Morris Beef Co. v. The Wells City
| Decision Date | 28 June 1893 |
| Citation | 57 F. 317 |
| Parties | THE WELLS CITY. v. THE WELLS CITY. [1] MORRIS BEEF CO. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of New York |
McFarland & Parkin, for libelant.
Convers & Kirlin, for claimant.
The above libel was filed to recover for damage to cargo during a salvage service rendered by the steamship 'Wells City' to the steamer 'Catalan,' which was found disabled by the Wells City on her voyage in October last from this port to Bristol, and was towed about 900 miles to the port of Valencia on the Irish coast. On a suit for salvage in the admiralty division of the high court of justice in England, an award of £2650 salvage was made on the 21st of November, 1892, upon an agreement between the parties to the suit, in which the libelant was not represented. The libelant claims that it sustained special damages through the delay consequent on the rendering of the salvage service which entitled it to compensation for its loss.
The libelant had shipped to Bristol a quantity of chilled beef in refrigerators. The contract of shipment authorized the ship to 'tow and assist vessels in all situations.' The usual time of the passage of the steamers of the Wells City Line from New York to Bristol is 16 days. The vessel sailed from New York on the 16th of October, fell in with the Catalan on the 28th of October, left her moored in the harbor of Valencia on the 4th of November, and after coaling, reached Bristol on the 7th,--a passage of 21 days.
I find upon the evidence that the detention occasioned by the salvage service amounted to from three to four days. During the first part of the voyage the ship had experienced rough weather, and when she fell in with the Catalan on the 28th, she was already at least one day behind her usual progress. Any extension of the voyage beyond 19 days, according to the libelant's evidence, was certain to be attended with injury to the chilled beef before it could be marketed.
For the libelant it is contended, that this injury was so certain and inevitable, and that the liability to damage was so well known to all engaged in the business, that it must be deemed to have been known to the master also; and that therefore his undertaking to tow the Catalan into port, which he knew would prolong the voyage considerably beyond 19 days, was equivalent to a voluntary and deliberate choice to sacrifice the libelant's beef to the earning of a salvage award; and that the stipulation in the bill of lading giving the privilege 'to tow and assist vessels in all situations' cannot properly be construed to authorize such a deliberate sacrifice of cargo without compensation.
Contracts, like statutes, are to receive a reasonable construction. This maxim is liberally and especially applied to the general, printed forms of mercantile and shipping instruments, in furtherance of the presumed intent of the parties. Abb. Shipp. 250-260; Raymond v. Tyson, 17 How. 59-62; Potter's Dwar. St. 130, 136, 145. General stipulations, having a reasonable scope of application consistent with the purpose of the voyage, are not to be construed as authorizing what is incompatible with its purpose, or what would inflict extraordinary loss, for it is not credible that either party could have so intended. Thus, the stipulation authorizing vessels to touch and stay, or to call, at any port or ports, and in any order, is limited to such as are upon the course of the voyage specified. Gairdner v. Senhouse, 3 Taunt. 16, 22; Solly v. Whitmore, 5 Barn. & Ald. 45; Leduc v. Ward, 20 Q. B. Div. 475; Steam-Ship Co. v. Theband, 35 F. 620, affirmed on appeal. In the case last cited, the same construction was applied to the clause in question, viz.: 'To tow and assist vessels in all situations;' and that clause was held not to authorize a vessel to go 40 miles directly out of her course for the purpose of taking another vessel in tow in the ordinary course of towage.
A similar construction here must exclude any general departure from the purpose of the voyage; or any such procedure as must plainly subvert...
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Rosenberg Bros. & Co. v. UNITED STATES SHIP. BOARD EF CORP.
...6 T. R. 531, 101 Eng. Repr. 686; Ardan Steamship Co. v. Theband, supra), whether "in any order" (Le Duc v. Ward, 20 Q. B. D. 475; The Wells City D. C. 57 F. 317, affirmed in C. C. A. 2 61 F. 857, 10 C. C. A. 123), or "in any rotation" (Margetson v. Glynn, 1892 1 Q. B. 337, 1893 A. C. 351), ......
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...ports not exactly in the ordinary track of the specific voyage, but not those far outside or beyond the ordinary track. The Wells City (D. C.) 57 F. 317, affirmed 61 F. 857, 10 C. C. A. 123. Bringing the principle to the immediate case, the ports to which the West Aleta could go were those ......
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