Morris v. David Lerner Assoc.s

• Decision Date: 26 January 2010
• Docket Number: No. 09-CV-2479 (JFB)(AKT).,09-CV-2479 (JFB)(AKT).
• Citation: Morris v. David Lerner Assocs., 680 F.Supp.2d 430 (E.D. N.Y. 2010)
• Parties: Dora MORRIS, Plaintiff, v. DAVID LERNER ASSOCIATES and David Lerner, Individually, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of New York

680 F.Supp.2d 430

Dora MORRIS, Plaintiff,

v.DAVID LERNER ASSOCIATES and David Lerner, Individually, Defendants.

No. 09-CV-2479 (JFB)(AKT).

United States District Court, E.D. New York.

Decided: Jan. 26, 2010.

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Jonathan Sack and Eric R. Stern, Sack and Sack, Esqs., New York, NY, for the plaintiff.

Mark S. Mancher and Kathryn J. RussoJackson Lewis LLP, Melville, NY, for defendantDavid Lerner Associates.

Michael G. Shannon, Thompson Hine LLP, New York, NY, for David Lerner individually.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

JOSEPH F. BIANCO, District Judge:

PlaintiffDora Morris("plaintiff) brings this employment discrimination action against her former employer, David Lerner Associates("DLA"), and David Lerner("Lerner"), DLA's President and plaintiffs supervisor throughout her tenure at DLA.Plaintiff alleges that DLA and Lerner discriminated against her because of her gender by paying her less than similarly situated male coworkers and by subjecting her to a hostile work environment.Plaintiff also alleges that, when she complained to Lerner about the fact that she was being paid less than similarly situated men, she was fired in retaliation for her complaints.

Defendants have now moved to partially dismiss the complaint.They argue that plaintiff failed to exhaust her administrative remedies for her hostile work environment and retaliatory termination claims and that, in any event, her allegations regarding those claims fail to state a claim for which relief can be granted.

As set forth in more detail in the following Memorandum and Order, the Court denies defendants' motion to dismiss.In short, plaintiffs hostile work environment and retaliatory termination claims are reasonably related to the charge she filed with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and are thus, deemed exhausted for purposes of this lawsuit.Additionally, plaintiffs complaint gives defendants fair notice of her hostile work environment and retaliatory termination claims and provides sufficient allegations for the purposes of surviving a motion to dismiss.

I.Background

A.Factual Background

For purposes of this motion to dismissthe Court has taken the facts described below from the plaintiffs Complaint ("Compl.").These facts are not findings of fact by the Court but rather are assumed to be true for the purpose of deciding this motion and are construed in a light most favorable to plaintiff, the nonmoving party.SeeLaFaro v. N.Y. Cardiothoracic Group, 570 F.3d 471, 475(2d Cir.2009).

Plaintiff began working at DLA in December 1994 as "Assistant to the President,"David Lerner.(Compl.¶ 19.)Throughout her tenure at DLA, plaintiff worked not only as Lerner's assistant, but also as a licensed Series 7 and Series 63 broker providing brokerage services to Lerner's clients.(Id.¶¶20-21.)She earned commissions for this work, but her commissions were less than those of her male counterparts.(Id.¶¶ 21-22.)

During plaintiffs employment, Lerner allegedly often made comments regarding women's role in the workplace (seeid.¶¶ 24-26); repeatedly said plaintiff should go on a trip with him but only if she would "stay in the same room"(id.¶27); commented on plaintiffs anatomy (id.¶¶2930); often made plaintiff"twirl" for him (id.¶ 31); and told his other personal assistant, Rande Hirsch, to purchase clothes and high-heeled shoes for plaintiff.(Id.¶32.)

In November 2007, Lerner advised plaintiff that she would have to share 15 percent of her broker commissions with Hirsch, even though Hirsch was not a licensed broker.(Id.¶¶ 35-36.).On or about Tuesday, November 20, 2007, plaintiff complained to Lerner, telling him that she was being treated differently than male brokers, who were required to share only one percent of their commissions.(Id.¶ 36.)After hearing plaintiffs complaints, Lerner told plaintiff that she was a "great worker and a good Mommy" and that he did not "want to lose her."(Id.¶ 38.)Lerner suggested that plaintiff take the upcoming holiday weekend to think about what she wanted to do.(Id.)Lerner stated that he would talk with plaintiff about the situation on the following Monday.(Id.).However, two days later DLA's Human Resources Vice President contacted Morris and told her that "David [Lerner] has accepted your resignation."(Id.¶39.)In a follow-up call two days later, the HR Vice President told plaintiff that her job was "eliminated."(Id.¶ 41.)

