Morris County Fair Housing Council v. Boonton Tp.
| Decision Date | 25 May 1984 |
| Citation | 484 A.2d 1302,197 N.J.Super. 359 |
| Parties | MORRIS COUNTY FAIR HOUSING COUNCIL, et al., Plaintiffs, v. BOONTON TOWNSHIP, et al., Defendants. CHARLES DEVELOPMENT CORP., Plaintiff, v. TOWNSHIP OF MORRIS, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | New Jersey Superior Court |
Guliet F. Hirsch, Princeton, for plaintiff Charles Development Corp. (Brener, Wallack & Hill, Princeton, attorneys).
John M. Mills, Morristown, for defendant Township of Morris (Mills, Hock, Dangler & Mills, Morristown, attorneys).
James R. Hillas, Jr., Morristown, for defendant Planning Board of Morris Tp.
Martin Gelber, Newark, for objector Hubschman (Gelber & Kruvant, Newark, attorneys).
Daniel S. Bernstein, Scotch Plains, for defendant Chatham Tp. (Bernstein, Hoffman & Clark, Scotch Plains, attorneys).
This motion presents significant issues regarding the procedures to be followed in the settlement of Mount Laurel litigation when the entry of a "judgment of compliance" is a precondition of a municipal defendant's willingness to settle.
This suit was filed by the Public Advocate on behalf of himself, the Morris County Fair Housing Council and the Morris County branch of the N.A.A.C.P., against twenty-seven municipalities in Morris County alleged to have zoning ordinances which are unconstitutional because they fail to provide a realistic opportunity for the construction of low and moderate income housing. See Borough of Morris Plains v. Dep't of Public Advocate, 169 N.J.Super. 403, 404 A.2d 1244 (App.Div.1979), certif. den. 81 N.J. 411, 408 A.2d 805 (1979). The Public Advocate dismissed its action, without prejudice, against fifteen of the original defendants, while continuing to proceed against twelve others.
Morris Township is one of the remaining defendants. It is also the defendant in two separate Mount Laurel actions brought by developers.
Morris Township has reached a proposed settlement with the Public Advocate and one of the developers, Charles Development Corporation. However, Morris Township's willingness to settle is contingent upon the court approving the settlement and entering a judgment of compliance. As envisioned by the parties to the settlement, such approval would represent a judicial recognition that Morris Township has taken the steps required to comply with Mount Laurel and it would have the practical effect of foreclosing the second developer, Hubschman, from pursuing his Mount Laurel claim. The matter has been brought before the court by the three parties to the settlement agreement on a joint motion to establish procedures for review of the settlement by the court.
The Supreme Court of New Jersey has adopted a special rule of repose which becomes operative when a municipality rezones as a result of Mount Laurel litigation. The rationale for this special rule is set forth in Southern Burlington Cty. N.A.A.C.P. v. Mount Laurel Tp., 92 N.J. 158, 456 A.2d 390 (1983) (Mount Laurel II ):
That balance [of all the policies involved in the Mount Laurel doctrine] also requires modification of the role of res judicata in these cases. Judicial determinations of compliance with the fair share obligation or of invalidity are This passage from Mount Laurel II does not expressly state that a judgment of compliance shall be binding upon non-parties. However, this seems to have been the Court's intent. There often will be numerous property owners in a municipality with land suitable for lower income housing as well as various organizations which may pursue Mount Laurel litigation on behalf of lower income persons. Therefore, if a judgment of compliance entered at the conclusion of Mount Laurel litigation were binding only upon the party who had filed the action, such a judgment would afford a municipality very limited repose. Yet, the Court said that upon issuance of a judgment of compliance a municipality would be "free of litigious interference with the normal planning process." Id. at 292, 456 A.2d 390. This degree of insulation from Mount Laurel claims can be realized only if a judgment of compliance is binding upon non-parties.
