Morneau v. State

• Decision Date: 20 May 2014
• Docket Number: No. 35423.,35423.
• Citation: 150 Conn.App. 237,90 A.3d 1003
• Court: Connecticut Court of Appeals
• Parties: Ricky A. MORNEAU v. STATE of Connecticut et al.

150 Conn.App. 237

90 A.3d 1003

Ricky A. MORNEAU

v.STATE of Connecticut et al.

No. 35423.

Appellate Court of Connecticut.

Argued Oct. 22, 2013.

Decided May 20, 2014.

Ricky A. Morneau, self-represented, the appellant (plaintiff).

Michael K. Skold, assistant attorney general, with whom, on the brief, was George Jepsen, attorney general, for the appellees (named defendant et al.).

DiPENTIMA, C.J., and SHELDON and FLYNN, Js.

DiPENTIMA, C.J.

The plaintiff, Ricky A. Morneau, appeals following the granting of a motion to dismiss filed by the defendants ¹ in the case. The self-represented ² plaintiff raised a variety of issues and subissues in his appellate brief, contending that the court improperly granted the motion to dismiss. The defendants counter that (1) certain causes of action set forth in the plaintiff's complaint never were presented to the General Assembly and therefore were not encompassed in the waiver of sovereign immunity authorized by the General Assembly, (2) all but one of the remaining causes of action were untimely and were public emoluments in violation of article first, § 1, of the Connecticut constitution, (3) the sole remaining cause of action against two prosecutors properly was dismissed because of absolute judicial immunity, and (4) the plaintiff lacked standing to seek injunctive relief. We agree with the defendants, and, therefore, affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The following facts and procedural history are necessary for our resolution of this appeal.³ In May, 2007, the plaintiff commenced a three count lawsuit in the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut. In that federal action, the plaintiff alleged that state Marshals Louis C. Aresco and Louis Corneroli had refused to serve process for him. The plaintiff also claimed that he had sent a letter complaining about the two marshals to then Attorney General Richard Blumenthal and that the letter thereafter was forwarded to the State Marshal Commission.⁴ After conducting an investigation,the State Marshal Commission dismissed the plaintiff's complaint. See Morneau v. State, United States District Court, Docket No. 3:07–cv–00–819–JBA, 2008 WL 2704817 (D.Conn. July 7, 2008). The plaintiff further alleged that the state, Aresco, Corneroli, Blumenthal, and the State Marshal Commission violated his rights to due process and equal protection, and conspired to violate those rights. The District Court dismissed all of the plaintiff's claims, rendered judgment in favor of the defendants and declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over any state law claims. Id.

On August 24, 2009, the plaintiff commenced an action in the Superior Court premised on allegations that state Marshal Albenie Gagnon had overbilled the plaintiff for services and made false statements, the State Marshal Commission had denied his request for certain documents, made pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act, General Statutes § 1–200 et seq., and the state had violated motion deadlines. The plaintiff subsequently added state Marshal Timothy J. Bennett as a defendant. The state successfully moved to dismiss the action on the basis of sovereign immunity; however, the action against the two marshals remained.⁵ The court concluded that the plaintiff had failed to obtain permission to sue the state from the Claims Commissioner and thus the plaintiff's claims were barred by sovereign immunity. The August 24, 2009 action is not the subject of this appeal.

On September 8, 2009, the plaintiff filed a claim ⁶ with the Claims Commissioner, requesting permission to sue the state. In his claim, the plaintiff alleged: (1) overbilling by state marshals in violation of General Statutes § 52–70; ⁷ (2) mail fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1341 et seq.; (3) violation of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. § 1961 et seq.; and (4) violations of due process and equal protection by various state actors. ⁸

The state filed a motion to dismiss, arguing, inter alia, that the Claims Commission lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the claim presented by the plaintiff was untimely. On May 3, 2010, the plaintiff filed an objection to the motion to dismiss, and included a “chronology of events” in support of his opposition. The Claims Commissioner issued a memorandum of decision on May 21, 2010. He noted that the plaintiff alleged that he had been overbilled by state marshals on two separate occasions and that these improper actions occurred in or about August, 2007. Relying on General Statutes § 4–148(a),⁹ the Claims Commissioner determined that the plaintiff's claim was untimely, and therefore he lacked subject matter jurisdiction and dismissed the entire claim. See General Statutes § 4–158(a)(1).

