Morrash v. Strobel, s. 85-1918
| Court | United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (4th Circuit) |
| Citation | 842 F.2d 64 |
| Docket Number | Nos. 85-1918,s. 85-1918 |
| Parties | Joseph MORRASH and Morton Ford, Plaintiffs-Appellees, and Charles Cox, Plaintiff, v. Charles STROBEL, Defendant-Appellant. and John R. Stedman, City of Alexandria; Defendant. Joseph MORRASH, Charles Cox and Morton Ford, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Charles STROBEL and City of Alexandria, Defendants-Appellees. and John R. Stedman, Defendant. Joseph MORRASH, Charles Cox and Morton Ford, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. CITY OF ALEXANDRIA, Defendant-Appellant. and Charles Strobel, John R. Stedman, Defendants. Joseph MORRASH and Morton Ford, Plaintiffs-Appellants, and Charles Cox, Plaintiff, v. Charles STROBEL, City of Alexandria, Defendants-Appellees. and John R. Stedman, Defendant. Joseph MORRASH and Morton Ford, Charles Cox, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Charles STROBEL, Defendant-Appellee. and John R. Stedman, City of Alexandria, Defendants. (L), 85-1939, 85-1998, 85-2002 and 86-3552. |
| Decision Date | 06 October 1987 |
Page 64
and
Charles Cox, Plaintiff,
v.
Charles STROBEL, Defendant-Appellant.
and
John R. Stedman, City of Alexandria; Defendant.
Joseph MORRASH, Charles Cox and Morton Ford, Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.
Charles STROBEL and City of Alexandria, Defendants-Appellees.
and
John R. Stedman, Defendant.
Joseph MORRASH, Charles Cox and Morton Ford, Plaintiffs-Appellees,
v.
CITY OF ALEXANDRIA, Defendant-Appellant.
and
Charles Strobel, John R. Stedman, Defendants.
Joseph MORRASH and Morton Ford, Plaintiffs-Appellants,
and
Charles Cox, Plaintiff,
v.
Charles STROBEL, City of Alexandria, Defendants-Appellees.
and
John R. Stedman, Defendant.
Joseph MORRASH and Morton Ford, Charles Cox, Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.
Charles STROBEL, Defendant-Appellee.
and
John R. Stedman, City of Alexandria, Defendants.
Fourth Circuit.
Decided Oct. 6, 1987.
Page 65
Robert A.W. Boraks, Washington, D.C. (Mary E. Craig, Reston, Va., on brief), for defendant-appellant.
Susan M. Cardenas, Joseph F. Cunningham (David G. Fiske, Thomas & Fiske, P.C.; David D. Hudgins, William H. Atwill, Jr., Cunningham & Hudgins, Alexandria, Va., on brief), for plaintiffs-appellees.
Before PHILLIPS and SPROUSE, Circuit Judges, and BOYLE, District Judge for the Eastern District of North Carolina, sitting by designation.
TERRENCE WILLIAM BOYLE, District Judge:
In this civil rights case, three Alexandria, Virginia, policemen sued the City and its Public Safety Director claiming that their constitutional rights were deprived by the defendants. All of the plaintiffs claim that they were "whistle blowers" who pursued and exposed police misconduct. The plaintiffs claim that in return for their efforts to expose corruption they were singled out by the defendants for retaliation resulting in either discipline or discharge. The plaintiffs seek to recover money damages from the defendants, together with injunctive relief reinstating the dismissed plaintiff and expunging the records of the disciplined plaintiffs, and a mandatory injunction against future violations of the plaintiffs' constitutional rights and the recovery of attorneys' fees under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1988.
I.
The controversy arose from two separate incidents. The first involved the alleged moral turpitude of an Alexandria police
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officer, and the second involved the alleged illegal drug activity of the city sheriff. In the summer of 1982, the plaintiff Morton Ford heard rumors that one of his fellow officers had made homosexual advances toward an adolescent male. Conversations with this officer increased Ford's suspicion. Ford sent a memo to the police department's internal affairs division expressing his concern over this subject. Shortly thereafter Ford had a disagreement with his superior, the defendant Charles Strobel, Director of Public Safety for the City of Alexandria. Strobel questioned Ford's motive in writing the memo setting out his suspicion of sexual misconduct by a fellow officer. Later, Ford was transferred from his assignment in vice/narcotics to a night shift patrol, without any loss of pay or of seniority.Ford claims that Strobel transferred him as punishment in retaliation for the memo. The defendants claim that the transfer was unrelated to the memo. Rather, defendants say that Ford's transfer resulted from his poor management and poor leadership and his disclosure within the police force of the allegations against his fellow officer. Ford did not invoke his right to an administrative grievance procedure to redress the transfer although that right was available to him.
After Ford's memo with the charges, Strobel conducted an investigation of the alleged sexual impropriety and concluded that the suspicions raised in the memo were the product of rumor and that the accusations against the officer were unfounded.
The summary handling of the official investigation caused a group called the Alexandria Police Association ("the Association") to initiate its own "unofficial" inquiry. A memo was sent to the defendant Strobel from the Association questioning the adequacy of his investigation. This was followed in October 1983 by the appointment by the Association of an "investigative committee" consisting of the plaintiff Ford, together with the plaintiff Joseph Morrash (a fellow officer) and a third police officer who is in no way involved in this lawsuit.