not binding under ordinary rules of res judicata since circumstances obviously change. In Mount Laurel cases, however, judgments of compliance should provide that measure of finality suggested in the Municipal Land Use Law, which requires the reexamination and amendment of land use regulations every six years. Compliance judgments in these cases therefore shall have res judicata effect, despite changed circumstances, for a period of six years, the period to begin with the entry of the judgment by the trial court. In this way, municipalities can enjoy the repose that the res judicata doctrine intends, free of litigious interference with the normal planning process. [at 291-292, 456 A.2d 390; footnote omitted]
Furthermore, this reading of Mount Laurel II is consistent with the effect given judgments in other representative litigation. Although the general black letter law is that a judgment is binding only upon the parties (1 Restatement, Judgments 2d, § 34(3) at 345 (1982)), a judgment may be binding upon non-parties if their interests have been represented by a party. Id. § 41(1) at 393. One widely recognized form of action in which a judgment may be binding upon non-parties is a traditional class action. Id. § 41(1)(e); see Penson v. Terminal Transport Co., 634 F.2d 989, 992 (5 Cir.1981); Telephone Workers Union Local 827 v. New Jersey Bell Telephone Co., 584 F.2d 31, 34 (3 Cir.1978); Harker v. McKissock, 12 N.J. 310, 317, 96 A.2d 660 (1953). A second is a suit by a public official or agency A Mount Laurel case may be appropriately viewed in line with these authorities as a representative action which is binding upon non-parties. The constitutional right protected by the Mount Laurel doctrine is the right of lower income persons to seek housing without being subject to the economic discrimination caused by exclusionary zoning. Mount Laurel II, 92 N.J. at 208-214, 456 A.2d 390; see Pascack Ass'n, Ltd. v. Washington Tp., 74 N.J. 470, 480, 379 A.2d 6 (1977). The Public Advocate and organizations such as the Fair Housing Council and N.A.A.C.P. have standing to pursue Mount Laurel litigation on behalf of lower income persons. Mount Laurel II, 92 N.J. at 336-338, 456 A.2d 390; Home Builders League v. Berlin Tp., 81 N.J. 127, 132-133, 405 A.2d 381 (1979). Developers and property owners with land suitable for lower income housing are also conferred standing to pursue Mount Laurel litigation. See Mount Laurel II, 92 N.J. at 279-281, 456 A.2d 390. In fact, the Court held that "any individual demonstrating an interest in, or The second issue presented by this motion is whether a judgment of compliance can be entered as part of a court approved settlement or only after a full trial in which there has been an adjudication of the validity of a zoning ordinance on Mount Laurel grounds. None of the six cases decided by the Supreme Court in Mount Laurel II provided the occasion for consideration of this issue.
which is authorized by law to represent the public or a class of citizens. 1 Restatement, Judgments 2d, § 41(1)(d) at 393 (1982); see Nevada v. United States, 463 U.S. 110, 103 S.Ct. 2906, 77 L.Ed.2d 509 (1983); Southwest Airlines Co. v. Texas International Airlines, Inc., 546 F.2d 84, 94-102 (5 Cir.1977) cert. den. 434 U.S. 832, 98 S.Ct. 117, 54 L.Ed.2d 93 (1977); Rynsburger v. Dairymen's Fertilizer Coop., Inc., 266 Cal.App.2d 269, 72 Cal.Rptr. 102 (Ct.App.1968). Another is a taxpayers' action brought on behalf of residents, citizens and taxpayers of a jurisdiction. Roberts v. Goldner, 79 N.J. 82, 397 A.2d 1090 (1979); In re Petition of Gardiner, 67 N.J.Super. 435, 447-449, 170 A.2d 820 (App.Div.1961). Non-parties may be bound in a variety of other contexts as well. See Southwest Airlines Co. v. Texas International Airlines, Inc., supra. Indeed, in Rynsburger v. Dairymen's Fertilizer Coop., Inc., supra, the court broadly stated that "[i]f it appears that a particular party, although not before the court in person, is so far represented by others that his interest received actual and efficient protection, the decree will be [484 A.2d 1306] held to be binding upon him." 266 Cal.App.2d at 278, 72 Cal.Rptr. at 107
any organization that has the objective of, securing lower income housing opportunities in a municipality will have standing to sue such municipality on Mount Laurel grounds." Id. at 337, 456 A.2d 390. However, such litigants are granted standing not to pursue their own interests, but rather as representatives of lower income persons whose constitutional rights allegedly have been violated by exclusionary zoning. It follows that a judgment of compliance entered as a result of Mount Laurel litigation would be binding upon non-party lower income persons as well as other potential representatives of their interests such as Hubschman
Our courts have long endorsed the policy of encouraging the settlement of litigation. Judson v. Peoples Bank & Trust Co., 25 N.J. 17, 35, 134 A.2d 761 (1957); Honeywell v. Bubb, 130 N.J.Super. 130, 136, 325 A.2d 832 (App.Div.1974). Settlements permit parties to resolve disputes on mutually acceptable terms rather than exposing themselves to the adverse judgment of a court. Settlements also save parties litigation expenses and facilitate the administration of the courts by conserving judicial resources.
These policies favoring settlement are operative in Mount Laurel litigation. The Court observed in Mount Laurel II that "[t]he length and complexity of [Mount Laurel ] trials is often outrageous, and the expense of litigation is so high that a real question develops whether the municipality can...
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