Moroch v. Collins
| Decision Date | 06 September 2005 |
| Docket Number | No. 05-03-00492-CV.,05-03-00492-CV. |
| Citation | 174 S.W.3d 849 |
| Parties | Thomas Francis MOROCH, Appellant, v. Christy Calvert COLLINS (Moroch), Appellee. |
| Court | Texas Supreme Court |
Anthony A. Petrocchi, Christopher M. Weil, Weil & Petrocchi, P.C., Dallas, for Appellant.
Paula J. Gaus, Irving, for Appellee.
Before Justices MOSELEY, BRIDGES, and LANG-MIERS.
Thomas Francis Moroch appeals from a final decree of divorce from Christy Calvert Collins (Moroch).1 In seventeen issues, Thomas challenges: (1) the trial court's characterization of the parties' estates; (2) the economic contribution award and the division of property; (3) the child support award; and (4) the attorney's fee award. In an additional issue, he challenges the admission of evidence relevant to Christy's economic contribution claim. For the reasons below, we resolve Thomas's issues against him and affirm the final decree of divorce.
Thomas and Christy married in 1976. They have two children, who were nineteen and sixteen years old when the divorce was granted. In 1979, Thomas and Christy purchased a house in Dallas referred to as the "DeLoache property." The deposit/earnest money paid on the contract for the DeLoache property was $10,000. The parties stipulated that the amount financed was $300,000, which was secured by a lien on the DeLoache property and satisfied in 1979. During the marriage the DeLoache property was renovated in two stages: the house was "gutted and rebuilt" between 1979 and 1986, and a garage was built between 1991 and 1992. The parties stipulated that the fair market value of the house for purposes of the divorce was $1,545,000.
In 1987, Thomas and Christy signed a postnuptial agreement partitioning their property. The only items designated as community property were the DeLoache property and the funds in "the household account."2 All other property was partitioned as either Thomas's or Christy's separate property. Separate property included earnings and property acquired in the future and the income, property, or increases arising from the separate property of each. The postnuptial agreement also provided for certain waivers, releases, and liability limits on the separate property.
In her original petition for divorce, Christy raised issues regarding conservatorship, child support, reimbursement, and attorney's fees. In her first supplemental petition for divorce, Christy made a claim for economic contribution to her separate estate against the community estate. Specifically, Christy claimed that her separate property estate contributed approximately $2.1 million to the community estate, and she requested that, if that amount exceeded the equity in the DeLoache property, then the entire amount of the equity should be awarded to her. Thomas answered, but made no counterclaims. An attorney ad litem was appointed for the children. Temporary orders were entered on behalf of the children.
Trial was to the court. The final divorce decree:
• dissolved the marriage;
• provided for conservatorship of and access to the two minor children;
• provided that Christy would make a lump-sum child support payment of $76,5003 to Thomas • incorporated the 1987 postnuptial agreement;
• granted Christy's claim for economic contribution in the amount of $1,559,043.45, and awarded her the DeLoache property in satisfaction of the claim;
• concluded that, after the award of the DeLoache property to Christy, pursuant to the parties' postnuptial agreement, there was no more community property to be awarded;
• granted Christy's request for attorney's fees and provided that the award was subject to a dollar-for-dollar credit against the lump-sum child support payment; and
• awarded separate property to the parties.
The trial court made findings of fact and conclusions of law, but refused Thomas's request for additional findings of fact and conclusions of law. The trial court denied Thomas's "motion for reconsideration, or to set aside final order, or for new trial" by written order. This appeal followed.
In issues one through ten, Thomas challenges the award of the DeLoache property in satisfaction of Christy's claim for economic contribution. In issue sixteen, Thomas challenges the division of property; in issue seventeen, Thomas challenges the admission of certain evidence relating to the property division. To place our review of these issues in context, we recount the general principles governing the award of marital property in divorce cases, including the law relating to contribution from one estate to another.
A trial court is charged with dividing the community estate in a "just and right" manner, considering the rights of both parties. TEX. FAM.CODE ANN. § 7.001 (Vernon 1998); LaFrensen v. La Frensen, 106 S.W.3d 876, 878 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2003, no pet.). Whether the property is separate or community property is determined by the facts that, according to rules of law, give character to the property. Boyd v. Boyd, 131 S.W.3d 605, 612 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2004, no pet.) (citing Robles v. Robles, 965 S.W.2d 605, 615 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1998, pet. denied) (op. on reh'g)). Separate property will retain its character through a series of exchanges so long as the party asserting separate ownership can overcome the presumption of community property by tracing the assets on hand during the marriage back to property that, because of its time and manner of acquisition, is separate in character. Id. (citing Cockerham v. Cockerham, 527 S.W.2d 162, 168 (Tex.1975)). When separate property has not been commingled or its identity as such can be traced, the statutory presumption is dispelled. Welder v. Welder, 794 S.W.2d 420, 425 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 1990, no writ) (citing Estate of Hanau v. Hanau, 730 S.W.2d 663, 667 (Tex.1987)). However, if the evidence shows that separate and community property have been so commingled as to defy resegregation and identification, the community presumption prevails. Boyd, 131 S.W.3d at 612.
