Morrell v. Astrue, Case No. 12-1366
| Decision Date | 16 September 2013 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 12-1366 |
| Parties | ROXANNA MORRELL, Plaintiff, v. MICHAEL J. ASTRUE, COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Central District of Illinois |
This matter is now before the Court on Plaintiff Roxanna Morrell's ("Plaintiff") Motion for Summary Judgment [ECF No. 13] and Defendant Commissioner of Social Security Michael J. Astrue's ("the Commissioner") Motion for Summary Affirmance [ECF No. 14]. Plaintiff seeks judicial review pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) of the determination that she is not disabled within the meaning Sections 216(i), 223(d), and 1614(a)(3)(A) of the Social Security Act and that she is not eligible for Disability Insurance Benefits. The Commissioner filed a cross-motion seeking affirmance of the Administrative Law Judge's ("the ALJ") decision denying benefits. For the following reasons, Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment [ECF No. 13] is DENIED and the Commissioner's Motion for Summary Affirmance [ECF No. 14] is GRANTED.
The Court begins its review of the Commissioner's determination with the applicable legal standards. To be eligible for Supplemental Security Income ("SSI") and/or Disability Insurance Benefits ("DIB"), a claimant must show that his or her inability to work is medical in nature and that he or she is totally disabled. Economic conditions, personal factors, financialconsiderations, and attitudes of employers are irrelevant in determining whether a claimant is eligible for disability benefits. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1566, 416.966. In order to establish a disability under the Social Security Act, a claimant must demonstrate an "inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than twelve months." 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). Establishing a disability under the Act is a five-step sequential process. The inquiry ends if at any given step the Commissioner1 affirmatively finds that the claimant is disabled or not disabled. However, should the ALJ not make that determination, he or she must proceed to the next step. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4). In the following order, the ALJ must evaluate whether the claimant:
This Court's review is governed by 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), which provides that "the findings of the Commissioner of Social Security as to any fact, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive." Substantial evidence is "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Schaaf v. Astrue, 602 F.3d 869, 874 (7th Cir. 2010) (quoting Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971)). A Court will "review the ALJ'sdecision deferentially." Overman v. Astrue, 546 F.3d 456, 462 (7th Cir. 2008). "Although this standard is generous, it is not entirely uncritical, and the case must be remanded if the decision lacks evidentiary support." Id. (quoting Steele v. Barnhart, 290 F.3d 936, 940 (7th Cir. 2002)). The Commissioner, acting through the ALJ, "is not required to address every piece of evidence or testimony presented, but must provide a 'logical bridge' between the evidence and his [or her] conclusions." Terry v. Astrue, 580 F.3d 471, 475 (7th Cir. 2009) (quoting Clifford v. Apfel, 227 F.3d 863, 872 (7th Cir. 2000)). It is this Court's role to view the record as a whole, but it may not reweigh the evidence or substitute its judgment for that of the ALJ. Schmidt v. Apfel, 201 F.3d 970, 972 (7th Cir. 2000). The ALJ must articulate some minimal basis for the conclusions that he or she reaches so the reviewing court may "trace the path" of the ALJ's reasoning. Willis v. Apfel, 116 F. Supp. 2d 971, 974 (N.D. Ill. 2000); see also Carlson v. Shalala, 999 F.2d 180, 181 (7th Cir. 1993).
On September 2, 2009, Plaintiff filed a Title II application for a period of disability and disability insurance benefits. (R24). Plaintiff also filed a Title XVI application for supplemental security income on September 14, 2009. (R24). In both of her applications, Plaintiff alleged that her disability began October 15, 2008. (R24). These claims were denied initially on December 9, 2009, and upon reconsideration on April 1, 2010. (R24). Thereafter, Plaintiff filed a written request for hearing on May 11, 2010. (R24). On June 6, 2011, a video hearing was held before an ALJ, Martha R. Reeves. (R24). Amy Kutschbach, an impartial vocational expert ("VE"), was also present at the hearing. (R24). On June 17, 2011, the ALJ issued a decision based on Plaintiff's application for a period of disability and disability insurance benefits filed on September 2, 2009, that Plaintiff is not disabled under Sections 216(i), 223(d), and 1614(a)(3)(A)of the Social Security Act. (R37). In addition, the ALJ issued a decision based on Plaintiff's application for SSI filed on September 14, 2009, that Plaintiff is not disabled under the Social Security Act. (R37). On July 18, 2012, the Appeals Council issued a decision denying review of the ALJ's decision. (R11-16).
