Morris Fertilizer Co. v. Bonner

• Court: South Carolina Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: MARION, J.
• Citation: Morris Fertilizer Co. v. Bonner, 126 S.C. 284, 119 S.E. 826 (S.C. 1923)
• Decision Date: 09 November 1923
• Docket Number: 11333.
• Parties: MORRIS FERTILIZER CO. v. BONNER. SOUTH ATLANTIC GUANO CO. v. BONNER.

119 S.E. 826

126 S.C. 284

MORRIS FERTILIZER CO. v. BONNER.

SOUTH ATLANTIC GUANO CO. v. BONNER.

No. 11333.

Supreme Court of South Carolina

November 9, 1923

Appeal from Common Pleas Circuit Court of Spartanburg County; W. S Hall, Special Judge.

Separate actions tried together by the Morris Fertilizer Company and the South Atlantic Guano Company against G. W. Bonner. From judgments for plaintiffs, defendant appeals. Affirmed.

The exceptions referred to in the opinion follow:

(2) The court erred as to matter of law in instructing the jury "So that when one comes into court and sets up a plea of insanity, or rather want of sufficient mental capacity to understand the nature, the legal effect, of his transactions then the burden of proof is on such party to establish by the greater weight of the testimony, or preponderance of the testimony, that at the time of the particular transaction such person did not have mind enough or mental capacity enough to understand the nature and effect of his contract or transaction"--the error being that the court erred in placing the burden of proof, at the particular time of the transaction, upon the appellant, as to his mental condition the error being that on questions of sanity or mental capacity, the general character or condition is the only evidence which is capable of being given. The law does not require a definite or particular time, as the exact time the notes were given, that specific want of capacity at that time must be established, and there was error in limiting the proof to the time of the particular transaction, and destroying the effect of all testimony, except that of facts and circumstances contemporaneous, and at the instant of execution of the notes sued on.

(3) Because the court erred in charging: "It is conceded that it was on January 2, 1920, and in the South Atlantic case, April 21, 1920. That was the time the contract was made for the purchase of fertilizers. Now, these notes were given at a subsequent date, May. So you are to determine from the evidence in the case whether or not the defendant George W. Bonner, through his committee, has established by the greater weight of the testimony to your satisfaction that George W. Bonner at the time of these transactions did not have mind enough or sufficient mental capacity to understand what he was doing, to understand the nature of his conduct or its effect. If the defendant has satisfied you by the greater weight of the testimony that at the time of these transactions George W. Bonner did not have mental capacity sufficient to understand the nature of the transaction, why then he is not liable." The error being that having required the appellant to assume the burden of establishing the want of capacity at the particular times, to wit, January 2, 1920, and April 21, 1920, and May, when the notes were given--the notes being the cause of action--it was error to require the appellant to establish by the greater weight of the evidence a want of capacity for three different transactions, one in January, one in April, and one in May, 1920. If the appellant satisfied the jury that at the time of giving the note he was not of sufficient mental capacity, then under the law he was not liable. The court erred in using the word "transactions." It should have been limited to transaction of giving the note.

(4) Because the court erred in requiring the appellant to assume the burden of establishing his want of capacity, not when the note was executed, but on three different occasions; in effect, requiring appellant to establish his defense on three different occasions, instead of the time of giving the notes.

(5) Because the court erred in charging the jury: "On the other hand, if the defendant establishes by the greater weight of the testimony that at those times he did not have sufficient mental capacity to understand the nature of his obligation or contract, then your verdict would be for the defendant, provided you do not also find that provided the fact that he may not have had mind enough to understand the nature of the transaction at the time when it was consummated, yet if afterwards at lucid periods he recognized and understood the nature of his obligation, he ratified the same, why then he would still be bound, because a contract made by a person who is insane is not void, but is voidable," the error being that the court assumed, if at any subsequent time the appellant's mind became lucid, that such capacity would amount to ratification, and misled the jury; whereas, not only must the appellant's mind have had capacity, but there should have been proof that a capable mind was exercised in making a ratification. Ratification is not a capacity of mind, but an exercise of such capacity with the intent and purpose to ratify an act.

(6) Because the court erred in modifying the defendant's first request to charge, in that he did not charge the jury as requested: "I charge you that mental incapacity is an affirmative defense, and the burden is upon the defendant to establish it by the...