Morin v. Nielsen
| Decision Date | 13 November 2020 |
| Docket Number | CV 19-206-M-KLD |
| Parties | TRACEY MORIN, Plaintiff, v. JERRY NIELSEN, JANICE NIELSEN, JOHN DOES A,B,C, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Montana |
This negligence action comes before the Court on Defendants Jerry and Janice Nielsen's motion for summary judgment on pro se Plaintiff Tracey Morin's damage claims. For the reasons set forth below, Defendants' motion is granted and this case is dismissed.
This lawsuit arises from a rear-end motor vehicle collision that took place on August 21, 2016, when the front of Defendants' vehicle impacted the rear of Plaintiff's vehicle while traveling westbound on an interstate highway in Montana. (Doc. 9 at 2). On August 19, 2019, Plaintiff filed this action against Defendants in state court alleging a common law negligence claim. (Doc. 14). In their state court answer, Defendants admitted that "Jerry Neilsen's negligent operation of his vehicle" caused the accident. (Doc. 15 at ¶ 2). Defendants later removed the case to this Court based on diversity jurisdiction. (Doc. 1). Plaintiff's complaint includes a request for specific performance that Defendants pay the repair value of her vehicle and all property losses, an award of reasonable attorney fees, the cost of a rental replacement for Plaintiff's vehicle, and such other and further relief allowable by law. (Doc. 14 at 4).
On June 16, 2020, Plaintiff filed her expert disclosure identifying two experts: Plaintiff and her father, Leroy Morin. (Doc. 18). Plaintiff intended to testify as an expert on several matters, including the fear, pain, trauma, and emotional distress she suffered as a result of the accident. (Doc. 18 at 2). Plaintiff was driving her father's truck at the time of the accident, and stated that her father would testify as an expert on the condition of the truck before and after the accident. (Doc. 18 at 3). Defendants moved to preclude Plaintiff's proffered experts from testifying at trial, arguing that Plaintiff's expert disclosure was inadequate and did not satisfy the requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. (Doc. 19-20). Plaintiff did not file a response brief, and the Courtgranted Defendants' motion on the ground that Plaintiff failed to comply with the expert disclosure requirements of Rule 26 and had not shown that her failure to comply with the rules was substantially justified or harmless. (Doc. 22).
During discovery, Defendants served an interrogatory asking Plaintiff to "specify with particularity any and all damages [she] is claiming in this lawsuit" and to "include the nature of the damages claimed, and the method of computing or determining the amount of damages for each such claim." (Doc. 25-1 at 2-3). Plaintiff answered with a seven-page narrative description of her alleged damages, including property damage, medical expenses, pain and suffering, and emotional distress. (Doc. 25-1 at 3-10). Defendants also served requests for production asking Plaintiff to produce all documents supporting her damage claims, including medical records. (Doc. 25-1 at 11-15). Plaintiff did not produce any medical records or other documents supporting her damage claims in response to these discovery requests. (Doc. 25-1 at 11-15). Discovery closed on August 28, 2020, and Defendants filed the pending motion for summary judgment.
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a), a party is entitled to summary judgment "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." The party seekingsummary judgment bears the initial burden of informing the Court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, which it believes demonstrate the absence of any genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Cattrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). A movant may satisfy this burden where the documentary evidence produced by the parties permits only one conclusion. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251 (1986).
Once the moving party has satisfied its initial burden with a properly supported motion, summary judgment is appropriate unless the non-moving party designates by affidavits, depositions, answers to interrogatories or admissions on file "specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Celotex, 477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986). The party opposing a motion for summary judgment "may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials" of the pleadings. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248.
In considering a motion for summary judgment, the court "may not make credibility determinations or weigh the evidence." Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., 530 U.S. 130, 150 (2000); Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249-50. The Court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and draw all justifiable inferences in the non-moving party's favor. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255; Betz v. Trainer Wortham & Co., Inc., 504 F.3d 1017, 1020-21 (9th Cir. 2007).
