Morrand Enters. v. Sachs/Haynes 503, LLC

• Decision Date: 09 November 2022
• Docket Number: CV-20-364
• Citation: 2022 Ark.App. 451
• Parties: MORRAND ENTERPRISES, LLC APPELLANT v. SACHS/HAYNES 503, LLC; AND HCH TOYOTA, LLC APPELLEES
• Court: Arkansas Court of Appeals

2022 Ark.App. 451

MORRAND ENTERPRISES, LLC APPELLANT
v.
SACHS/HAYNES 503, LLC; AND HCH TOYOTA, LLC APPELLEES

No. CV-20-364

Court of Appeals of Arkansas, Division II

November 9, 2022

APPEAL FROM THE BENTON COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT [NO. 04CV-16-803] HONORABLE JOHN R. SCOTT, JUDGE

Doss Law Firm, P.A., by: D. Westbrook Doss, Jr., and Alex T. Shirley, for appellant.

Friday, Eldredge & Clark, LLP, by: Clifford W. Plunkett and Joshua C. Ashley, for appellees.

OPINION

BART F. VIRDEN, Judge

Appellant Morrand Enterprises, LLC ("Morrand"), appeals from the Benton County Circuit Court's judgment in favor of appellees, HCH Toyota, LLC, and Sachs/Haynes 503, LLC ("HCH and Sachs"), on Morrand's claims for breach of contract, conversion, and unjust enrichment. The appeal returns to this court after we reversed and remanded the trial court's summary judgment in favor of HCH and Sachs. GM Enters., LLC v. HCH Toyota, LLC, 2018 Ark.App. 607, 567 S.W.3d 878.^[1] After a trial on the merits, judgment was entered against Morrand. Morrand raises three points for reversal: (1) the trial court erred in denying its motion for summary judgment based on the law of the case; (2) the trial court failed to follow

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Arkansas contract law and the law of the case; and (3) the trial court erred in denying its claim for unjust enrichment. We affirm.

Because we do not reach the merits of Morrand's arguments for procedural reasons, it is not necessary to delve too deeply into the facts. In GM Enterprises, we concluded that summary judgment was not appropriate on Morrand's claim for breach of contract regarding lease-termination agreements ("LTAs"). We also reversed on Morrand's conversion claim as a result of the reversal of the breach-of-contract claim. Further, we reversed as to Morrand's claim for unjust enrichment because the trial court had dismissed the claim solely in reliance on the existence of a written contract without considering any exceptions to the general rule. Our mandate issued February 21, 2019.

On April 16, 2019, Morrand filed a motion for summary judgment on the basis that there were no material facts at issue. Morrand referred to GM Enterprises in its argument at the hearing on the summary-judgment motion and suggested that certain matters had been established in that opinion; however, in denying Morrand's motion, the trial court simply said that there were material issues of fact to be tried. In its order denying the motion, the trial court bifurcated the upcoming trial with factual issues to be decided by a jury and equitable theories to be determined by the court.

At trial, the trial court framed the issue for the jury, stating that the jury's job was to interpret the parties' leases. Morrand's counsel agreed with that characterization of the issue. The jury unanimously found for HCH and Sachs on Morrand's claim for breach of contract.

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Nine jurors found for HCH and Sachs on Morrand's conversion claim. Finally, the trial court concluded that HCH and Sachs had not been unjustly enriched.

I. Denial of Summary Judgment

Morrand argues that the trial court erred in not granting its motion for summary judgment given the law of the case established by this court in GM Enterprises. The denial of summary judgment, however, is generally not reviewable on appeal. See City of Little Rock v. Nelson ex rel. Nelson, 2020 Ark. 34, 592 S.W.3d 633. This is true even after a trial on the merits. Id. A denial of summary judgment is reviewable only when it results in a denial of sovereign immunity or the immunity of a government official. Id. Because this case does not involve any claims of immunity, these exceptions do not apply. Nor is this a case in which the trial court's denial of the motion was combined with a dismissal on the merits that...