Morgan v. Town of Lexington

Decision Date24 September 2015
Docket NumberCivil Action No. 14-13781-DJC
Citation138 F.Supp.3d 82
Parties Christine Morgan, next friend and mother of minor, R.M., Plaintiff, v. Town of Lexington, Lexington Public Schools, Paul Ash and Steven Flynn, Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — District of Massachusetts

Timothy M. Burke, Jared S. Burke, Law Offices of Timothy M. Burke, Needham, MA, for Plaintiff.

John J. Cloherty, III, Pierce, Davis & Perritano, LLP, Boston, MA, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

CASPER

, District Judge
I. Introduction

Plaintiff Christine Morgan ("Morgan"), next friend and mother of the minor R.M., has filed this lawsuit against defendants Town of Lexington ("Lexington"), Lexington Public Schools ("LPS"), Superintendant Paul Ash ("Ash") and Principal Steven Flynn ("Flynn") (collectively, the "Defendants"), alleging a violation of R.M.'s substantive due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983

against all Defendants (Count I), negligence against all Defendants (Count II), intentional infliction of emotional distress against Ash and Flynn (Count III), negligent infliction of emotional distress against Ash and Flynn (Count IV), negligent hiring, training and supervision against Lexington and LPS (Count V) and violations of the Massachusetts Civil Rights Act, Mass. Gen. L. c. 12, §§ 11H, I against all Defendants (Count VI). D. 1. Morgan has moved to amend her complaint to add a hostile environment claim based on sexual harassment and discrimination pursuant to Title IX, 20 U.S.C. § 1681. D. 15. The Defendants have moved to dismiss the original complaint, D. 6, and oppose the amendment, D. 19. For the reasons stated below, the Court ALLOWS the Defendants' motion to dismiss and DENIES Morgan's motion to amend.

II. Standard of Review

In considering a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)

, the Court must determine if the facts alleged "plausibly narrate a claim for relief." Schatz v. Republican State Leadership Comm. , 669 F.3d 50, 55 (1st Cir.2012) (citation omitted). This determination requires a two-step inquiry. Garc

i

a

Catalán v.

United States , 734 F.3d 100, 103 (1st Cir.2013). First, the Court must distinguish the factual allegations from the conclusory legal allegations in the complaint. Id. Second, taking the Plaintiff's allegations as true, the Court should be able to draw "the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id. (quoting Haley v. City of Boston , 657 F.3d 39, 46 (1st Cir.2011) ).

The Court will dismiss a pleading that fails to plead "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007)

. To state a plausible claim, a claim need not contain detailed factual allegations, but it must recite facts sufficient to at least "raise a right to relief above the speculative level ... on the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact)." Twombly , 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955

. "A pleading that offers ‘labels and conclusions' or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.’ " Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (quoting Twombly , 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955 ). "Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders ‘naked assertion[s] devoid of ‘further factual enhancement.’ " Id. (quoting Twombly , 550 U.S. at 557, 127 S.Ct. 1955 ) (alteration in original). At bottom, a claim must contain sufficient factual matter that, accepted as true, would allow the Court "to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id. However, "[i]n determining whether a [pleading] crosses the plausibility threshold, ‘the reviewing court [must] draw on its judicial experience and common sense.’ ... This context-specific inquiry does not demand ‘a high degree of factual specificity.’ " Garc

i

a

Catalán , 734 F.3d 100, 103 (1st Cir.2013) (internal citations omitted).

III. Factual Allegations

These facts are as stated in the complaint, D. 1, and are accepted as true for the purpose of the motion to dismiss. R.M. has attended Lexington Public Schools since he was five years old. Id. ¶ 7. At all times relevant to this action, Defendant Ash was the superintendent of the Lexington School District. Id. ¶ 4. Beginning in September 2010, R.M. was a student at Jonas Clarke Middle School ("Clarke"), where Defendant Flynn served as the principal. Id. ¶¶ 5, 8.

On or about October 5, 2011, when R.M. was twelve years old, he sustained injuries as a result of a physical assault on school grounds by several other students at Clarke referred to in the complaint as members of the "Kool-Aid Club." Id. ¶¶ 13-16. Morgan alleges multiple students, teachers and staff witnessed the assault. Id. ¶ 18. Morgan further alleges the assault was recorded on a student's cell phone and that the video was later provided to school administrators. Id. ¶ 19.