In accordance with § 4–158(b), the plaintiff asked the General Assembly to review the decision of the Claims Commissioner dismissing the claim. On June 8, 2011, the General Assembly issued a Substitute Joint Resolution No. 34 (resolution) vacating the decision of the Claims Commissioner and authorizing the plaintiff “to institute and prosecute to final judgment an action against the state to recover damages as compensation for injury to person or damage to property, or both, allegedly suffered by the [plaintiff] as set forth in said claim. Such action shall be brought not later than one year from the date of the final adoption by the General Assembly of this resolution.”

The plaintiff then commenced the present action with a six count complaint, alleging: (1) violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983¹⁰ by the defendants; (2) conduct by the Office of the Attorney General, the Office of the State's Attorney, the State Marshal Commission, Gagnon and Bennett that constituted negligent infliction of emotional distress; (3) that the conduct of Gagnon and Bennett violated the federal RICO statute and the state Corrupt Organizations and Racketeering Activity Act (CORA), General Statutes § 53–395; (4) that the conduct of Gagnon and Bennett violated the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act (CUTPA), General Statutes § 42–110a et seq.; (5) that the conduct of the attorney general's office, the state's attorney's office and the State Marshal Commission constituted vexatious litigation in violation of General Statutes § 52–568; and (6) that the plaintiff was entitled to injunctive relief against the State Marshal Commission. The plaintiff sought monetary damages in counts one through five, and injunctive relief in count six.

Pursuant to Practice Book §§ 10–30¹¹ and 10–31, the defendants moved to dismiss the entire complaint filed by the plaintiff. Specifically, the defendants argued that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction on the basis of sovereign immunity, absolute immunity and the plaintiff's lack of standing.¹² After hearing argument, the court issued a memorandum of decision granting the defendants' motion and dismissed the plaintiff's complaint. The plaintiff filed a motion to reargue, which the court denied. This appeal followed.

Before addressing the specifics of the plaintiff's claims on appeal, we set forth the legal principles regarding a motion to dismiss. “The standard of review for a court's decision on a motion to dismiss is well settled. A motion to dismiss tests, inter alia, whether, on the face of the record, the court is without jurisdiction.... [O]ur review of the court's ultimate legal conclusion and resulting [determination] of the motion to dismiss will be de novo.... When a ... court decides a jurisdictional question raised by a pretrial motion to dismiss, it must consider the allegations of the complaint in their most favorable light.... In this regard, a court must take the facts to be those alleged in the complaint, including those facts necessarily implied from the allegations, construing them in a manner most favorable to the pleader.... The motion to dismiss ... admits all facts which are well pleaded, invokes the existing record and must be decided upon that alone.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Gold v. Rowland, 296 Conn. 186, 200–201, 994 A.2d 106 (2010); Bagg v. Thompson, 114 Conn.App. 30, 37–38, 968 A.2d 468 (2009).

I

The plaintiff first claims that the court improperly determined the scope of the legislative waiver of sovereign immunity. The defendants counter that the trial court properly concluded that the resolution of the General Assembly waived sovereign immunity only for the causes of actions that had been raised before the Claims Commissioner and that any other actions are barred by sovereign immunity. Specifically, the defendants maintain that the court properly dismissed (1) aspects of count one regarding the actions and omissions of Attorney General George Jepsen, Assistant Attorney General Philip Miller and the State Marshal Commission,¹³ (2) count two, negligent infliction of emotional distress, (3) count four, CUTPA violations, and (4) count five, vexatious litigation. We conclude that the trial court properly granted the motion to dismiss with respect to these causes of action.

As an initial matter, we set forth the relevant legal principles regarding sovereign immunity.¹⁴ “Sovereign immunity relates to a court's subject matter jurisdiction over a case, and therefore presents a question of law over which we exercise de novo review.... In so doing, we must decide whether [the trial court's] conclusions are legally and logically correct and find support in the facts that appear in the record.... The principle that the state cannot be sued without its consent, or sovereign immunity, is well established under our case law.... It has deep roots in this state and our legal system in general, finding its origin in ancient common law.... Not only have we recognized the state's immunity as an entity, but [w]e have also recognized that because the state can act only through its officers and agents, a suit against a state officer concerning a matter in which the officer represents ...