B.Procedural Background

Plaintiff filed a charge of discrimination with the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission on January 10, 2008.(Id.¶6.)She received a Right to Sue Letter on March 13, 2009.(Id.¶ 7.)Plaintiff filed a complaint in this Court on June 1, 2009.The complaint asserts the following claims against DLA and Lerner: (1) disparate treatment on the basis of sex in violation of Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act;(2) disparate treatment in violation of the New York State Human Rights Law; (3) disparate treatment under the New York City Human Rights Law;(4) hostile work environment under Title VII;(5) hostile work environment under the New York State Human Rights Law; (6) hostile work environment under the New York City Human Rights law;(7) retaliatory termination under Title VII;(8) retaliatory termination under the New York State Human Rights Law; (9) retaliatory termination under the New York City Human Rights Law; and, against Lerner only, for (10) aiding and abetting under the New York State Human Rights Law and (11) aiding and abetting under the New York City Human Rights Law.

In a July 27, 2009 letter, plaintiff voluntarily withdrew her claims under the New York City Human Rights Law—namely claims three, six, nine, and eleven—against all parties; her Title VII claims—namely, claims one, four, and seven—against Lerner; and her request for punitive damages under counts two, five, and eight.

Therefore, the claims still pending in this case are (1) a Title VII discrimination claim against DLA; (2) an NYSHRL discrimination claim against DLA and Lerner; (3) a Title VII hostile work environment claim against DLA; (4) an NYSHRL hostile work environment claim against DLA and Lerner; (5) a Title VII retaliatory termination claim against DLA; (6) an NYSHRL retaliatory termination claim against DLA and Lerner; and (7) an NYSHRL aiding and abetting claim against Lerner.

On September 30, 2009, defendants moved to partially dismiss the complaint.Specifically, defendants argue that plaintiff has failed to exhaust her administrative remedies with respect to her hostile work environment claims and retaliation claims.Defendants also argue that plaintiffs complaint fails to state a claim for hostile work environment and retaliatory termination.Plaintiff submitted her opposition on December 7, 2009, and defendants filed a reply on January 7, 2010.The Court heard oral argument on January 22, 2010.

II.Standard of Review

In reviewing a motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), the Court must accept the factual allegations set forth in the complaint as true and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff.SeeCleveland v Caplaw Enters., 448 F.3d 518, 521(2d Cir.2006);Nechis v. Oxford Health Plans, Inc., 421 F.3d 96, 100(2d Cir.2005).The plaintiff must satisfy "a flexible 'plausibility standard.'"Iqbal v. Hasty, 490 F.3d 143, 157(2d Cir.2007), rev'd an other grounds sub nom. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, — U.S.—, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868(2009)."[0]nce a claim has been stated adequately, it may be supported by showing any set of facts consistent with the allegations in the complaint."Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 563, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929(2007).The Court, therefore, does not require "heightened fact pleading of specifics, but only enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face."Id. at 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955.

The Supreme Court recently clarified the appropriate pleading standard in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, — U.S. —, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868(2009), setting forth a two-pronged approach for courts deciding a motion to dismiss.District courts are to first "identify[] pleadings that, because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth."129 S.Ct. at 1950.Though "legal conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual allegations."Id.Second, if a complaint contains "well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief."Id."A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.The plausibility standard is not akin to a 'probability requirement, ' but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully."Id. at 1949(quoting and citingTwombly, 550 U.S. at 556-57, 127 S.Ct. 1955)(internal citations omitted).

Finally, in connection with a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), as noted above, the Court may only consider "facts stated in the complaint or documents at- tached to the complaint as exhibits or incorporated by reference."Nechis, 421 F.3d at 100;accordKramer v. Time Warner Inc., 937 F.2d 767, 773(2d Cir.1991).Moreover, with respect to administrative filings (such as the NYSDHR and the EEOC) and decisions, the Court may consider such documents because they are public documents filed in state administrative proceedings, as well as because they are integral to plaintiff's claims.See, e.g.McCarty v. Dana Holding Corp., No. 08 Civ. 690, 2008 WL 4865038, at *3(E.D.Mo.Nov. 7, 2008)(under Rule 12(b)(6) standard, "it is clear that the Court may properly incorporate the EEOC charge into its analysis");Williams v. Thompson, No. Civ. A.AW-03-2084, 2004 WL 3178072, at *4 n....