In general, "pro se litigants in the ordinary civil case should not be treated more favorably than parties with attorneys of record." Jacobsen v. Filler, 790 F.2d 1362, 1364 (9th Cir. 1986). This means that "[p]ro se litigants must follow the same rules of procedure that govern other litigants." King v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 565, 576 (9th Cir. 1987). In the summary judgment context, however, courts are to construe pro se documents liberally and give pro se litigants the benefit of any doubt. Erickson v. Pardus 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007); Frost v. Symington, 197 F.3d 348, 352 (9th Cir. 1999). Although Plaintiff is a formerly practicing attorney, the Court will nevertheless evaluate Defendants' summary judgment motion using the liberal standards typically applicable to pro se litigants.
As Defendants point out in their reply brief, Plaintiff filed her summary judgment response brief five days after the September 30, 2020 court-ordered deadline, and also failed to provide a statement of disputed facts that conforms to the requirements of Local Rule 56.1(b). As a result, Defendants ask the Court to deem Plaintiff's failure to file a statement of disputed facts an admission that no material facts are in dispute pursuant to Local Rule 56.1(d), and to deem their summary judgment motion well-taken pursuant to Local Rule 7(d)(1)(B)(ii). Notwithstanding these deficiencies, the Court will consider Defendants' motion and Plaintiffs' response on the merits.
Defendants argue they are entitled to judgment as a matter of law because Plaintiff has not produced any admissible evidence to support her damage claims, and seeks certain damages that are legally impossible for her to recover in this action.
Under Montana law, 1 Town of Superior Montana v. Asarco, Inc., 874 F.Supp.2d 937, 943 (D. Mont. 2004) (citing Massee v. Thompson, 90 P.3d 394, 400 (Mont. 2004)). When "a plaintiff fails to offer proof of any one of the elements of negligence (duty, breach, causation, and damages), then summary judgment in favor of the defendant is proper." Town of Superior Montana, 874 F.Supp.2d at 943 (quoting Hinkle v. Shepherd School Dist. #37, 93 P.3d 1239, 1243-1244 (Mont. 2004)). An award of "damages must be supported by substantial evidencethat is not mere guess or speculation, although mathematical precision is not required." In re Marriage of Mease, 92 P.3d 1148, 1155 (Mont. 2004). While Defendants admit in their answer that "Jerry Nielsen's negligent operation of his vehicle" caused the accident at issue (Doc. 15 at ¶ 2), Plaintiff still must present some competent evidence in support of any claimed damages for her negligence action to survive summary judgment. See e.g. Town of Superior Montana, 874 F.Supp.2d at 943; Weinberg v. Whatcom County, 241 F.3d 746, 752 (9th Cir. 2001) ().
As set forth in her interrogatory answers, Plaintiff seeks to recover for property damage to the 2001 Chevrolet pickup truck she was driving at the time of the accident. (Doc. 25-1 at 7). Plaintiff explains that Defendants' insurer offered her $2,500 as the replacement value of her vehicle, after allegedly "bullying" the repair shop to determine that the vehicle was totaled. (Doc. 25-1 at 7). Plaintiff makes clear that she is not seeking the replacement value, however, and is instead requesting damages for the cost to repair her vehicle. Plaintiff states in her interrogatory answers that "[t]he repair estimate is $16,929.11." (Doc. 25-1 at 7).
Significantly, however, Plaintiff did not produce any documents during discovery to support these claimed damages. Defendants served Plaintiff with a request for production asking her to "produce all documents identified" in her interrogatory answers. (Doc. 25-1 at 15). Although Plaintiff referenced a repair estimate of $16,929.11 in her interrogatory answer, she did not produce any supporting documentation in answer to Defendants' requests for production. (Doc. 25-1 at 15). In addition, Plaintiff's proffered experts, who would have testified to the value of her vehicle, have been excluded by the Court. (Doc. 22).
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(c)(1) plainly provides that "[i]f a party fails to provide information or identify a witness as required by Rule 26(a) or (e), the party is not allowed to use that information or witness to supply evidence on a motion, at a hearing, or at a trial, unless the failure was substantially justified or is harmless." In responding to Defendants' summary...
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