Morones v. Harlingen Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist.
| Decision Date | 02 October 2020 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. 1:20-cv-050 |
| Parties | LEONARDO MORONES, As next friend of L.A.M., a minor, Plaintiff v. HARLINGEN CONSOLIDATED INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT, And DENNIS LESTER, Defendants |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Texas |
Pending before the Court is the "12(b)(1) Motion to Dismiss in Part and 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Original Petition" (hereinafter, Defendants' "Motion" or "Motion to Dismiss"), filed by Harlingen Consolidated Independent School District and Dennis Lester. Dkt. No. 8. After Defendants filed this Motion to Dismiss, Plaintiff Leonardo Morones filed his "Third Motion for Leave to File Amended Complaint" (hereinafter, "Morones's "Motion to Amend"). Dkt. No. 23. For the reasons provided below, it is RECOMMENDED that the Court: (1) DENY Morones's Motion to Amend; (2) GRANT Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, in part; (3) DENY Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, in part; and (4) DIRECT the Clerk of Court to CLOSE this case.
Plaintiff Leonardo Morones, as next friend of L.A.M., a minor, initiated this civil action by filing an Original Petition in the 404th Judicial District Court of Cameron County, Texas on February 24, 2020. Dkt. No. 1-3. Asserting that federal question subject matter jurisdiction exits, Defendants removed this action from the 404th Judicial District Court to this Court on April 8, 2020. Dkt. No. 1 at 1-2 (citing 28 U.S.C §§ 1331 and 1343). On June 9, 2020, Defendants filed their instant Motion to Dismiss. Dkt. No. 8. Defendants argue that dismissal is proper under Rules 12(b)(1) and (6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Id.
Morones filed an untimely response to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss which failed to comply with the Local Rules. Dkt. No. 14. The Court struck Morones's response without prejudice to refiling. Dkt. No. 15. Morones additionally filed several submissions attempting to amend his Original Petition (Dkt. Nos. 13, 16, 18, 21), but those submissions also failed to comply with the Local Rules. See Dkt. Nos. 15, 17, 19, 22. On August 20, 2020, Morones filed his instant Motion to Amend. Dkt. No. 23. Defendants responded to the Motion to Amend on September 10, 2020, arguing that the Motion should be denied on futility grounds because Morones's proposed First Amended Complaint fails to state a claim within the jurisdiction of this Court. Dkt. No. 24.
Morones's Original Petition and proposed First Amended Complaint both fail to state a claim within the jurisdiction of the Court. Accordingly, for the reasons provided below, it is recommended that the Court deny Morones's Motion to Amend, grant Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, in part, and dismiss this case.
Morones's Original Petition states that Harlingen Consolidated Independent School District (hereinafter, "the District"), and its former band teacher, Dennis Lester, are liable to Morones for the injuries Lester inflicted on his son. Dkt. No. 1-3. In support of his Original Petition, Morones asserts as follows:
1. On or about May 3, 2019, at Vernon Middle School in Harlingen, Texas, Lester assaulted L.A.M. and used excessive force while attempting to discipline him. Dkt. No. 1-3 at 2-3. Specifically, Lester grabbed and pulled L.A.M. by the arm, which left marks and caused serious injuries. Id. At the time, Lester was working as an employee of the District and L.A.M. was a twelve-year-old student enrolled at the school. Id. at 3.
2. Lester's assault and attempt to discipline L.A.M. violated L.A.M.'s rights under the Constitutions of Texas and the United States. Id. at 4-5. The District's actions and inactions make it liable to Morones under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because Lester violated L.A.M.'s constitutional rights while acting under color of state law. Id. at 5-6.
3. Lester's conduct constituted negligence and gross negligence. He is liable to Morones for the injuries caused by his conduct. His conduct also justifies an award of exemplary damages under § 41.003(a) of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code. Id. at 5.
4. In addition to being liable for negligence and gross negligence, Lester is also liable to Morones because he used excessive force. The injuries caused by his use of excessive force required extensive medical treatment. Id. at 6. Because Lester used excessive force, § 22.0511 of the Texas Education Code applies to waive any official immunity he might otherwise be entitled to assert. Id.
5. In addition to requiring the payment of exemplary damages, the Court should issue monetary awards for past and future physical pain, past and future mental anguish, past and future medical expenses, and past and future loss of enjoyment. The Court should also require Defendants to pay for the attorney's fees and court costs incurred by Morones in bringing this lawsuit. Id. at 6-7.
