Morra v. Hill

• Decision Date: 30 November 1961
• Citation: Morra v. Hill, 103 N.H. 492, 175 A.2d 824 (N.H. 1961)
• Parties: Stephen MORRA v. Harry HILL et al.
• Court: New Hampshire Supreme Court

Page 824

175 A.2d 824

103 N.H. 492

Stephen MORRA v. Harry HILL et al.

Supreme Court of New Hampshire.

Argued Nov. 7, 1961.

Decided Nov. 30, 1961.

Broderick & Loughlin, Manchester (Martin F. Loughlin, Manchester, orally), for plaintiff.

Joseph V. Stancik, Derry (by brief and orally), for defendants.

DUNCAN, Justice.

The defendants, who are husband and wife, own and operate a mobile home park in Manchester, known as 'Hill's Trailer Court,' which accommodates some forty house trailers. Access to and from the public highway is provided by means of a semicircular paved driveway. The plaintiff, who was engaged in the range and fuel oil business, was given permission by the defendants in August or September 1957 to service trailers in the park, and thereafter for a period of approximately a year delivered oil to a substantial number of them, as well as to the defendants and members of their family, until the defendants advised him that they did not 'want [him] in the park any more.' On September 12, 1958, following a dispute over a small bill for gasoline furnished an employee of the defendants at the plaintiff's store, the defendant wife again advised the plaintiff to leave the park and not return. When he declined to leave the police were called, and when he returned later the same day with his oil truck, the defendants blocked his exit until after a conference with the police and counsel for the parties. The plaintiff has not since undertaken to enter the park.

The defendants' evidence tended to prove that the request that the plaintiff cease deliveries in the park was preceded by complaints from trailer owners of excessive noise from his delivery truck, damage to asphalt pavement by oil leakage from the truck, excessive speed within the park, and operation of the truck in the park at unreasonable hours and for purposes other than delivery of oil. There was evidence that the plaintiff made frequent and lengthy calls at one particular trailer during nighttime hours when his truck was permitted to stand with the motor running, and that this trailer was subsequently evicted from the park.

The evidence also tended to show that the trailer owners who occupied the park had no written leases but were charged $20 per month, and were expected to sign registration blanks agreeing to certain regulations for the conduct of the park, including rules which forbade 'solicitors' without 'permission * * * granted at the office,' and the operation of vehicles in excess of five miles an hour.

There was no evidence that the plaintiff delivered oil to any trailer owner under contract, but it appeared that over the year during which he did business at the park he delivered oil with some regularity to a number of trailers. It was his contention that the defendants wrongfully deprived him of the opportunity to derive continued profits from this business, and he produced evidence of the profits derived during the year in question.

The law is settled that one who without privilege to do so purposely prevents a third person from continuing a business relation with another is liable to the other for harm sustained as a result. Russell v. Croteau, 98 N.H. 68, 94 A.2d 376, and authorities cited. Prosser on Torts (2d ed.) § 106; Note: Interference with Contractual Relations in New England, 38 B.U.L.Rev. 285. In the case before us, it could be found that although the plaintiff entered into his business relationships with the defendants' tenants pursuant to permission from the defendants to do so, he thereafter...