme Court granted the motion and the Appellate Division affirmed (229 A.D.2d 555, 646 N.Y.S.2d 283).We affirm.

Chimerine v World Champion John ChungTae Kwon Do Inst.

Plaintiff injured her knee in 1992 while attempting what is described as a "jumping" or "hopping" kick maneuver.The injury occurred during her fourth class at defendants' martial arts training school.She sued.Supreme Court granted defendants' motion to dismiss the complaint, and the Appellate Division affirmed (225 A.D.2d 323, 638 N.Y.S.2d 474).We affirm.

Siegel v. City of New York

This 60-year-old plaintiff was injured in 1992 when he tripped playing tennis at defendant Paerdegat Racquet Club in Brooklyn.DefendantCity of New York owns the premises and leases them to Paerdegat.During a game, Siegel snagged his foot in a torn vinyl hem at the bottom of a net dividing the indoor tennis courts.He had been a member of the club for 10 years and played doubles tennis there once a week.His deposition testimony showed that he had known for over two years that the side divider net was ripped and that although he had never informed Paerdegat's management of the problem, other club members had.

Defendants moved for summary judgment.Supreme Court granted the motion and dismissed the complaint.The court held that by electing to play tennis on a court inescapably known for a long time to have a torn net, Siegel assumed a known risk that rendered his lawsuit susceptible to a defense motion for summary judgment.The Appellate Division affirmed (230 A.D.2d 782, 646 N.Y.S.2d 380).We reverse.

I.

Plaintiffs-appellants in these factually discrete cases argue that the Appellate Division misapplied the assumption of risk doctrine and diminished the duty owed by owners and operators of sports facilities to voluntary participants in athletic activities.They assert that their opportunity for recovery upon plenary trials should not be barred by the assumption doctrine because the occurrences that are the proximate causes of their injuries are not "inherent" in the relevant sporting or recreational activity.Based upon their constricted interpretation of the risks that inhere in the various activities which caused their injuries, they build a theory that the assumption of risk doctrine should no longer apply to bar recoveries as a matter of law in these cases.We reject their arguments because they do not sufficiently credit the development of the assumption of risk doctrine, as more lately applied in this Court's precedents...