Morones's proposed First Amended Complaint is very similar to his Original Petition. Compare Dkt. No. 1-3, with Dkt. No. 23-1. With respect to the alleged facts, the proposed First Amended Complaint differs from the Original Petition in that it: (1) specifies that Lester left red markings on L.A.M.'s arm; and (2) states that Lester failed to provide L.A.M. with assistance after the assault, or adequate, prompt medical care. Dkt. No. 23-1 at 3-4. With respect to the alleged legal claims, the proposed First Amended Complaint differs from the Original Petition in more significant respects.
Morones's Original Petition asserts that the District violated 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by violating the Constitutions of Texas and the United States. Dkt. No. 1-3 at 3-5, 6 (). The Original Petition does not raise any other claims against the District, nor does it raise a § 1983 claim against Lester. Id. Instead, the Original Petition asserts only common law tort claims against Lester, stating that Lester is liable for negligence, gross negligence, and the use of excessive force. Id. at 5-6 ("Causes of Action Against Dennis Lester"). Morones's First Amended Complaint asserts the same claims he asserted in his Original Petition, except that he asserts all claims against both Defendants. Compare Dkt. No. 1-3 at 3-6, with Dkt. No. 23-1 at 4-7. In all other material respects, Morones's First Amended Complaint and Original Petition are the same.
A. FED. R. CIV. P. 15(a). Rule 15(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure states that courts should "freely" grant leave to amend "when justice so requires." FED. R. CIV. P. 15(a)(2). Absent a substantial reason, such as a showing of substantial prejudiceto a party that cannot be cured through other means, a court's discretion is not broad enough to allow denial of leave to amend. Stripling v. Jordan Prod. Co., 234 F.3d 863, 872 (5th Cir. 2000) (citing Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962)); Leffall v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 28 F.3d 521, 524 (5th Cir. 1994); Dussouy v. Gulf Coast Inv. Corp., 660 F.2d 594, 597 (5th Cir. 1981). That said, leave to amend is not automatic. Wimm v. Jack Eckerd Corp., 3 F.3d 137, 139 (5th Cir. 1993) (quotation omitted).
Courts generally consider five factors when determining whether to grant leave to amend under Rule 15(a). Smith v. EMC Corp., 393 F.3d 590, 595 (5th Cir. 2004). Specifically, courts consider: (1) whether the moving party is guilty of undue delay; (2) whether the amendment is prompted by bad faith or a dilatory motive; (3) whether the moving party is guilty of repeated failure to cure deficiencies by previous amendments; (4) whether the amendment will cause the opposing party to suffer undue prejudice; and, (5) whether it would be futile to allow the amendment. Id. (citing Rosenzweig v. Azurix Corp., 332 F.3d 854, 864 (5th Cir. 2003)). A motion to amend may be denied on futility grounds because, for example, the amended complaint would fail to state a claim, or the court would lack jurisdiction over the amended complaint. Stripling v. Jordan Prod. Co., 234 F.3d 863, 873.
B. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(1). "Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction[.]" Stockman v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 138 F.3d 144, 151 (5th Cir. 1998) (citing Veldhoen v. United States Coast Guard, 35 F.3d 222, 225 (5th Cir. 1994)). The party asserting jurisdiction "constantly bears the burden of proof" to show that jurisdiction exists. Ramming v. United States, 281 F.3d 158, 161 (5th Cir. 2001) (per curiam) (citations omitted). Under Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a court must dismiss a claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction when it lacks the constitutional orstatutory power to adjudicate the claim. In re FEMA Trailer Formaldehyde Prods. Liab. Litig. (Miss. Plaintiffs), 668 F.3d 281, 286 (5th Cir. 2012) (citting Home Builders Ass'n, Inc. v. City of Madison, 143 F.3d 1006, 1010 (5th Cir. 1998)). A court may dismiss an action for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction based on: "(1) the complaint alone; (2) the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts in the record; or (3) the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts plus the court's resolution of disputed facts." Clark v. Tarrant Cty., 798 F.2d 736, 741 (5th Cir. 1986).
C. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6). Dismissal is appropriate under Rule 12(b)(6) if the plaintiff fails "to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6). In Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007), and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-80 (2009), the Supreme Court confirmed that Rule 12(b)(6) must be read in conjunction with Rule 8(a). Richter v. Nationstar Mortgage, LLC, Civil Action No. H-17-2021, 2017 WL 4155477, at *1 (S.D. Tex., 2017). Rule 8(a) requires "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2). To withstand a Rule 12(b)(6)...
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