Morin v. Caire

• Decision Date: 07 March 1996
• Docket Number: No. 95-30308,95-30308
• Parties: Ralph MORIN; Larry Keith Young, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. Randy CAIRE, Defendant-Appellant, and City of Slidell, Defendant. Summary Calendar.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit

Page 116

77 F.3d 116

Ralph MORIN; Larry Keith Young, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. Randy CAIRE, Defendant-Appellant and City of Slidell, Defendant.

No. 95-30308

Summary Calendar.

United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit.

March 7, 1996.

Edward Joseph Cloos, III, Metairie, LA, for plaintiffs-appellees.

Gerald Joseph Nielsen, Metairie, LA, for Caire and City of Slidell.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana.

Before WISDOM, DAVIS and STEWART, Circuit Judges.

WISDOM, Circuit Judge:

Defendant/appellant, Randy Caire, appeals the district court's denial of his Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss a civil rights claim filed against him by plaintiffs/appellees, Ralph Morin and Larry Keith Young. For the reasons that follow, we REVERSE.

I. Facts and Background

On November 6, 1991, defendant/appellant, Randy Caire ("defendant" or "Caire"), a police officer for defendant City of Slidell, Louisiana ("City"), arrested the plaintiffs/appellees, Ralph Morin and Larry Keith Young ("plaintiffs" or "Morin" and "Young"), for the murder of Morin's business partner, Leo Harp, in September 1991. Prior to arresting the plaintiffs, Caire interrogated Brian Mouring, an individual who was linked to a gun found near the murder site. Mouring told Caire that he had sold the gun to his uncle, plaintiff Young, who had told Mouring that he was going to use the gun to kill Leo Harp in a murder for hire plot originated by plaintiff Morin. Based on this information, Caire obtained a warrant for the plaintiffs' arrests, and took them into custody. Caire also testified before a grand jury regarding his investigation of the crime, and the grand jury issued indictments for murder against both plaintiffs.

Morin and Young remained in jail awaiting trial from the time of their arrests in November 1991, until August 1993, when the charges against them were dropped for undetermined reasons. After their release, Morin and Young filed this civil rights action against Caire and the City seeking damages of two million dollars for their allegedly improper incarceration. Specifically, the suit alleges violations of the plaintiffs' Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights, and further asserts Louisiana state law tort claims of false imprisonment, malicious prosecution, and abuse of process. The defendants filed a Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss that argued: 1) the plaintiffs' complaint failed to state a constitutional claim upon which relief could be granted; 2) if the complaint did state constitutional claims, then defendant Caire is immune from suit in them; and 3) there is no basis on which the state law claims could proceed. The district court summarily denied the 12(b)(6) motion. Defendant Randy Caire now appeals that dismissal.

II. Discussion

A. Appellate Jurisdiction and Standard of Review:

Ordinarily, this court does not have jurisdiction over the denial of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for no cause of action, because such an order is interlocutory in nature. ¹ The Supreme Court has held, however, that orders denying substantial claims of qualified immunity are immediately appealable under the collateral order doctrine. ² Because the defendants' motion to dismiss asserts a qualified immunity defense to the plaintiffs' constitutional claims, we may hear the appeal on the denial of that portion of the motion. ³

Although the immunity exception does not apply to the decision to deny the plaintiffs' state law claims, we also may have jurisdiction to review that decision. In the interest of judicial economy, this court may exercise its discretion to consider under pendant appellate jurisdiction claims that are closely related to the issue properly before us. ⁴ Although we generally exercise this power with caution, ⁵ it is appropriate for us to do so in this situation, for if we were to refuse to exercise jurisdiction over the state law claims, our refusal would defeat the principal purpose of allowing an appeal of immunity issues before a government employee is forced to go to trial. ⁶

A district court's ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion is subject to de novo review. ⁷ The motion may be granted "only if it appears that no relief could be granted under any set of facts that could be proved consistent with the allegations". ⁸ The review of such a motion is limited to the plaintiffs' complaint. ⁹

B. The Plaintiffs' Constitutional Claims:

Public officials are entitled to qualified immunity from suit under § 1983 unless it is shown by specific allegations that the officials violated clearly established law. ¹⁰ To determine if qualified immunity applies, this court follows a two-step process. First, we determine if the plaintiff has stated a violation of a clearly established constitutional right. ¹¹ If so, we next examine the reasonableness of the defendant's conduct. ¹²

