Moriarty v. GARDEN SANCTUARY CHURCH

Citation334 S.C. 150,511 S.E.2d 699
Decision Date18 January 1999
Docket NumberNo. 2928.,2928.
PartiesAmy Ferrell MORIARTY, Appellant, v. GARDEN SANCTUARY CHURCH OF GOD, Respondent.
CourtCourt of Appeals of South Carolina

Gregg Meyers, of Pratt—Thomas, Pearce, Epting & Walker, of Charleston, for Appellant.

David Betts, of Columbia; and Frank A. Hirsch, Jr., of Charlotte, for Respondent.

ANDERSON, Judge:

Amy Ferrell Moriarty brought this action to recover damages for mental and emotional injuries she allegedly sustained as a result of being sexually abused as a child while attending Kiddie Kollege Day Care Center, a child care facility operated by the Garden Sanctuary Church of God (the Church). In her complaint, Moriarty claimed she was so ill-equipped as a child to cope with the sexual abuse she repressed all memory of the events. The Church pled the statute of limitations as a defense. The trial court granted the Church's motion for summary judgment holding the action was time barred pursuant to S.C.Code Ann. § 15-3-40 (1977)1 and Doe v. R.D., 308 S.C. 139, 417 S.E.2d 541 (1992). We reverse.

FACTS/PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Amy Moriarty was born on August 26, 1971. From August of 1973 to May of 1976, she attended Kiddie Kollege, a day care center sponsored by the Cedar Street Church of God.2 According to her mother, Moriarty was a very bright, articulate child. However, during the period she attended Kiddie Kollege, her demeanor changed. She became stubborn and unhappy; experienced night terrors; and grew apprehensive about attending day care. Moriarty's mother took her to the pediatrician in response to her night terrors. The doctor, who was unaware of anything unusual happening at Kiddie Kollege, advised Moriarty's mother not to be concerned about the episodes. In May of 1976, Moriarty left Kiddie Kollege.

Growing up, Moriarty continued to have "emotional disturbances and a generalized concern about sleep." Her self concept was low. Moriarty's teachers advised her mother that Moriarty did not work up to her potential. During this time, Moriarty was treated at York County Mental Health Department and an organization called Keystone. She graduated from high school in 1989.

In 1992, Moriarty reported to her mother she had begun to obsessively count numbers in her head. She could not stop the counting and did not understand what compelled her to count. She asked her mother to schedule an appointment for her with a mental health counselor. Moriarty's mother arranged for her to see Lynn Bryan at Carmel Counseling.

Around this time, Moriarty became depressed. She missed classes at York Technical School, where she was a student of the nursing program. She slept excessively and was combative with her fiance. Bryan referred Moriarty to Dr. James Jewell, who prescribed Prozac for Moriarty's depression and obsessive thoughts. Moriarty attended counseling regularly.

After reading a nursing textbook (as part of her academic studies) and a popular magazine which mentioned masturbation, Moriarty became obsessed with masturbation concluding it was abnormal. She began to see pictures in her mind of a little girl's hand masturbating a male. In late November 1992, Moriarty recognized the hand as her own. She recollected the particular dress she was wearing during an episode of abuse. Moriarty and her mother saw, in old family films which had not been viewed for a number of years, a yellow dress matching the description given by Moriarty.

Additionally, Moriarty recalled particular physical characteristics of the abuser: crooked teeth, bushy eyebrows, and frizzy hair. Moriarty visited each of the locations where she had attended day care and felt a "strong reaction" to Kiddie Kollege. One night Moriarty called her mother to ask if the preacher at Kiddie Kollege had bushy eyebrows and frizzy hair. Upon review of a series of photographs, she had a "strong reaction" to a picture of one individual who had bushy eyebrows and frizzy hair.

Moriarty recalled her abuser used a particular name to refer to his penis. She further remembered her abuser warning her if she told about the abuse she would be "overtaken by the devil."

According to the affidavit of Moriarty's mother, Janet Ferrell, Moriarty filed this action within three years of when she had reason to believe she had been the victim of sexual abuse. Ferrell further averred:

The sexual abuse affected [Moriarty] as a child, when the origin was unknown, but she was also affected as an adult, and it was her adult manifestations which prompted the work to discover even generally the origin of her discomfort. Many of the manifestations for which I have been asked to arrange mental health treatment of my daughter, and all of the adult problems associated with these incidents, became manifested only in 1992 and 1993.

