Morin v. Manson, 11467

• Decision Date: 03 April 1984
• Docket Number: No. 11467,11467
• Citation: 472 A.2d 1278,192 Conn. 576
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: Joseph D. MORIN v. John R. MANSON, Commissioner, Department of Correction.

Page 1278

472 A.2d 1278

192 Conn. 576

Joseph D. MORIN v. John R. MANSON, Commissioner, Department of Correction.

No. 11467.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued Jan. 4, 1984.

Decided April 3, 1984.

G. Douglas Nash, Asst. Public Defender, with whom, on the brief, was Joette Katz, Public Defender, for appellant (plaintiff).

Arnold M. Schwolsky, Asst. State's Atty., with whom, on the brief, was John M. Bailey, State's Atty., for appellee (defendant).

Before SPEZIALE, C.J., and PETERS, HEALEY, PARSKEY and GRILLO, JJ.

GRILLO, Associate Justice.

This appeal is from the judgment of the trial court denying the relief requested in the plaintiff Joseph Morin's petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The trial court held in a written memorandum of decision dated May 7, 1982, that the plaintiff had failed to prove that there was no deliberate bypass of a direct appeal. In addition, the court found that when the plaintiff pleaded guilty to four counts of second degree murder, he was aware of his waiver of constitutional rights and of the elements of the offense with which he was charged. On appeal, the plaintiff claims (1) that the habeas corpus court erred in finding that a direct appeal was deliberately bypassed and (2) that the plaintiff's constitutional right to due process was violated by the court's finding that the guilty plea was entered voluntarily and intelligently.

The facts which form the basis for this appeal and to which the plaintiff pleaded guilty were recited by the prosecutor during the proceedings on the plea of guilty. See Practice Book § 713. The events occurred in the early morning hours on March 27, 1970 in an apartment in Enfield. A number of young people were spending the night at the apartment drinking beer and playing cards. The plaintiff arrived at about 11 p.m. Sometime after 2 a.m., many of the young people left the apartment, leaving the plaintiff with four others in the apartment. The next morning, the four people were found shot to death in the apartment. Near one of the bodies was an open handbag which contained a wallet with no bills in it. On the body of another was $487. Inside the apartment, forty-seven empty beer cans and an empty vodka bottle were found.

The prosecutor further stated that the plaintiff had surrendered to New York authorities on or about March 30 and had made a confession. The plaintiff indicated that he had been drinking beer and had taken an hallucinogenic drug, LSD, prior to the shootings. The taking of LSD was corroborated on March 30 by a Naval medical examination and report on the plaintiff.

The prosecutor indicated to the court that the effect of the drugs and alcohol on the plaintiff was so great that the plaintiff's intent had been diminished. Without indicating what intent was required for the offense of murder in the second degree, the prosecutor recommended that a plea of guilty to second degree murder be accepted.

On September 4, 1970, the plaintiff entered a plea of guilty to each of four counts of murder in the second degree. Each count of the indictment was read in its entirety and to each count the plaintiff responded "not guilty to First Degree Murder, guilty to Second Degree Murder." Some eight years later, the present matter was initiated by a pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus which was amended once on December 23, 1980 and again on December 3, 1981.

In his first claimed error, the plaintiff argues on appeal that he was ignorant of the law and was unable to evaluate whether an illegality had taken place in his conviction and sentencing. He does, however acknowledge that he had an attorney upon whom he relied "in all legal matters." He asserts that the test for evaluating deliberate bypass includes consideration of the consultations between counsel and the criminal defendant; citing Vena v. Warden, 154 Conn. 363, 225 A.2d 802 (1966); and that his lawyer, Attorney James Connolly, did not discuss with him, between September 4, 1970 (when the guilty pleas were entered) and September 25, 1970 (when sentencing occurred), the possibility of withdrawing the pleas. Since no motion to withdraw the pleas was made, the plaintiff maintains the curious position that "there was nothing presented to the Superior Court from which an appeal could be taken." The plaintiff claims that it was only some eight years after his incarceration that his fellow inmates persuaded him that his conviction was illegal. Hence, he did not knowingly bypass a direct appeal. Under the circumstances presented to us in this case, we find that the plaintiff has failed to sustain his burden of proving that he did not deliberately bypass a direct appeal.

The case of Vena v. Warden, supra, is instructive on the issue of deliberate bypass. In that case, we held: "[A] petitioner may collaterally raise federal constitutional claims in a habeas corpus proceeding even though he has failed to appeal his federal constitutional claims directly to us if he alleges and proves, by a fair preponderance of the evidence, facts which will establish that he did not deliberately bypass the orderly procedure of a direct appeal. To be more precise, he must both allege in his petition and prove at the habeas corpus hearing that he did not 'after consultation with competent counsel or otherwise, understandingly and knowingly ... [forego] the privilege of seeking to...