Moriarity v. United Tech. Rep. Emp. Retire. Plan, Civil No. 3:95cv2578 (PCD).
| Decision Date | 20 November 1996 |
| Docket Number | Civil No. 3:95cv2578 (PCD). |
| Parties | Michael MORIARITY, Plaintiff, v. UNITED TECHNOLOGIES CORPORATION REPRESENTED EMPLOYEES RETIREMENT PLAN, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Connecticut |
Joseph D. Farrell, Benefits Litigation Concepts, Marlborough, CT, for Plaintiff.
Theodore J. Tucci, Jean Elizabeth Tomasco, Robinson & Cole, Hartford, CT, for Defendant.
RULING ON CROSS-MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Plaintiff Michael Moriarity, relying on the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA"), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1132(a)(1)(B), 1132(a)(2), seeks a determination of his right to recover benefits allegedly due to him under Defendant United Technologies Corporation Represented Employees Retirement Plan ("Plan"). Plaintiff and Defendant filed cross-motions for summary judgment. For the following reasons, Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment is denied. Defendant's motion for summary judgment is granted.
The material facts in this case are undisputed. Plaintiff commenced employment with United Technologies Corporation — Hamilton Standard Division ("UTC") on September 9, 1968. Stipulation of Facts ("Stip.") ¶ 1. Plaintiff terminated that employment on September 19, 1989, (Id.), allegedly due to physical and psychological disability. Complaint ¶ 5.1 While employed by UTC Plaintiff became eligible to participate in the Plan2. Stip. ¶ 2. As of his termination he had earned a monthly pension benefit under the Plan in the amount of $896.87, payable at his normal retirement date of May 1, 2012. Id. It is a vested, non-forfeitable and accrued benefit under the terms of the pension plan. Id. After leaving UTC's employment Plaintiff alleges that he attempted to "continue working in a less demanding and stressful environment" but was unsuccessful due to his disability. Complaint ¶ 6.
On March 9, 1992, Plaintiff applied for Social Security disability benefits and was determined to be disabled as of that date. Plaintiff's Statement of Material Facts ("Pl.Statem.") ¶ 8. Plaintiff began receiving Social Security benefits on October 1, 1992. Complaint ¶ 7. In late 1994, Plaintiff contacted Defendant for information about disability benefits under the Plan. By letter dated November 3, 1994, Defendant informed Plaintiff that he did not qualify for disability benefits because his employment with UTC terminated before he became disabled as determined by the Social Security Administration. Defendant's Appendix to Motion for Summary Judgment ("Appen."), Ex. 2. Plaintiff was also informed that he had fulfilled the eligibility requirements for a vested pension benefit to be paid in the future and the amount of that benefit. Id.
Plaintiff presented his claim to Defendant's Benefit Claims Appeal Committee (the "Committee"), which on February 7 1995, unanimously denied his claim on the basis that his disability date was subsequent to termination of his employment with UTC and, therefore, he was not entitled to disability benefits under the terms of the Plan. Affidavit of Ellen McGroary ("McGroary Aff.") ¶ 12. Defendant informed Plaintiff of the Committee's decision by letter dated March 8, 1995. Appen., Ex. 5. Plaintiff instituted the instant action under ERISA seeking disability benefits and a determination of his benefits under the Plan.
The Plan is an "employee benefit plan,"3 which provides both retirement benefits and ancillary benefits4 to participants and is governed by ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1001 et seq. The Plan defines a "Participant" as "any Employee who has become a Participant in the Plan in accordance with Article Four." Plan § 2.27, p. 10. Article Four provides that employees automatically become a Participant upon the first of the following: 1) the completion of one year of eligibility service and attaining age 25; or 2) completing 5 years of eligibility service. Plan § 4.2(a), p. 22. Further, a participant ceases to be such on the date on which he ceases to be an employee of the employer. Plan § 4.6, p. 24. As required by ERISA, however, Article Eight provides for vesting of retirement annuities. Plan § 8.1, p. 43.5
Under the Plan, disability benefits are available to a Participant who has completed 10 years of continuous service and has been determined to be disabled under the Social Security Act. Plan § 6.1(a), p. 36. Once eligible, disability benefits under the Plan continue until the first of the following occur: 1) Social Security benefits cease; 2) the Participant begins receiving Retirement Annuity payments; 3) the Participant retires at the normal retirement date; or 4) the Participant dies. Plan § 6.2(a), pp. 36-37. The amount of the disability benefit is calculated in the same manner as the Participant's pension benefit. Plan § 6.2(b), p. 37.
