Morrell v. Williams

• Decision Date: 08 December 1976
• Docket Number: No. 62,62
• Citation: 279 Md. 497,366 A.2d 1040
• Parties: Morris A. MORRELL et al. v. Sylvia Hall WILLIAMS et al. v. Raynetta Renee FOWLKES v. Morris A. MORRELL.
• Court: Maryland Court of Appeals

Page 497

279 Md. 497

366 A.2d 1040

Morris A. MORRELL et al. v. Sylvia Hall WILLIAMS et al. v. Raynetta Renee FOWLKES v. Morris A. MORRELL.

No. 62.

Court of Appeals of Maryland.

Dec. 8, 1976.

Frank J. Vecella and E. Dale Adkins, III, Baltimore (Anderson, Coe & King, Baltimore, on the brief) for Morris A. Morrell; by Steven A. Charles, Baltimore (E. B. Harris and Hardwick, Tripoda & Harris, Baltimore, on the brief) for John Lee Worsham.

I. Marshall Seidler, Baltimore (Henry Miller and Eccleston, Seidler & Miller, Baltimore, on the brief), for Sylvia Hall Williams et al.

Argued before MURPHY, C. J., and SINGLEY, SMITH, DIGGES, LEVINE, ELDRIDGE and ORTH, JJ.

SINGLEY, Judge.

This wrongful death action has generated three appeals. A discussion of the facts and of the proceedings in the lower court is a necessary preliminary to an understanding of the issues.

Raymond D. Hall, a 16-year-old student, was struck and killed on the night of 22 January 1971 by a van truck owned by Morris A. Morrell and driven by John Lee Worsham. Worsham, who had been employed by Morrell for nearly two months, transported rental television sets to and from area hospitals. At the time of the accident, Worsham had completed his work for the day and was not on Morrell's business.

At the time Worsham was interviewed for the job, he represented to Joseph Caccaimo, Morrell's supervisor, that he had served in Vietnam, had been honorably discharged from the service had a driver's license and had considerable driving experience, including the driving of trucks. Caccaimo testified that Worsham, at the time of the interview, showed him a military driver's license and what purported to be a valid Maryland driver's license. Worsham's version was that he merely told both Caccaimo and Morrell that he had a driver's license.

It was not until after the accident that Morrell learned that Worsham had neither a Maryland driver's license nor a driver's license from any other state and was at least technically absent without leave from the United States Army. ¹

In January, 1972, Sylvia Hall Williams, the mother of Raymond Hall, as personal representative of the estate of her deceased son, and as wrongful death beneficiary, filed a three-count declaration against Morrell and Worsham.

Counts one and two of the declaration brought by Mrs. Williams in her capacity as her son's personal representative were for damages for the decedent's pain and suffering and medical and funeral expenses. Count one was brought against Morrell and Worsham; count two, against Morrell alone, predicated upon negligent entrustment. Count three of the wrongful death claim set forth Mrs. Williams' claim against Morrell and Worsham for pecuniary loss.

In March, 1973, more than two years after Raymond's death an amended declaration was filed, incorporating the same three counts, but adding to the third count a new element of damage: a claim for damages for Mrs. Williams' mental anguish occasioned by the death of Raymond Hall. Both Morrell and Worsham filed a plea of limitations to the mental anguish claim.

About two months later, a second amended declaration was filed, incorporating the counts of the first amended declaration, but adding a fourth count, by Margaret Mae Banks, the maternal grandmother and next friend of Raynetta Renee Fowlkes, asserting the wrongful death claim of Raynetta Renee Fowlkes, born 9 August 1971, the illegitimate infant daughter of Raymond Hall. This fourth count specifically referred to itself as a 'separate and distinct cause of action.' Morrell demurred to the fourth count, and his demurrer was sustained. Fowlkes appealed to the Court of Special Appeals and that court dismissed the appeal because of a failure to comply with Maryland Rule 605(a) which provides that where there is more than one claim for relief an appeal may be taken from a final judgment upon one or more but less than all of the claims only upon an express determination by the trial court that there is no just reason for delay. Worsham filed a plea.

The case came on for trial before a jury in the Superior Court of Baltimore City. The court reserved ruling on Morrell's motions for directed verdicts, and the case was submitted to the jury on issues. The jury found no contributory negligence on Raymond's part, found Worsham to have been negligent, absolved Morrell of any liability grounded on agency, but imposed liability on Morrell on the theory of negligent entrustment.

