Morongo Band of Mission Indians v. Stach, ED CV 96-0336-RT (VAPx).

• Decision Date: 16 January 1997
• Docket Number: No. ED CV 96-0336-RT (VAPx).,ED CV 96-0336-RT (VAPx).
• Citation: 951 F.Supp. 1455
• Court: U.S. District Court — Central District of California
• Parties: MORONGO BAND OF MISSION INDIANS, Plaintiff, v. Dennis STACH, Workers' Compensation Appeals Board for the State of California, and Frederick P. Popanda, Defendants.

951 F.Supp. 1455

MORONGO BAND OF MISSION INDIANS, Plaintiff, v. Dennis STACH, Workers' Compensation Appeals Board for the State of California, and Frederick P. Popanda, Defendants.

No. ED CV 96-0336-RT (VAPx).

United States District Court, C.D. California.

January 16, 1997.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Barbara E. Karshmer, John R. Shordike, Richard A. Cross, Alexander & Karshmer, Berkeley, CA, for Plaintiff.

John Plotz, Jacqueline Schauer, M.C. Rudy, Division of Workers' Compensation, Legal Unit, San Francisco, CA, Thomas J. McBirnie, Jr., Workers' Compensation Appeals Board, San Francisco, CA, for Defendants.

ORDER (1) GRANTING DENNIS STACH'S AND WORKER'S COMPENSATION APPEALS BOARD'S MOTION TO DISMISS THE COMPLAINT AS TO THEM WITH PREJUDICE, AND (2) DENYING PLAINTIFF MORONGO BAND OF MISSION INDIANS' REQUEST FOR A PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION AGAINST DEFENDANTS DENNIS STACH, WORKERS' COMPENSATION APPEALS BOARD FOR THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA, AND FREDERICK P. POPANDA

TIMLIN, District Judge.

The court, the Honorable Robert J. Timlin, has read and considered plaintiff Morongo Band of Mission Indians' (Band's) application for a preliminary injunction against defendants Dennis Stach (Stach), Workers' Compensation Appeals Board for the State of California (WCAB), and Frederick P. Popanda (Popanda) (collectively defendants), Popanda's opposition to the motion for preliminary injunction, WCAB's memorandum of points and authorities in response to an order to show cause, and Band's reply brief in support of its application for temporary restraining order/preliminary injunction, as well as oral argument on the application for preliminary injunction.

The court has also read and considered Stach's and WCAB's motion to dismiss Band's complaint as to them (motion to dismiss), the memorandum of points and authorities in support of the motion, the opposition and reply, Stach's and WCAB's requests for judicial notice, filed November 7 and November 14, 1996, and Band's November 12 opposition to, and November 19 objection to, the requests for judicial notice. Popanda did not file a motion to dismiss, but instead filed an answer to the complaint.

Based on such consideration, the court concludes as follows:

I.

EVIDENTIARY RULINGS AND RULING ON REQUEST FOR ORAL ARGUMENT

In connection with the request for a preliminary injunction, Band objects to Popanda's reference to the contents of Band's (operating as Casino Morongo) employee handbook, on which Popanda relies to argue that Band waived its sovereign immunity and submitted to the jurisdiction of the State of California for the purposes of processing claims for industrial injuries, on the grounds that Popanda has failed to provide the court with a copy of the document and that its contents are hearsay and inadmissible.

The objection is SUSTAINED on the former ground.

Band's request for judicial notice of all pleadings filed in this action (Opposition at p. 1, fn. 2), concurred in by defendants, is GRANTED.

In connection with the motion to dismiss, Stach's and WCAB's request for judicial notice of various documents in the underlying action of Popanda v. Morongo Bingo Casino (Cal.WCAB No. SBR 223071) (the WCAB action), including the motion to dismiss in that case filed by Band (in which motion to dismiss defendant Band noted that it had been improperly identified in the WCAB action as "Morongo Bingo Casino"), which request is opposed by Band, is GRANTED, but the use of the material so noticed may be limited for the reasons noted in Band's November 12, 1996 opposition to request for judicial notice.

Band's request for oral argument on the issue of judicial notice is DENIED.

II.

FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND¹

Band is a federally recognized Indian tribe, and thus is entitled to the rights, privileges and immunities secured by article I, section 8, clause 3 and article II, section 2, clause 2 of the United States Constitution, by the Mission Indian Relief Act, 26 Stat. 712 (1891), and federal common law. It is the beneficial owner of the Morongo Indian Reservation (the reservation), and the owner and operator of a tribal gaming business known as Casino Morongo, which is located within the exterior boundaries of the reservation, and which is operated in accordance with and under the authority of the laws and regulations of the Morongo Band, the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, 25 U.S.C. section 2701 et seq. (IGRA), and related federal statutory and common law.

On or about October 11, 1993, Popanda filed against Band a claim pursuant to California Labor Code section 132a(1) (the claim), which formed the basis of the WCAB action.² The entity allegedly known as the Morongo Bingo Casino was and is the Casino Morongo.

