Morgan v. U.S. Bank Nat'Lass'N, A13A0279.

CourtUnited States Court of Appeals (Georgia)
Citation745 S.E.2d 290,322 Ga.App. 357
Docket NumberNo. A13A0279.,A13A0279.
Decision Date20 June 2013

322 Ga.App. 357
745 S.E.2d 290


No. A13A0279.

Court of Appeals of Georgia.

June 20, 2013.

[745 S.E.2d 291]

Francis J. Morgan, pro se.

Tracy L. Starr, Jonathan Evan Green, Steven Gordon Hall, Joshua Neil Tropper, Atlanta, for Appellee.

McFADDEN, Judge.

[322 Ga.App. 357]Francis J. Morgan appeals pro se from the trial court's order dissolving a temporary restraining order and allowing U.S. Bank National Association (in its capacity as Trustee for the C–Bass Mortgage Loan Asset–Backed Certificates Series 2006–CB5) to foreclose on Morgan's house. Because the trial court did not abuse its discretion [322 Ga.App. 358]in declining to consider at the hearing on injunctive relief other claims raised by Morgan in an amended complaint, and did not abuse its discretion in requiring, as a condition for extending injunctive relief, that Morgan place into escrow an amount of money reflecting past-due payments on his mortgage, we affirm.

1. Facts and procedural posture.

The evidence is undisputed that Morgan obtained a mortgage on his house and subsequently stopped making payments on that mortgage. He did so because he concluded that the note had become “void or voidable” due to a “failure of conveyance,” apparently referring to an assignment that he alleged was improper. After being notified that U.S. Bank intended to foreclose on the house, Morgan filed a pro se action against U.S. Bank styled “Complaint for Fraud and Request for Temporary Restraining Order.” Therein, he asserted that U.S. Bank had no standing to foreclose because it was not the holder of either the note or deed securing the debt on the property, sought further discovery into “U.S. Bank's actions,” and sought to enjoin the foreclosure. The same day that Morgan filed the complaint, the trial court granted him a temporary restraining order and directed the parties to appear for a hearing on the complaint the following month. Shortly before the scheduled hearing, Morgan filed an amended complaint in which he alleged additional causes of action and sought damages, declaratory relief, and further injunctive relief.

The trial court conducted a hearing on July 2, 2012, to determine “whether the TRO is going to be made permanent or not.” The trial court expressly did not consider other issues raised in the amended complaint, noting that U.S. Bank had not yet received a copy of that pleading. At the hearing, Morgan presented testimony and argued that, although he stopped making payments on his mortgage, questions existed about whether U.S. Bank was the entity to which he owed those payments and whether he was presently indebted to any entity at all. The trial court indicated his willingness to grant Morgan injunctive relief from the foreclosure if he placed into the court registry an amount of money covering the past-due payments on the mortgage. Morgan declined to do so. The trial court then ruled from the bench that he was “going to dissolve the temporary restraining order and let U.S. Bank proceed,” noting that the law “d[id] not favor” Morgan's contention that U.S. Bank lacked standing to pursue payments under the note.

On July 13, the trial court entered a written order dissolving the temporary restraining order and allowing U.S. Bank to proceed with...

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3 cases
  • Ford Motor Co. v. Young, A12A2335.
    • United States
    • United States Court of Appeals (Georgia)
    • June 20, 2013
    ...of disciplinary rules appear to be the exclusive province of the Supreme Court of Georgia, not of [the] trial court,” it lacked [322 Ga.App. 357]authority to determine whether plaintiff's counsel violated Rule 4.2 of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct and therefore should be disquali......
  • Walker v. Gowen Stores LLC., A13A0803.
    • United States
    • United States Court of Appeals (Georgia)
    • June 20, 2013
    ...Brown, 207 Ga.App. 134, 135(2), 427 S.E.2d 104 (1993). We reject the defendants' argument that the complaint must be dismissed because [745 S.E.2d 290]damages are too remote to be proven. “[T]he speculative nature of damages alleged in a complaint may not afford a basis for the granting of ......
  • Babinsack v. Alfonso-Garcia, A16A1071.
    • United States
    • United States Court of Appeals (Georgia)
    • May 16, 2016 the dismissal of temporary injunctive relief was directly appealable under OCGA § 5–6–34(a)(4) ); Morgan v. U.S. Bank Natl. Assn., 322 Ga.App. 357, 359(2), 745 S.E.2d 290 (2013) (OCGA § 5–6–34(a)(4) permitted appellant to file a direct appeal from an order that in “function and substance......

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