Morris v. Derrick Young, Wal-Mart Stores E., L.P.
| Decision Date | 03 May 2016 |
| Docket Number | CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:14-CV-136-SA-DAS |
| Parties | RHONDA GAIL MORRIS PLAINTIFF v. DERRICK YOUNG, WAL-MART STORES EAST, L.P., and STEVEN LANE DEFENDANTS |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Mississippi |
Plaintiff Rhonda Gail Morris commenced this action, alleging age discrimination against her former employer Wal-Mart Stores East, L.P., and tortious interference with contract against one of her supervisors Derrick Young and a Wal-Mart customer Steven Lane. Wal-Mart and Young filed the pending Motion for Summary Judgment [93], which the Court resolves as follows:
Facts and Procedural History
Morris worked as a sales associate and customer service manager at the West Main Street Wal-Mart in Tupelo for nearly eight years before she was terminated after allegedly committing multiple disciplinary infractions. At the time of her termination, Morris was fifty-three years old.
Pursuant to Wal-Mart's disciplinary "Coaching for Improvement" policy, an employee may receive three levels of discipline or "coaching"—first written coaching, second written coaching, and third written coaching. When an employee receives a coaching, if she already has an "active coaching" on her record, meaning it occurred within the last year, then the new coaching is issued at the level higher than the existing active coaching. An employee who has an active third written coaching is subject to termination if she receives additional discipline.
In June 2012, Morris received her first written coaching for cashing a check and then mistakenly handing the check and cash back to the customer. Morris brought the mistake to a manager's attention, and she does not dispute that disciplinary action was warranted.
Morris received a second written coaching in December of the same year for failing to respond quickly enough to long checkout lines. Morris took issue with this coaching, explaining that the store was busy, too few staff members were available, and she was doing the best she could under the circumstances.
Wal-Mart issued a third written coaching to Morris in October 2013 for failing to complete ten cash register audits per day, as each customer service manager was required to do. Morris disputes this third coaching. She claims that the customer service managers misunderstood the audit-requirement, believing that the managers' audits could be aggregated to reach the required number. Indeed, every customer service manager at the West Main Street Wal-Mart received a coaching for failing to complete the required audits.
The final incident, in April 2014, resulted in Morris' termination. Customer Steven Lane attempted to return a vacuum cleaner. According to Morris, the store co-manager Brenda McMillen had instructed Morris and the other customer service managers to refuse attempted returns by Lane unless he presented a receipt, as he had caused problems in the past. Thus, when Lane approached the return counter without a receipt in April 2014, Morris halted the return and radioed for McMillen and an associate in asset protection, but neither responded. Assistant manager Derrick Young, then age twenty-four, responded over the radio. Morris testified that she told Young "hey, the customer that y'all told us to let y'all know if he come in here, he's up here[,]" and that Young responded, "without a receipt, don't let him have it." Young testified that Morris represented over the radio that Lane had returned three items in the previous twoweeks, the most allowable under Wal-Mart's Returns and Exchanges Policy. Morris denies that she communicated a number of returns by Lane.
Lane then became upset at Morris, and Young went to the returns area to resolve the dispute. He keyed Lane's driver's license number into Wal-Mart's computer system, which showed that Lane had only returned one item without a receipt that year. Lane's return was processed, but he remained very upset. According to Morris, Lane stated that Morris should be fired, and Young responded
Later that day, Lane called co-manager Justin Copeland and made further complaint against Morris for refusing his return. Lane testified that Young urged him to make this complaint. Young denies that he did so. Copeland convened a meeting with Young, McMillen, and another manager, and determined that Morris should receive another disciplinary coaching. As Young was processing the coaching in the computer, Wal-Mart's system automatically triggered the exit-interview screen, and the managers decided they had no choice but to terminate Morris.
Following her termination, Morris filed an EEOC charge, received her right-to-sue letter, and then commenced this suit, alleging age discrimination against Wal-Mart in violation of the ADEA and tortious interference with contract against her manager, Young, and the customer, Lane. The Clerk of Court has entered a default against Lane. Wal-Mart and Young have requested summary judgment in their favor on all Morris' claims.