Plaintiff alleges, and Defendant does not dispute, that he was never provided with a copy of the Plan. Affidavit of Michael Moriarity ("Moriarity Aff.") ¶ 5. However, as required by ERISA6 a Summary Plan Description ("SPD") was distributed to employees. Defendant's Statement of Undisputed Material Facts in Support of its Motion for Summary Judgment ("Def.'s Statem.") ¶ 32. The introduction to the SPD describes the purpose of the booklet as to explain the retirement income that a Participant is entitled to receive under the Plan. The SPD provides that "[a]s an employee of the company, you automatically become a participant in the plan ... after you have ... completed one year of eligibility service and reached age 21, or completed five years of eligibility service regardless of age." SPD, p. 4 (emphasis in original). The SPD summarizes the various retirement, death and disability benefits available under the Plan, as well as payment methods for the various benefits. With respect to disability benefits, the SPD provides: "If you become permanently and totally disabled, you will be eligible for a disability pension if you ... have at least 10 years of continuous service, and receive Social Security disability benefits." SPD, p. 10. Like the Plan, the SPD also provides that disability benefits cease when Social Security benefits stop, normal, early or vested benefits begin, normal retirement occurs or the disabled individual dies, whichever is earliest. SPD, p. 10.
Unlike the Plan, the SPD does not include a definition of Participant, and, therefore, the SPD does not contain the language in Article 4 of the Plan that "[a]n Employee who has become a Participant in the Plan shall cease to be a Participant on ... [t]he date on which he ceases to be an employee...." The SPD does set forth the benefits an employee who leaves the company prior to retirement is entitled to in a section entitled "VESTED BENEFITS." SPD, p. 10. That section provides that an employee who leaves the company before retirement, but after 5 years of continuous service, is "vested" with respect to retirement and certain death benefits, which means they "are entitled — beginning at [their] normal retirement date — to income from the Plan based on the full benefits [they] earned up to the time [they] left the company." SPD, p. 10.
Summary judgment shall be granted when "the pleadings, depositions ... and admissions on file ... show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). "`Properly employed summary judgment allows the court to dispose of meritless claims before becoming entrenched in a frivolous and costly trial.'" Diamantopulos v. Brookside Corp., 683 F.Supp. 322, 325 (D.Conn.1988) (citing Donahue v. Windsor Locks Bd. of Fire Comm'rs, 834 F.2d 54, 57-58 (2nd Cir. 1987)). The moving party bears the initial burden of establishing that there is no genuine issue of material fact. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 256, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2514, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). An issue of material fact is genuine "if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Id. at 248, 106 S.Ct. at 2510. A factual issue is "material" if it "might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law...." Id.
Once the movant has satisfied its burden, the party opposing summary judgment "must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Id. at 250, 106 S.Ct. at 2511. The non-movant may not merely rest on the allegations and denials in the pleadings but must establish, via affidavits, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, a genuine issue of material fact exists. Id. at 248, 106 S.Ct. at 2510. In considering a motion for summary judgment all reasonable inferences must be drawn in favor of the nonmoving party. Id. at 255, 106 S.Ct. at 2513-14. Summary judgment is particularly appropriate where a court is called upon to interpret the law governing construction and effect of unambiguous contract terms.7
Defendant challenges Plaintiff's standing under ERISA to bring this action. Only a "participant" or "beneficiary" may bring a civil action under ERISA. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a). A "participant" is "any employee or former employee of an employer, ... who is or may become eligible to receive a benefit of any type from an employee benefit plan which covers employees of such employer...." 29 U.S.C. § 1002(7). The statutory definition of "participant" has been further clarified, albeit not in the context of standing:
[T]he term `participant' is naturally read to mean either `employees in, or reasonably expected to be in, currently covered employment,' or former employees who `have ... a reasonable expectation of returning to covered employment' or who have `a colorable claim' to vested benefits. In order to establish that he or she `may become eligible' for benefits, a claimant must have a colorable claim that (1)...
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