On or about February 7, 1994, a law firm doing business under the name of O'Flaherty & Belgum and/or Kathleen Bloch, an individual employed by O'Flaherty & Belgum, both purporting to represent Band, filed or caused to be filed on behalf of Band an answer to the claim. According to Band, "neither O'Flaherty & Belgum nor Ms. Bloch represented or was authorized to represent the [Band]; they had no attorney contract approved by the Bureau of Indian Affairs as required by federal law, and their purported actions on behalf of the [Band] in response to the [claim] filed in the [state action] were null and void and of no effect whatever. ¶ Thereafter, O'Flaherty and Belgum and/or Ms. Bloch purportedly took certain actions on behalf of [Band] in the course of their purported representation of [Band] in the [state action]. For the reasons herein alleged neither O'Flaherty & Belgum nor Ms. Bloch had any right or authority to represent [Band], to act [on Band's] behalf, to file the [a]nswer, or to appear for any purpose on behalf of the Band pursuant to or in connection with the [c]laim."

On or about February 15, 1995, Band, appearing specially in the WCAB action and represented by its current law firm, moved to dismiss the claim for lack of subject matter and personal jurisdiction. In September 1995, Stach and WCAB denied Band's motion to dismiss the WCAB action and set the matter for hearing.

On or about May 15, 1996, Stach and WCAB granted an order awarding monetary benefits to Popanda and against Band. On or about May 28, 1996, Band filed a petition for reconsideration challenging the denial of its motion to dismiss, which was denied. Popanda's claim was set for a half-day administrative trial, which trial was subsequently enjoined by this court as a result of the filing of this action and the court's granting Band's application for a temporary restraining order (TRO) after an order to show cause (OSC) was issued and a hearing conducted thereon.

Band, which invokes this court's jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. sections 1331, 1362, 2201 and 2202³, seeks a declaration, pursuant to section 2201, that (1) the State of California and WCAB lack jurisdiction to apply or enforce California Labor Code, section 132a, to Band, its reservation, or Casino Morongo, because of Band's sovereign immunity, which it has not waived, and (2) California and WCAB lack personal jurisdiction over Band or its officers, members and/or employees. Band also seeks an injunction to prevent WCAB and Stach from applying to it and enforcing against it California's Labor Code.⁴

III.

ANALYSIS

A. WCAB's and Stach's Motion to Dismiss Band's Complaint Must Be Granted Because this Court Lacks Subject Matter Jurisdiction

WCAB contends that this court lacks jurisdiction over it and Dennis Stach, the worker's compensation referee who was presiding over the WCAB action, because this court is barred from exercising jurisdiction over state agencies by (1) the Eleventh Amendment as recently interpreted by Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, ___ U.S. ___, 116 S.Ct. 1114, 134 L.Ed.2d 252 (1996) (Seminole) and (2) the Anti-Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. section 2283 (Act).

1. The Eleventh Amendment Bars Suits by Indian Tribes Against a State Or Its Agencies in the Absence of Consent to Suit by the State

The Eleventh Amendment of the United States Constitution prohibits federal courts from considering actions brought by private citizens against state governments, without the states' consent. Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 15, 10 S.Ct. 504, 507, 33 L.Ed. 842 (1890). The Eleventh Amendment's sovereign immunity also restricts suits against states by other sovereigns, including Indian tribes. Blatchford v. Native Village of Noatak, 501 U.S. 775, 779-82, 111 S.Ct. 2578, 2581-83, 115 L.Ed.2d 686 (1991). Although 28 U.S.C. section 1362 gives federal district courts original jurisdiction over all civil actions brought by any recognized Indian tribe or band when the matter in controversy arises under federal law, that section does not abrogate state sovereign immunity. Blatchford v. Native Village of Noatak, 501 U.S. at 788, 111 S.Ct. at 2586.

The Eleventh Amendment bars suits against states and their agencies for equitable relief as well as damages. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100, 104 S.Ct. 900, 907, 79 L.Ed.2d 67 (1984). A state's sovereign immunity extends to state agencies and to state officers, who act on behalf of the state and can therefore assert the state's sovereign immunity. P.R. Aqueduct & Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddy, 506 U.S. 139, 142-46, 113 S.Ct. 684, 687-88, 121 L.Ed.2d 605 (1993); Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. at 101, 104 S.Ct. at 907, 79 L.Ed.2d 67. The only exception to this principle is that state officials are not immune from federal suit to enjoin them from violating federal laws. Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 28 S.Ct. 441, 52 L.Ed. 714 (1908).

The Supreme Court recently addressed the Eleventh Amendment as it applies to suits by Indian tribes against states in Seminole, ___ U.S. ___, 116 S.Ct. 1114, 134 L.Ed.2d 252. The primary effect of Seminole was to overturn the Court's prior decision in Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 109...