Morris v. Commonwealth
| Decision Date | 02 August 2022 |
| Docket Number | 1194-21-2 |
| Parties | JORDAN DARRELL MORRIS, Appellant, v. COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA, Appellee. |
| Court | Virginia Court of Appeals |
Date 9/06/2022.
Upon a Petition for Rehearing En Banc
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF HENRICO COUNTY, Circuit Court No CR21-1545-00F Randall G. Johnson, Jr., Judge
H Pratt Cook, III (Law Office of H. Pratt Cook, III, on brief) for appellant.
Stephen J. Sovinsky, Assistant Attorney General (Jason S. Miyares, Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.
Before Chief Judge Decker, Judges Humphreys, Beales, Huff, O'Brien, Atlee, Malveaux, Athey, Fulton, Ortiz, Causey, Friedman, Chaney, Raphael, Lorish, Callins and White
Present: Judges Russell, [*] Ortiz and Raphael Argued at Richmond, Virginia
On August 16, 2022 came the appellee, by the Attorney General of Virginia, and filed a petition requesting that the Court set aside the judgment rendered herein on August 2, 2022, and grant a rehearing en banc on the issue(s) raised in the petition.
On consideration whereof and pursuant to Rule 5A:35 of the Rules of the Supreme Court of Virginia, the petition for rehearing en banc is granted and the appeal of those issues is reinstated on the docket of this Court. The mandate previously entered herein is stayed pending the decision of the Court en banc.
The parties shall file briefs in compliance with the schedule set forth in Rule 5A:35(b). The appellant shall attach as an addendum to the opening brief upon rehearing en banc a copy of the opinion previously rendered by the Court in this matter. An electronic version of each brief shall be filed with the Court and served on opposing counsel.[1]
OPINIONThis case presents two questions of first impression concerning Virginia's medical-amnesty statute, Code § 18.2-251.03, which shields from arrest or prosecution those persons who seek emergency medical assistance because they are experiencing a drug overdose (or who seek emergency medical assistance for others who are experiencing an overdose). First, suppose the defendant seeking emergency medical assistance subjectively believes he is suffering a drug overdose, but in fact he is not. Is the defendant entitled to amnesty, or must the trier of fact be satisfied that the defendant, objectively, is having an overdose? We conclude from the statute's plain language that the General Assembly intended a subjective standard.
Second does drug-induced suicidal ideation qualify as an "overdose" under the statute? We conclude that it does. While an "overdose" from drugs in common parlance may not embrace the desire to kill oneself, the statute defines "overdose" as "a life-threatening condition resulting from the consumption or use of a controlled substance, alcohol, or any combination of such substances." Code § 18.2-251.03(A). A drug-induced impulse to kill oneself is "a life-threatening condition" under that definition.
Because the circuit court erred in applying an objective standard to the defendant's claim that he was seeking emergency medical care for his drug-induced suicidal ideation, we vacate the drug-possession conviction and remand this case for the trial court to determine whether the defendant is entitled to medical-amnesty immunity under the correct legal standard.
Appellant Jordan Darrell Morris was arrested on November 16, 2020, outside the Short Pump emergency room, and charged with possession of a Schedule I or II controlled substance (in violation of Code § 18.2-250) and driving under the influence of drugs, first offense (in violation of Code § 18.2-266). He was released from jail on a $1,400 recognizance bond.
The Commonwealth's written opposition asserted that Morris "had produced no evidence or testimony from any medical personnel present that evening, nor any other evidence, that he was experiencing an overdose."
On July 15, the trial court conducted a hearing on Morris's suppression motion and motion to dismiss, at which both sides "agreed to proffer the facts." Paraphrasing the police report, Morris's counsel represented that Henrico police officers observed a white Ford Edge trying to turn onto the road adjacent to the Short Pump emergency room. The vehicle nearly struck a curb in the turn lane and stopped in the middle of the road, blocking through-traffic. Officers Cirillo and Steelman approached the vehicle, driven by Morris, and asked him to park the car. Morris said that "he was there to get help," telling the officers that he had smoked crack cocaine. The officers escorted Morris into the emergency room.
As medical personnel drew a blood sample, Morris "made suicidal statements." In response to questions from a third policeman, Officer Foley, Morris said that he worked at Food Lion; he had asked to sit in his boss's car to call his mother; he had called his mother "because he was thinking about committing suicide"; he had driven away from the Food Lion and had driven around awhile before heading to the Short Pump emergency room. When asked whether his mother had told him to "go to the ER," Morris said he "chose to do so himself" because "he was thinking about suicide." When Foley asked, why suicide, Morris responded, "drugs." Morris said that he had used heroin, fentanyl, and cocaine, that he had smoked crack cocaine in his boss's car, and that he "came to the ER to get help for the suicidal thoughts and his drug problem." Morris alerted the officers to a crack pipe in the vehicle, which they found tucked in the crevice of the passenger seat.
The Commonwealth initially disagreed with certain aspects of the proffer. Pressed by the trial court, however, the Commonwealth agreed to "the Defense version" to the extent there were any inconsistencies.[1]
Both parties treated the statute as creating an "affirmative defense" to be proven by the defendant. The Commonwealth argued that Morris was required to present expert testimony that he was in fact experiencing an overdose and that it was not enough to simply take his word for it. Morris's counsel argued that the immunity statute applied because the lab tests showed cocaine in Morris's blood, Morris drove himself to the emergency room seeking treatment, and he said three times that he was suicidal because of his drug use.
Ruling from the bench, the trial court denied Morris's motions to suppress the drug evidence and to dismiss the drug-possession charge. The court saw "no evidence that [Morris] was experiencing a life-threatening condition." It was "not going so far as to say" that a medical professional had to be called as a witness to prove an overdose-circumstantial evidence could suffice. But the court found the proffer insufficient. "[J]ust because" the drugs "affected his behavior [did] not mean we're in a life-threatening situation." The court said there must be "some showing" that Morris's expression of wanting to kill himself "was caused by the ingestion of cocaine and this overdose situation."
Morris subsequently pleaded no contest to the charges against him, reserving his right to appeal the immunity ruling on the drug-possession charge. The trial court accepted the pleas, finding Morris guilty on both charges. The court sentenced Morris to five years' incarceration on the drug-possession charge, suspending all but two months. It sentenced him to twelve months (all suspended) on the driving-under-the-influence charge.
Morris now appeals the trial court's decision denying him medical-amnesty immunity on the drug-possession charge (Case No. CR21-1545-00F).[2]
The proper interpretation of Code § 18.2-251.03 is a question of law that we review de novo. E.g., Citland, Ltd. v. Commonwealth ex rel. Kilgore, 45 Va.App. 268, 275 (2005) ; Broadous v. Commonwealth, 67 Va.App. 265, 268 (2017) ().
Beginning with New Mexico in 2007, at least forty States have enacted laws providing protection from criminal liability for persons seeking emergency medical assistance for a drug overdose. See Nicole Schill, The Fatal Shortcomings of Our Good Samaritan Overdose Statutes and Proposed Model Statute, 25 Cardozo J. Equal Rts. & Soc. Just. 123 126 (2018). We will refer to such statutes as "medical-amnesty laws," but they are also sometimes called "Good Samaritan Overdose Laws" or "911 Immunity Laws." Id. at 126 n.17. Different States have taken different approaches. Some permit the summoning of medical help to be used by the defendant only "as [a] mitigating circumstance[]" at sentencing. Id. at 139-40 (describing ...
To continue reading
Request your trial