When tracing separate property, it is not enough to show that separate funds could have been the source of a subsequent deposit of funds. Id. (citing Latham v. Allison, 560 S.W.2d 481, 485 (Tex.Civ.App.-Fort Worth 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.)). Moreover, as a general rule, mere testimony that property was purchased with separate funds, without any tracing of the funds, is insufficient to rebut the community presumption. Id. (); Bahr v. Kohr, 980 S.W.2d 723, 728 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1998, no pet.); McElwee v. McElwee, 911 S.W.2d 182, 188 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1995, writ denied). Any doubt as to the character of property should be resolved in favor of the community estate. Boyd, 131 S.W.3d at 612 (citing Akin v. Akin, 649 S.W.2d 700, 703 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 1983, writ ref'd n.r.e.)).
"A marital estate that makes an economic contribution to property owned by another marital estate has a claim for economic contribution with respect to the benefitted estate." TEX. FAM.CODE ANN. § 3.403(a) (Vernon Supp.2004-05). A claim for economic contribution does not affect the inception of title under which the character of property is determined at the time the right to own or claim the property arises. Id. § 3.404(a) (Vernon Supp.2004-05). Instead, it creates a claim against the property of the benefitted estate by the contributing estate. Id. § 3.404(b) (Vernon Supp.2004-05). Here, the claim matures on dissolution of the marriage. Id.
As pertinent here, "economic contribution" is the dollar amount of: (1) the reduction of the principal amount of that part of a debt, including a home equity loan incurred during marriage, secured by a lien on property, and incurred for the acquisition of, or for capital improvements to, property; and (2) capital improvements to property other than by incurring debt. Id. § 3.402(a)(3)(A)-(C), (6) (Vernon Sup.2004-05). Pursuant to the then-effective statute and as applicable here, the amount of an economic contribution claim is calculated by multiplying the equity in the benefitted property on the date of dissolution of the marriage by a fraction. The numerator of the fraction is the amount of economic contribution to the property by the contributing estate, while the fraction's denominator is the sum of three amounts: (i) the economic contribution to the property by the contributing estate; (ii) the equity in the property as of the date of the first economic contribution by the contributing estate; and (iii) the economic contribution to the property by the benefitted estate during the marriage. Act of May 22, 2001, 77th Leg., R.S., ch. 838, § 2, sec. 3.403(b), 2001 Tex. Gen. Laws 1679, 1681, amended by Act of May 28, 2003, 78th Leg., R.S., ch. 230, § 1, 2003 Tex. Gen. Laws 1056, 1057 . Here, the amount of a claim may not exceed the equity in the property on the date of dissolution of the marriage. TEX. FAM.CODE ANN. § 3.403(d).
Property possessed by either spouse during or on the dissolution of marriage is presumed to be community property. TEX. FAM.CODE ANN. § 3.003(a) (Vernon 1998). Thus, a spouse making a claim for economic contribution on behalf of his or her separate estate must prove by clear and convincing evidence that the funds expended to reduce the community debt were separate funds. Id. § 3.003(b). The statutory presumption that property possessed by either spouse upon dissolution of the marriage is community is a rebuttable presumption and is overcome by evidence that a specified item of property is the separate property of one spouse or the other. Jackson v....
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Bradshaw v. Bradshaw, 16–0328
...the trial court abused its discretion. Garza v. Garza , 217 S.W.3d 538, 549 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2006, no pet.) ; Moroch v. Collins , 174 S.W.3d 849, 857 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2005, pet. denied).Under the second prong, appellate review begins with the presumption that the trial court properly......
-
Condom Sense, Inc. v. Alshalabi
...discretion if, under the record, it reasonably could have reached only one decision and failed to do so. Moroch v. Collins, 174 S.W.3d 849, 864 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2005, pet. denied). A trial court does not abuse its discretion if there is some evidence of a substantive and probative character......
-
In re Interest of J.J.G.
...discretion. Bush v. Bush , 336 S.W.3d 722, 729 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2010, no pet.) ; see also Moroch v. Collins , 174 S.W.3d 849, 857 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2005, pet. denied). We conduct the applicable sufficiency review when considering the first prong of the test. Bush , 336 S.W.3d ......
-
Moeller v. Blanc
...its discretion if, on the evidence, it reasonably could have reached only one decision and failed to do so. Moroch v. Collins, 174 S.W.3d 849, 864 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2005, pet. denied). At the second step of the analysis, however, there is no fact-finding to be done. The trial court simply ac......