Moritz v. Horsman

• Decision Date: 07 June 1943
• Docket Number: No. 64.,64.
• Parties: MORITZ et al. v HORSMAN (CLEMENTS, Intervenor).
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court

305 Mich. 627

9 N.W.2d 868

MORITZ et al.vHORSMAN (CLEMENTS, Intervenor).

No. 64.

Supreme Court of Michigan.

June 7, 1943.

Bills by Edith Moritz, as plaintiff, and by Edna Clements, as intervening plaintiff, against Edward Horsman, asking restitution of sums received by defendant from the estate of John Horsman, deceased. From an adverse decree defendant appeals.

Decree affirmed as modified.Appeal from Circuit Court, Wayne County; Arthur Webster, judge.

Before the Entire Bench.

Toy & Newman, of Detroit, for appellee Edith Moritz.

Douglas B. Crane, of Detroit, for appellee Edna Clements.

Wiley, Streeter & Meyer, of Detroit, for appellant.

BUTZEL, Justice.

In Moritz v. Wayne Circuit Judge, 291 Mich. 190, 289 N.W. 126, we affirmed the order of the circuit court denying delayed appeal from an order of the probate court, allowing the final account of Thomas B. Horsman, general administrator of the estate of John Horsman, deceased. Edward Horsman is the adopted son of Edward Horsman, Sr. John died intestate leaving as his heirs his brother Thomas B. Horsman and the children of a deceased brother, Edward Horsman, Sr. In the John Horsman estate, beginning with the petitions of Thomas B. Horsman for general administration and of Edith Moritz, a daughter of teh deceased brother Edward Horsman, Sr., for special administration and throughout the entire probate proceedings, the probate court was informed that the children of Edward Horsman consisted of Edith Moritz, Edna Clements and Pearl I. Snowhook, daughters, and Edward Horsman, Jr., a son. The latter, however, was an adopted son and as such was not an heir of his Uncle John. Van Derlyn v. Mack, 137 Mich. 146, 100 N.W. 278,66 L.R.A. 437, 109 Am.St.Rep. 669,4 Ann.Cas. 879. The three daughters of Edward Horsman, Sr., regarded Edward, Jr., as a natural brother, although they knew he was an adopted son. They signed receipts and approved of the distribution of the personal property in the estate of which Edward, Jr., received a one-eighth share, the same as if he were a natural son of his deceased foster father. Only a few days before the expiration of a year in which a delayed appeal could be applied for, the sisters learned that their brother by adoption was not an heir and Mrs. Moritz filed a motion for a delayed appeal, which was denied on the ground that it might subject the administrator and his surety to a liability for which, as far as the record showed, the sisters at least were partly responsible. Moritz v. Wayne Circuit Judge, supra. We stated in our opinion that our holding was without prejudice to any rights the sisters might have against Esward, Jr. Two months after we rendered our opinion, Edith Moritz, plaintiff, and Edna Clements as an intervening plaintiff, two of the sisters, filed bills in the instant case against Edward Jr., and asked for restitution of the sums he had received and to which, as a stranger to the blood, he was not legally entitled and which had been taken from the shares of the real heirs at law. Mrs. Snowhock, the third sister, made no claim so that if the two sisters are entitled to relief, they can recover only two-thirds of any sums for which defendant is liable. In our holding in Moritz v. Wayne Circuit Judge, supra, we added the saving clause so not to foreclose any rights plaintiffs might have. The question of the right to recover was not briefed or considered, so that it is now presented to us for the first time.

In bills filed by plaintiff and intervening plaintiff, fraud on the part of defendant was alleged but not proved. The record satisfies us that an honest mistake was made by the attorneys who no longer represent the heirs. No fraud of any kind was shown. The order of the probate court became res adjudicata. It is conceded that Edward Horsman, Jr., defendant, was an adopted son of his foster father, and not being a blood relation of the deceased uncle, he was not legally entitled to inherit. He was a stranger in the eyes of the law and any amounts paid to him came out of the shares of the three sisters in the estate. In the hearing in the instant case, the trial judge held that the probate orders and distribution were res adjudicata, but that the two sisters were entitled to two-thirds of $13,200.42, the amount that defendant had received through a mistake in being included as one of the heirs. The judge based his decision upon the fact that defendant had been unjustly enriched by receiving an amount to which he had absolutely no legal claim whatsoever.

Two questions are presented, which we will discuss seriatim: First, May plaintiffs recover the amounts received by defendant through a mistake of law on the theory of unjust enrichment where there is no fraud nor any inequitable conduct by defendant in inducing the mistake? It is well nigh impossible to reconcile the many cases allowing or denying recovery caused through a mistake of law. The rule denying recovery is based historically on the maxim that everyone is presumed to know the law. In the enforcement of the criminal law, this maxim expresses a necessary rule of conduct. Were we to adopt the principle so often used in civil cases that the presumption disappears when there is evidence to the contrary, there is ample testimony to show that none of the parties nor their former attorneys knew the law with respect to the right of an adopted son to inherit from an uncle who died intestate. The more acceptable theory for denying recovery on account of mistake of law is that proof of mistake of law, unlike proof of mistake of fact, is not objectively ascertainable because it must be found in the mind of the party making payment. The subjective evidence of what was in a person's mind is not considered a satisfactory means of determining the real motive for payment. See note, 45 Harvard Law Rev., 336. In this State, the rule been laid down that relief will be granted where there has been a mistake as to antecedent and existing private legal rights or where the mistake has been induced by defendant's inequitable conduct. See Barr v. Payne, 298 Mich. 85, 298 N.W. 460;Renard v. Clink, 91 Mich. 1, 51 N.W. 692,30 Am.St.Rep. 458. In recent years text-writers and a few of the courts have come to the conclusion that relief for mistake of law should be given as readily as that for mistake of fact. Williston, Contracts, Rev.Ed.1937, § 1581; Restatement of Law of Restitution, p. 179; Peterson v. First National Bank, 162 Minn. 369, 203 N.W. 53, 42 A.L.R. 1185; Reggio v. Warren, 207 Mass. 525, 93 N.E. 805, 32 L.R.A.,N.S., 340, 20 Ann.Cas. 1244. In the recent case of Barr v. Payne, 298 Mich. 85, 298 N.W. 460, although we denied recovery because of certain other facts in the case,...