Morgan v. State

Docket Number23A-CR-260
Decision Date26 October 2023
PartiesDaniel Morgan, Appellant-Defendant, v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff.
CourtIndiana Appellate Court

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision is not binding precedent for any court and may be cited only for persuasive value or to establish res judicata, collateral estoppel, or law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT Valerie K. Boots Kelly Starling Marion County Public Defender Agency

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Theodore E. Rokita Attorney General of Indiana Samuel J. Dayton Deputy Attorney General

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Tavitas, Judge.

Case Summary

[¶1] Daniel Morgan was convicted of three counts of child molesting, one as a Level 1 felony and two as Level 4 felonies, and one count of child exploitation, a Level 5 felony. Morgan appeals and argues: (1) the trial court abused its discretion by admitting testimony regarding the transmission of the case from the investigating detective to the prosecutor's office; (2) the discrepancy between the trial court's oral sentencing statement and written sentencing order requires that we remand for correction of Morgan's sentence; and (3) Morgan's sentence is inappropriate.

[¶2] We agree that the discrepancy between the trial court's oral sentencing statement and written sentencing order requires that we remand for correction of Morgan's sentence; however, we find Morgan's remaining arguments without merit. Accordingly, we affirm and remand.

Issues

[¶3] Morgan raises three issues on appeal, which we restate as:

I. Whether the trial court abused its discretion by admitting testimony regarding the transmission of the case from the investigating detective to the prosecutor's office.
II. Whether the discrepancy between the trial court's oral sentencing statement and written sentencing order requires that we remand for correction of Morgan's sentence.
III. Whether Morgan's sentence is inappropriate.
Facts

[¶4] A.C. was born in 2011. Morgan is A.C.'s paternal great uncle, whom she referred to as "Uncle Dan." Tr. Vol. II p. 189. Mary Kay Morgan ("Mary Kay") is Morgan's wife and A.C.'s great aunt. Morgan and Mary Kay often took A.C. and her brother to sports games, hiking trips, and other activities, and the children would spend the night at the Morgans' house in an upstairs bedroom.

[¶5] At bedtime, Morgan and Mary Kay gave the children "back massages" before the children fell asleep. Id. at 191. When A.C. was six or seven years old, Morgan began to inappropriately touch A.C. while giving her back massages. Morgan would start by rubbing A.C.'s back, then "go down and touch [her] butt" over and under her pajamas. Id. at 196. Morgan would then "go back up and [] put his hand under [A.C.] and touch [her] chest and breasts." Id. at 197. After that, Morgan would have A.C. lay on her back, and Morgan would touch her breasts and "rub[]" her vagina over and under her pajamas with his fingers. Id. at 199. A.C. would cross her arms over herself, but Morgan would move her arms aside.

[¶6] Morgan inappropriately touched A.C. "every time she spent the night." Id. at 179. A.C. specifically recalled that Morgan touched "all of [her] privates" when she spent the night on New Year's Eve in 2020. Id. at 213. Morgan told A.C. not to tell anyone about the inappropriate touching because "no one would [] believe [her]." Tr. Vol. II p. 201. A.C. believed Morgan and did not immediately report the abuse. Id.

[¶7] Most of the time, Morgan's fingers stayed "on top of the line" of A.C.'s vagina. Id. at 200. On at least one occasion, however, Morgan's fingers "went inside the line" of A.C.'s vagina, which hurt A.C. Id. The next day, A.C. told her mother about the pain, and A.C.'s mother noticed "irritation on the inside" of A.C.'s vagina. Tr. Vol. III pp. 119, 121.

[¶8] Morgan engaged in additional inappropriate behavior with A.C. A.C. recalled that, one time at a museum, Morgan told A.C. that her "butt looked as nice as [her] face." Id. at 202. A.C. felt "weirded out" and went to find her brother and Mary Kay because she did not want to be around Morgan. Id. at 203.

[¶9] Additionally, one morning after A.C. spent the night at the Morgans' house, A.C. was changing out of her pajamas, and as she put her pants on, Morgan came into the room and "asked if he could take pictures" of A.C. Id. at 205. A.C. initially refused, and Morgan said, "Please." Id. A.C. complied because she was "scared" that if she refused, she would "get in trouble or hurt." Id. Morgan had A.C. lay on her back, told her to "open [her] legs," and took photographs of A.C.'s vagina with a black camera. Id. A.C. was age six or seven at the time. Id. at 228.