Moriarty commenced this action in November of 1995. In her complaint, she alleged causes of action for negligent infliction of severe emotional distress, invasion of privacy, negligent supervision, and breach of warranty. Moriarty claimed the abuser removed her from supervised rest periods to perform the abusive acts.

In its answer, the Church alleged all causes of action were barred because they were brought more than six years after they accrued and more than one year after Moriarty reached her twenty-first birthday. The Church filed a motion for summary judgment arguing Moriarty's causes of action accrued, if at all, not later than May of 1976 when she was approximately four and one half years old. Therefore, the Church maintained, her action had to be commenced within one year of her twenty-first birthday or not later than August 26, 1993.

The trial court granted summary judgment to the Church pursuant to S.C.Code Ann. § 15-3-40 and Doe v. R.D., 308 S.C. 139, 417 S.E.2d 541 (1992). The court ruled Moriarty was required to bring this action within one year of her twenty-first birthday. Because she commenced this action more than one year after her twenty-first birthday, the court found the suit was time barred.

The focus of this appeal is two-pronged. The first prong involves the issue of whether the repressed memory syndrome (Dissociative Amnesia) is a viable theory in South Carolina. The second prong concerns the application of the discovery rule to the statute of limitations in repressed memory cases.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Summary judgment is appropriate when it is clear there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Etheredge v. Richland Sch. Dist. 1, 330 S.C. 447, 499 S.E.2d 238 (Ct.App.1998); Rule 56(c), SCRCP. In determining whether any triable issue of fact exists, as will preclude summary judgment, the evidence and all inferences which can be reasonably drawn therefrom must be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Etheredge, supra; Pye v. Aycock, 325 S.C. 426, 480 S.E.2d 455 (Ct.App.1997). If triable issues exist, those issues must go to the jury. Rothrock v. Copeland, 305 S.C. 402, 409 S.E.2d 366 (1991); Etheredge, supra.

Summary judgment is not appropriate where further inquiry into the facts of the case is desirable to clarify the application of the law. Tupper v. Dorchester County, 326 S.C. 318, 487 S.E.2d 187 (1997). Even when there is no dispute as to evidentiary facts, but only as to the conclusions or inferences to be drawn from them, summary judgment should be denied. Staubes v. City of Folly Beach, 331 S.C. 192, 500 S.E.2d 160 (Ct.App. 1998). However, when plain, palpable, and indisputable facts exist on which reasonable minds cannot differ, summary judgment should be granted. Id.; Pye, supra. All ambiguities, conclusions, and inferences arising from the evidence must be construed most strongly against the movant. Staubes, supra.

The party seeking summary judgment has the burden of clearly establishing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Etheredge, supra. For summary judgment to be granted, it must be perfectly clear no issue of fact is involved. Id. Because it is a drastic remedy, summary judgment should be cautiously invoked so no person will be improperly deprived of a trial of the disputed factual issues. Id.

ISSUES
I. Does South Carolina recognize repressed memory of childhood sexual abuse?
II. Is the discovery rule applicable to repressed memory of childhood sexual abuse?
LAW/ANALYSIS
I. REPRESSED MEMORY SYNDROME

To cope with the horror of their experiences, many child sexual abuse victims develop dissociative defense mechanisms similar to those observed in combat veterans and victims of other atrocities. Dissociation can take a number of forms, including traumatic amnesia—more commonly known as repressed memory. Joy Lazo, Comment, True or False: Expert Testimony on Repressed Memory, 28 Loy.L.A.L.Rev. 1345 (1995). Childhood sexual abuse is extremely traumatic for the child victim and is therefore especially conducive to the repression of memory. E.A. Foster, Comment, Repressed Memory Syndrome: Preventing Invalid Sexual Abuse Cases in Illinois, 21 S.Ill.U.L.J. 169 (1996).

The study of the repressed memory phenomenon dates back to the turn of the century when Sigmund Freud first developed the theory in the 1890's. Rosemarie Ferrante, Note, The Discovery Rule: Allowing Adult Survivors of Childhood Sexual Abuse the Opportunity for Redress, 61 Brook.L.Rev. 199 (1995). Freud theorized the conscious mind can push away, or repress, anxiety-provoking ideas. Christina J. D'Appolonia, Note, Nuccio v. Nuccio: The Doctrine of Equitable Estoppel Will Not Bar the Statute of Limitations Defense in a Child Sexual Abuse Case Involving Repressed Memory, 49 Me. L.Rev. 235 (1997). According to Freud, potent memories, when submerged, can cause both physical and mental symptoms. Id. Similarly, studies and observations by philosopher and psychologist William James in 1891 indicated strong emotions (whether positive or negative)...

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