Summary judgment is warranted under Rule 56(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure when the evidence reveals no genuine dispute regarding any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The rule "mandates the entry ofsummary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S. Ct. 2548, 91 L. Ed. 2d 265 (1986).
The party moving for summary judgment "bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of [the record] which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact." Id. at 323, 106 S. Ct. 2548. The nonmoving party must then "go beyond the pleadings" and "set forth 'specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.'" Id. at 324, 106 S. Ct. 2548 (citation omitted). In reviewing the evidence, factual controversies are to be resolved in favor of the nonmovant, "but only when . . . both parties have submitted evidence of contradictory facts." Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994) (en banc). Importantly, conclusory allegations, speculation, unsubstantiated assertions, and legalistic arguments have never constituted an adequate substitute for specific facts showing a genuine issue for trial. TIG Ins. Co. v. Sedgwick James of Wash., 276 F.3d 754, 759 (5th Cir. 2002); SEC v. Recile, 10 F.3d 1093, 1097 (5th Cir. 1997); Little, 37 F.3d at 1075.
The ADEA prohibits an employer from discharging an employee because of her age. 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1). To prove discriminatory termination, Morris must show that but for the alleged discrimination, she would not have been terminated. Gross v. FBL Financial Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 176, 129 S. Ct. 2343, 174 L. Ed. 2d 119 (2009). Because Morris seeks to establish her claim with circumstantial evidence only, the Court utilizes the familiar McDonnell Douglasburden-shifting evidentiary framework. Miller v. Raython Co., 716 F.3d 138, 144 (5th Cir. 2013) (citing McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S. Ct. 1817, 36 L. Ed. 2d 668 (1973)) (other citation omitted).
Within the McDonnell Douglas contours, Morris must first establish a prima facie case of age discrimination, "at which point, the burden shifts to [Wal-Mart] to articulate a legitimate non-discriminatory reason for the employment decision." Berquist v. Wash. Mut. Bank, 500 F.3d 344, 349 (5th Cir. 2007). If Wal-Mart meets its burden of production, Morris must introduce evidence from which a jury could infer that Wal-Mart's reason is not true, but instead a pretext for discrimination, or that even if Wal-Mart's reason is true, Morris was terminated because of her age. Miller, 716 F.3d at 144 (citing Gross, 557 U.S. at 180, 129 S. Ct. 2343).
To establish a prima facie case of discriminatory termination under the ADEA, Morris must demonstrate that she: (1) was discharged, (2) was qualified for the position held, (3) was age forty or older, and (4) was either replaced by someone younger, replaced by someone outside the protected class, or otherwise discharged because of her age. Phillips v. Leggett & Platt, Inc., 658 F.3d 452, 455 (5th Cir. 2011) (citing Rachid v. Jack in the Box, Inc., 376 F.3d 305, 309 (5th Cir. 2004)). Wal-Mart does not contest Morris' prima facie case for summary judgment purposes, and thus the Court considers it established.
Therefore, the burden shifts to Wal-Mart to provide a legitimate non-discriminatory reason for terminating Morris. Berquist, 500 F.3d at 349. Wal-Mart need not "persuade the court that it was actually motivated by the proffered reasons." Tex. Dept. of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254-55, 101 S. Ct. 1089, 67 L. Ed. 2d 207 (1981). It must only "clearly set forth, through the introduction of admissible evidence, the reasons for [its decision]." Id. Wal-Mart contends that it terminated Morris for exceeding the allowable number of coachings under itsCoaching for Improvement Policy. Specifically with regard to the April 2014 incident, Wal-Mart asserts that Morris failed to follow Wal-Mart's Return and Exchange Policy by refusing a return without first verifying the number of Lane's previous recent returns without receipts. Wal-Mart's asserted reason is supported by deposition testimony from various managers and by Morris' exit-interview documentation. Thus, the Court finds that Wal-Mart has discharged its obligation of producing a legitimate non-discriminatory reason.
Accordingly, the burden shifts to Morris to show that Wal-Mart's proffered reason is merely pretextual, or that even if true, her age was...
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