Thereafter, Morgan left a message for Flynn informing him of the incident, notifying him that R.M. had been the victim of bullying and that she was concerned for his safety. Id. ¶¶ 22-23. As some point later that day, based on a lack of response from Flynn, Morgan called the school again and left a message for Assistant Principal Jennifer Turner ("Turner"). Id. ¶ 24. The next day, October 6, 2011, Flynn returned Morgan's call while he had another student present in his office. Id. ¶ 25. Flynn told Morgan that R.M. had not "told the whole story" and that R.M. had initially agreed to the assault to become a member of the "Kool-Aid Club." Id. ¶¶ 25-26. He also indicated the school administration had a video of the assault. Id. ¶ 27. Flynn stated that R.M. was not in trouble as he had not "been the aggressor," but that Flynn "was not happy with R.M. for delaying the investigation." Id. ¶ 28. As a result, Flynn banned R.M. from running in a track meet scheduled for later that day. Id. ¶ 29.

Morgan alleges that Flynn's refusal to acknowledge that bullying had occurred and the punishment of being banned from the track meet deterred R.M. from reporting subsequent incidents of bullying. Id. ¶ 30. On October 11, 2011, R.M. told Morgan he feared retaliation for reporting the bullying. Id. ¶ 35. Because of this, Morgan met with Taylor and another assistant principal, Anna Monaco ("Monaco"), to explain that she and R.M. were afraid for his safety. Id. ¶¶ 35-36. Morgan alleges Monaco was confrontational and stated R.M. had "invited" the assault based on a video that had been provided to the administration. Id. ¶¶ 39-40.

The complaint alleges that as a consequence of the administration's indifference, R.M. was assaulted and verbally harassed by the students who previously assaulted him in retaliation for "getting them in trouble." Id. ¶¶ 44-47. R.M. immediately reported this to Turner. Id. ¶ 48. Turner instructed R.M. to move away from the group of students. Id. ¶ 49.

Thereafter, R.M.'s pants were pulled down, on multiple occasions and in front of other students, by the same group involved in the earlier incident. Id. ¶ 53. R.M. was also "table topped," in which two students pushed R.M. from opposite directions so that he fell backwards. Id. ¶ 54. R.M. was repeatedly called "Mandex Man," "thunder thighs" and hungry hippo." Id. ¶ 56. The complaint further alleges that R.M. was repeatedly pushed, tripped, punched or verbally assaulted while walking in school hallways. Id. ¶ 55. On December 21, 2011, R.M. was pushed into a locker, breaking his watch. Id. ¶ 62.

The next day, Morgan emailed Flynn to explain that R.M. did not feel safe at school and that he was afraid to report the bullying because he experienced retaliation when he reported similar conduct earlier in the year. Id. ¶¶ 63-65. Flynn replied that he could not investigate the allegations unless R.M. reported the bullying himself, id. ¶ 66, although Lexington's Bullying Prevention Plan indicated parents could report bullying incidents. Id. ¶ 68. On December 23, 2011, Morgan met with Turner to report the list of incidents R.M. had provided. Id. ¶ 75. The complaint alleges Turner did not record any of these incidents or the names of the alleged participants and that no investigation or remedial action was taken. Id. ¶¶ 76-80. The two agreed that if R.M. did not feel safe attending school following the holiday break, that Turner and the school social worker Mia Brousse ("Brousse") would visit the Morgan residence to discuss the matter. Id. ¶ 82.

When school began on January 2, 2012, R.M. refused to attend due to fear of being bullied. Id. ¶ 84. The next day Morgan informed Turner and Brousse and discussed the visit to the Morgan residence. Id. ¶ 85. Flynn maintained that the school could not investigate the bullying allegations unless R.M. personally reported the incidents. Id. at ¶ 86. The following day, January 4, 2012, when R.M. again was not at school, Flynn dispatched two Lexington police officers, who were not told that R.M. refused to attend school due to his fear of bullying, to the Morgan residence. Id. ¶¶ 87-88, 91. R.M. viewed the visit from police as a threat by Flynn to intimidate and coerce him to return to school. Id. ¶ 89.

That day, Morgan emailed Flynn to complain that R.M. was being "treated as the wrongdoer." Id. ¶ 94. She explained that while she realized Flynn felt that R.M. should come to school and provide details of the events, she believed she had "provided enough preliminary information for an investigation to have been initiated." Id. She further provided that it had taken weeks for R.M. to discuss some of the treatment, particularly "having his pants pulled down outside the school, in front of a girl." Id. ¶ 95. She explained that being asked to repeat the conduct was "exacerbating [R.M.'s] anxiety, reinforcing the humiliation and making him even more upset." Id. She...

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