Plaintiff's hearing before an ALJ was held June 6, 2011. (R24). Plaintiff testified that she was born on May 1, 1961. (R36). She was forty-seven years old at the onset of her rheumatoid arthritis. (R29). Plaintiff has a nursing degree and did work as a housekeeper and licensed practical nurse ("LPN"). (R29). Plaintiff last worked in October 2008 cleaning houses, but she stopped because of pain in her hands from rheumatoid arthritis. (R29). The rheumatoid arthritis largely affected her hands, her joints locked up, and she could not feel objects she tried to hold. (R30). Sometimes, she manually moved some fingers when she could not feel or grip. (R30). Plaintiff also had arthritic symptoms in her shoulders, hip, knee, back, and feet. (R30). She experienced shoulder aching, burning, and locking and lower back pain. (R30). To treat her rheumatoid arthritis, Plaintiff took tramadol and Arthritis Strength Tylenol but tramadol caused dizziness and drowsiness. (R30).
In addition to rheumatoid arthritis, Plaintiff experienced thyroid problems. (R30). She treated her condition with medication and received regular blood work to monitor her condition. (R30). The combination of thyroid problems and rheumatoid arthritis made her tired. (R30). She could do daily household chores for twenty minutes at a time before she rested for fifteen to twenty minutes. (R30). Any type of walking caused her to lie down for fifteen to twenty minutes, and she could go outside for no more than thirty minutes. (R30).
The following sections (pages 5-13) summarize the ALJ's written decision. Based on the application for a period of disability and disability insurance benefits filed on September 2, 2009, the ALJ found that Plaintiff was not disabled under Section 216(i) and 223(d) of the Social Security Act. In addition, based on the application for supplemental security income filed on September 14, 2009, the ALJ found that Plaintiff was not disabled under Section 1614(a)(3)(A) of the Social Security Act.
At step one of the evaluation, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since October 15, 2008. (R26). At step two, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had inflammatory arthritis, bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome, and lumbar disc protrusion as severe impairments. (R26). At step three, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff's impairments, whether considered singly or in combination, did not meet or equal any listed impairment. (R28). Here, the ALJ specifically considered Plaintiff's assertion that the arthritis in her hands met the requirements of Listing 14.09A2 and found that she did not. (R28-29). Between steps three and four, the ALJ found that Plaintiff retained the residual functional capacity ("RFC") to perform a limited range of light work that limited her to lifting no more than ten pounds. (R29). The ALJ also found that pushing and pulling was limited in Plaintiff's upper extremities, that she could stand and walk for six hours in an eight-hour day, and that for the remaining two hours, she had to be allowed to alternate between sitting and standing. (R29). Although the ALJ found that Plaintiff could frequently reach, she limited her to only occasional handling, feeling, and fine finger manipulation. (R29). The ALJ determined that Plaintiff's testimony about her allegedly disabling symptoms was not credible. (R30). At step four, the ALJ found that Plaintiff could not perform either of her past jobs. (R35). At step five, the ALJ relied on VE testimony, inconjunction with the medical-vocational guidelines, to find that Plaintiff was not disabled because she could perform a significant number of light jobs, such as a case aid. (R36-37).
The ALJ found Plaintiff did not have an impairment or combination of impairments that met or medically equalled one of the listed impairments in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1 (20 C.F.R. 404.1520(d), 404.1525, 404.1526, 416.920(d), 416.925, and 416.926). (R28). The ALJ stated that although Plaintiff had "severe" impairments, the impairments did not meet the criteria of any listed impairments described in Appendix 1 of the Regulations (20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1). (R28). Plaintiff's treating or examining physicians did not...
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