Caire first argues that the district court should have dismissed the plaintiffs' claims arising under the Fifth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments because these constitutional provisions do not protect individuals from the types of harm alleged by the plaintiffs. We agree. The protections of the Eighth Amendment against cruel and unusual punishment are limited in scope to convicted prisoners and do not apply to pretrial detainees such as the plaintiffs. ¹³ Similarly, the Fifth Amendment applies only to the actions of the federal government, and not to the actions of a municipal government as in the present case. ¹⁴ And, although the Fourteenth Amendment's due process clause does apply to municipalities, the plaintiff has not pleaded any allegations upon which a procedural due process claim could be based, and the U.S. Supreme Court has recently determined that there is no substantive due process right to be free from criminal prosecution except upon probable cause. ¹⁵ Thus, the plaintiffs' only remaining constitutional claims are premised on the protections of the Fourth Amendment against unreasonable search and seizure. ¹⁶

Specifically, the plaintiffs allege that Caire violated their Fourth Amendment rights by engaging in the following activities: 1) relying on false evidence; 2) relying on an unreliable source; and 3) participating in and furthering the plaintiffs' extended incarceration in an effort to coerce admissions of guilt. ¹⁷ Caire argues that the plaintiffs' complaint fails to state sufficient facts regarding these allegations to support a constitutional claim. We agree.

In a recent en banc opinion, Schultea v. Wood, ¹⁸ this court determined that when a plaintiff sues a public official under § 1983, the district court must insist on heightened pleading by the plaintiff. ¹⁹ The court must first demand that a plaintiff must file "a short and plain statement of his complaint, a complaint that rests on more than conclusions alone." ²⁰ Next, the court may, in its own discretion, insist that the plaintiff file a reply tailored to an answer pleading the defense of qualified immunity. ²¹ The court's discretion not to order such a reply is very narrow, however, when greater detail might assist. ²²

In this case, the initial complaint pleads only conclusions. It asserts that Caire "knew, or should have known, that the statements of Bryan Moring [sic] were false," without pleading factual allegations indicating that Mouring's statement are indeed false, or facts indicating that no reasonable police officer would have believed Mouring's statement. The complaint also alleges that Caire "knew that the evidence assembled against Morin and Young was not sufficient to take to trial," yet fails to state facts supporting this conclusion. This omission is particularly severe in a case such as this in which a grand jury separately determined that there was sufficient evidence to warrant a trial. Similarly, the plaintiffs' allegation that Caire knew the evidence "was not sufficient to furnish probable cause or prosecute [the plaintiffs]," is inadequate when Caire obtained an arrest warrant prior to arresting the plaintiffs. Finally, the mere allegation that "the progress of the prosecution of [the plaintiffs] was delayed by Randy Caire, and by the St. Tammany Parish District Attorney's office due to their knowledge of the shortcomings of the case against [the plaintiffs]," requires more specific allegations of how the defendant himself unconstitutionally caused the plaintiffs' continued incarceration where he had obtained a warrant and a grand jury indictment was issued.

In spite of these factual shortcomings, the district court failed to order the plaintiff to file either a statement of facts, or a reply to the defendants' assertion of qualified immunity. This is clear error. ²³ Ordinarily this situation would require a remand to the district court to allow the plaintiffs an opportunity to amend their pleadings. ²⁴ Such a remand is not always required, however. If the individual circumstances of the case indicate that the plaintiffs have pleaded their best case, there is no need to remand for further proceedings. ²⁵ In the present situation, a remand would not be useful.

Although the plaintiffs' complaint is devoid of factual allegations, both the plaintiffs' original response to the defendants' 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, and the plaintiffs' appellate brief make it clear that the plaintiffs are basing their entire case on allegations that Caire did not conduct a thorough investigation prior to obtaining a warrant for the plaintiffs' arrest. They contend that Caire omitted material statements and made false and misleading statements in his affidavit to obtain an arrest warrant for the plaintiffs. Specifically, they allege Caire made the following omissions from the warrant affidavit: 1) that Caire did not thoroughly investigate the veracity of Mouring's statement before seeking a warrant for the plaintiffs' arrest; 2) that Mouring gave two different stories as to how he disposed of the gun; 3) that at the time the affidavit...