[¶10] In August 2021, when A.C. was nine years old, she told her teacher, "My Uncle Dan touches me." Id. at 208. A.C. then reported the abuse to her school guidance counselor, who contacted the Department of Child Services and A.C.'s mother. Several days later, A.C. participated in a forensic interview and described the abuse. In particular, A.C. reported that "the tip of [Morgan's] finger went in" her vagina. Tr. Vol. III p. 22.

[¶11] Law enforcement executed a search warrant and located a black camera in Morgan's house. On the camera, law enforcement recovered a deleted photograph of "a small child lying on her back with her legs spread and vagina exposed." Id. at 89.

[¶12] On September 24, 2021, the State charged Morgan with four counts: Count I, child molesting, a Level 1 felony; Counts II and III, child molesting, Level 4 felonies; and Count IV, child exploitation, a Level 5 felony.

[¶13] The trial court held a jury trial in November 2022. A.C. testified regarding the abuse, as did A.C.'s mother, teacher, guidance counselor, and forensic interviewer. A.C. further testified that she recognized the room in the photograph recovered from Morgan's camera as the bedroom where she slept in the Morgans' house.

[¶14] Additionally, Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Department Detective Daniel Henson testified that, after his investigation, he concluded that he had "probable cause" and "submitted the case for screening" at the prosecutor's office so the prosecutor could "make a decision" regarding whether to file charges. Tr. Vol. III p. 37. Morgan objected to this testimony, which the trial court overruled. Detective Henson then testified that he was not involved in the decision regarding whether to file charges.

[¶15] The jury found Morgan guilty of all four counts. The trial court held a sentencing hearing on January 20, 2023. Morgan took responsibility for his offenses and expressed remorse for the harm that he caused. In its oral sentencing statement, the trial court sentenced Morgan to concurrent sentences of: thirty years with five years suspended on Count I; seven years with three years suspended on Counts II and III; and six years on Count IV, for an aggregate sentence of thirty years with five years suspended. The trial court's written sentencing order reflects the same sentences; however, it identifies thirty-five years as Morgan's sentence on Count I. Morgan now appeals.

Discussion and Decision
I. Abuse of Discretion-Admission of Evidence

[¶16] Morgan first argues that the trial court abused its discretion by admitting Detective Henson's testimony regarding his submission of the case to the prosecutor's office for the prosecutor to determine whether to file charges. Morgan argues that this testimony is irrelevant and constitutes improper vouching. We find that any error in admitting this testimony, which we do not decide, would be harmless.

[¶17] We review challenges to the admission of evidence for an abuse of the trial court's discretion. Combs v. State, 168 N.E.3d 985, 990 (Ind. 2021), cert. denied. We will reverse only where the decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances and the error affects a party's substantial rights. Clark v. State, 994 N.E.2d 252, 259-60 (Ind. 2013). "The effect of an error on a party's substantial rights turns on the probable impact of the impermissible evidence upon the jury in light of all the other evidence at trial." Gonzales v. State, 929 N.E.2d 699, 702 (Ind. 2010). Thus, even when evidence was improperly admitted at trial, the improper admission "is harmless error when the conviction is supported by such substantial independent evidence of guilt as to satisfy the reviewing court that there is no substantial likelihood that the questioned evidence contributed to the conviction." Pelissier v. State, 122 N.E.3d 983, 988 (Ind.Ct.App. 2019), trans. denied.

[¶18] Morgan argues that Detective Hensen's testimony was irrelevant to the charges against him. He further argues that the testimony constituted improper vouching for A.C. because "[t]he only purpose of admitting this testimony was to suggest that there were several layers of government officials, including both police officers and prosecutors, that believed Morgan molested A.C. and that her allegations were true." 1[] Appellant's Br. p. 23.

[¶19] We do not decide whether the trial court abused its discretion by admitting Detective Henson's testimony because any error would be harmless in light of the overwhelming evidence against Morgan. A.C. testified to the following: beginning when she was six or seven years old Morgan inappropriately touched her on numerous occasions when she spent the night at the Morgans' house. When Morgan gave her back massages before bed, Morgan touched her butt and breasts and rubbed her vagina, all both over and underneath her pajamas. On at least one occasion, Morgan...

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