The jury returned verdicts in favor of Mrs. Williams as personal representative against both defendants for $20,000.00, in favor of Mrs. Williams as wrongful death beneficiary against both defendants for $30,000.00, and a verdict in favor of Raynetta Renee Fowlkes as wrongful death beneficiary for $20,000.00 against Worsham only, Morrell's demurrer having been sustained. Morrell and Worsham filed motions for judgments n. o. v. and Worsham, a motion for a new trial. All motions were denied, and judgments absolute were entered.

Appeals to the Court of Special Appeals were noted by Morrell and Worsham from the judgments entered against them, and by Raynetta Renee Fowlkes from the order of the trial court sustaining Morrell's demurrer. We granted certiorari before the case was heard in the Court of Special Appeals.

The contentions raised by the several appellants, which will be separately considered, can be summarized.

Morrell:

(i) The trial court erred in failing to direct a verdict for Morrell on negligent entrustment;

(ii) The trial court erred in its instructions to the jury;

(iii) The wrongful death claim of Sylvia Hall Williams for mental anguish was barred by limitations.

Worsham:

(i) The wrongful death claim of Sylvia Hall Williams for mental anguish was barred by limitations;

(ii) The wrongful death claim of Raynetta Renee Fowlkes was barred by limitations;

(iii) The wrongful death claim of Raynetta Renee Fowlkes was barred by her illegitimacy.

Fowlkes:

(i) Because Maryland Code (1957) Art. 67, Section 4, which permitted an illegitimate child to recover for the wrongful death of his or her mother, but not for the wrongful death of his or her father, was unconstitutionally discriminatory, Morrell's demurrer should not have been sustained, and the statute should be construed to permit recovery for the wrongful death of an illegitimate child's father.

The Morrell Appeal

Under the view which we take as regards the issue of negligent entrustment, a consideration of Morrell's other contentions is unnecessary.

The Maryland Motor Vehicle Law is found in Code (1957, 1970 Repl. Vol.) Art. 66 1/2. Section 6-305 of that article, in effect on the date of the accident with which we are here concerned, provided:

'No person shall authorize or knowingly permit a motor vehicle owned by him or under his control (1) to be driven upon any highway by any person who is not authorized hereunder or (2) in violation of any of the provisions of this subtitle.' ²

It should be noted that this is a criminal sanction, the violation of which constituted a misdemeanor under § 17-101(a).

Maryland has adopted the doctrine of negligent entrustment as stated in 2 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 390 at 314 (1965):

'One who supplies directly or through a third person a chattel for the use of another whom the supplier knows or has reason to know to be likely because of his youth, inexperience, or otherwise, to use it in a manner involving unreasonable risk of physical harm to himself and others whom the supplier should expect to share in or be endangered by its use, is subject to liability for physical harm resulting to them.' (emphasis supplied)

In short, the doctrine requires scienter and has been applied in cases involving automobiles where the owner knew or should have known that the use of the entrusted car by the entrustee would likely involve unreasonable risk, Curley v. General Valet Service, Inc., 270 Md. 248, 311 A.2d 231 (1973); Snowhite v. State ex rel. Tennant, 243 Md. 291, 221 A.2d 342 (1966); Rounds v. Phillips, 166 Md. 151, 170 A. 532 (1933).

Morrell argues that there was insufficient evidence to permit the issue of negligent entrustment to go to the jury, and that his motion for a directed verdict in his favor should have been granted. We agree. The critical point is that a violation of § 6-305 of the Motor Vehicle Code requires proof that the vehicle owner authorized the use of a motor vehicle by a person whom he knew to be without a license, while the doctrine of negligent entrustment may be invoked only against the vehicle owner who knows or should have known that the use would involve an inordinate risk of physical harm. In Curley, supra, the employer knew of the driver's traffic record; in Snowhite, supra, the employer knew of the driver's intemperate drinking, and in Rounds, supra, the parents knew of their son's reckless driving and accident record.

In our view, the case before us is not controlled by these cases, but may be likened to U-Haul Co. v. Rutherford, 10 Md.App. 373, 270 A.2d 490 (1970), where the Court of Special Appeals concluded that the lessor of an automobile was entitled to a directed verdict in its favor when the evidence showed that although it leased a truck to an unlicensed driver, it neither knew nor had reason to know that the license exhibited by the lessee was not his own, compare U-Haul Co. v. Rutherford, supra, with Tri-State Equipment Co. v. Stauffer, 24 Md.App. 221, 330 A.2d 680 (1975).

So far as Morrell knew, Worsham was an experienced driver who had a driver's license. Worsham told Morrell that he had a driver's license, that he had driven automobiles in Maryland before going into the army, that after entering the army in 1968 he had undergone driver's training at Fort Dix, that he had driven army vehicles at Fort Dix, that he had driven army trucks in Vietnam for nearly a year, and that after returning to Fort Meade in Maryland, he had driven army vehicles on Maryland...