Morrash and Ford contend that they were authorized as members of a committee of the Police Association to determine whether Public Safety Director Strobel's investigation was adequate or a sham.
Approximately two weeks after the committee had been formed, Officer Morrash was cautioned by his superior, Lieutenant Hilleary, not to conduct his investigation while he was on duty. On November 28, 1983, Morrash was transferred from his job as a burglary investigator to foot patrol at a shopping center. On November 29, 1983, Morrash filed a grievance to this transfer. Morrash and Ford continued to participate in the investigation for several months. During January and February 1984, the Association questioned the usefulness of continuing the investigation as its members began to voice objection to the committee's activity.
On April 4, 1984, when the committee failed to produce substantial proof to corroborate Officer Ford's allegations of sexual misconduct, the Association entirely withdrew its support from the committee.
Morrash appealed the transfer through established grievance procedures and secured the reinstatement of his previous job assignment. An arbitration panel unanimously held that the transfer was punitive and that the reasons for the transfer were pretextual.
The second incident involved the following facts. The plaintiff-appellant Charles Cox, a police officer, was assigned to investigate suspected drug trafficking at an Alexandria restaurant. Cox and another officer conducted the investigation, which began in February 1984, under the command of Lt. Arthur Bratcher. Through a confidential informant, it was discovered that a regular patron of the restaurant was the Alexandria sheriff. The sheriff was at one point a "target" of the investigation. The evidence produced by this investigation was insignificant and circumstantial. Thereafter, Bratcher terminated the sheriff's status as a target of the inquiry and the investigation of the restaurant stopped
Page 67
in mid-March 1984. Cox then wrote a memo to Bratcher stating that the investigation of the sheriff should continue, citing what he believed to be promising new leads. The investigation was not reopened. On August 24, 1984, Cox resigned from the police force after allegations (which he denied) that he had been improperly using sick leave time for his recreation. Cox, Ford and Morrash filed this action.The district judge allowed summary judgment for the City on all of the claims of all of the plaintiffs. The court also allowed summary judgment for the defendant Strobel on the claims of Charles Cox. The jury tried and decided the claims of the plaintiffs Morrash and Ford against the defendant Strobel under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983. These included claims for the alleged deprivation of the plaintiffs' constitutional rights to free association and due process.
The jury awarded Morrash $6,000 and Ford $9,000 on these claims. No punitive damages were awarded. Defendant Strobel did not make a motion to the trial court for judgment n.o.v. Thereafter, the district court ordered Ford reinstated to his prior position and ordered Morrash's and Ford's files to be expunged of any adverse content as a result of this...
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...during the stand-off. The First Amendment right to freedom of association is protectable in § 1983 actions. See, e.g., Morrash v. Strobel, 842 F.2d 64, 69 (4th Cir. 1987); Thorne v. El Segundo, 726 F.2d 459, 471 (9th Cir.1983), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 979, 105 S.Ct. 380, 83 L.Ed.2d 315 (1984......
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Chisolm v. Michigan Afscme Council 25, No. 01-CV-71312-DT.
...an employment context pertain not to the right to continue in a given job but rather to the freedom to seek another." Morrash v. Strobel, 842 F.2d 64, 68 (4th Cir.1987); see also Med Corp., Inc. v. City of Lima, 296 F.3d 404, 413-14 (6th Cir.2002) (noting that the Supreme Court has suggeste......
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Donaggio v. Arlington County, Va., Civ. A. No. 1:94CV1277.
...Cir.1988) (school maintenance supervisor is not § 1983 policymaker because of superior authority of school board); Morrash v. Strobel, 842 F.2d 64, 67-68 (4th Cir. 1987) (city's public safety director is not § 1983 policymaker because of superior authority of city manager and city...
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White v. Town of Chapel Hill, Civ. No. 1:93CV00304.
...during the stand-off. The First Amendment right to freedom of association is protectable in § 1983 actions. See, e.g., Morrash v. Strobel, 842 F.2d 64, 69 (4th Cir. 1987); Thorne v. El Segundo, 726 F.2d 459, 471 (9th Cir.1983), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 979, 105 S.Ct. 380, 83 L.Ed.2d 315 (1984......
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Donaggio v. Arlington County, Va., Civ. A. No. 1:94CV1277.
...Cir.1988) (school maintenance supervisor is not § 1983 policymaker because of superior authority of school board); Morrash v. Strobel, 842 F.2d 64, 67-68 (4th Cir. 1987) (city's public safety director is not § 1983 policymaker because of superior authority of city manager and city ...
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Brubaker v. City of Richmond, 90-1523
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Chisolm v. Michigan Afscme Council 25, 01-CV-71312-DT.
...an employment context pertain not to the right to continue in a given job but rather to the freedom to seek another." Morrash v. Strobel, 842 F.2d 64, 68 (4th Cir.1987); see also Med Corp., Inc. v. City of Lima, 296 F.3d 404, 413-14 (6th Cir.2002) (noting that the Supreme Court has suggeste......