Morris v. Dollar Tree Store, No. 1D03-0336.
| Court | Court of Appeal of Florida (US) |
| Writing for the Court | ERVIN, J. |
| Citation | 869 So.2d 704 |
| Parties | Angie MORRIS, Appellant, v. DOLLAR TREE STORE and Specialty Risk Services, Appellees. |
| Decision Date | 06 April 2004 |
| Docket Number | No. 1D03-0336. |
869 So.2d 704
Angie MORRIS, Appellant,v.
DOLLAR TREE STORE and Specialty Risk Services, Appellees
No. 1D03-0336.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
April 6, 2004.
T. Rhett Smith and Teresa E. Liles of Smith & Janes, P.A., Pensacola, for Appellant.
ERVIN, J.
This is a workers' compensation appeal challenging as unreasonable an order awarding attorney's fees to claimant, Angie Morris. We agree that the fee awarded is unreasonable and reverse and remand with directions.
Appellant first contends the judge of compensation claims (JCC) erred in denying her reimbursement for attorney's time expended before the filing of a petition for benefits. In regard to the reasonableness of the fees that should be allowed, claimant's expert, Douglas F. Miller, testified that counsel reasonably expended between 25 and 30 hours, which included the time involved before the filing of the petition for benefits. The JCC awarded a total fee of $4,380.00, based upon 25 attorney-hours exerted, multiplied by $168.00 per hour, yielding a sum of $4,200.00, to which he added $180.00 for paralegal services. The JCC refused, however, to include within the fee assessed the lawyer's pre-petition time, concluding that the plain language of section 440.192(7), Florida Statutes (2001), precluded the consideration of same. Because the JCC's interpretation is one of law, our review standard is de novo.
Section 440.192(7) states:
Notwithstanding the provisions of s. 440.34, a judge of compensation claims may not award attorney's fees payable by the carrier for services expended or costs incurred prior to the filing of a petition that does not meet the requirements of this section.
We find it very difficult to conclude that the above language clearly and unambiguously bars compensation for any attorney time expended before a petition is filed, and particularly so in view of the qualification therein specifically linking the preclusion of fees to a petition that fails to satisfy the statute's requirements. Under the circumstances, the provisions of subsection (7) obviously cannot be considered in isolation from other pertinent statutory specifications, namely, those in section 440.34, relating to the factors to be considered in awarding claimant's attorney fees, and those in section 440.192(2), setting out the requisites of a petition for benefits.
Because of subsection (7)'s reference to other statutes, we deem it necessary to apply the in pari materia canon of statutory construction, which recognizes that statutes will be considered together when "two different statutory provisions deal with the same specific subject or with subjects so connected that the meaning of the one informs the other." See Brown v. State, 848 So.2d 361, 364 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003). In our judgment, subsection (7) is so interconnected with the subsection (2) criteria that the meaning of the former cannot be ascertained without reference to the latter. Section 440.192(2) clearly states that a petition shall be dismissed if it fails to comply with its filing requirements. This court, moreover, in construing the provisions of the two subsections in pari materia, has concluded that no attorney fee can be awarded to claimant's counsel for time expended before the filing of a petition that is later dismissed on the ground that it did not satisfy the subsection (2) requisites. See Kennedy v. Orlando Shader Realty, 711 So.2d 156, 158 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998). The logical inference from Kennedy is that services performed before a proper petition is filed may be included in a fee awarded to a prevailing claimant.
In the case at bar, the petition was not dismissed, nor has any contention been made that it did not meet the statute's
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Hale v. Shear Express, Inc., No. 1D05-3636.
...what to him seemed reasonable"). Accord Marshall v. City of Miami, 920 So.2d 107, 108 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006); Morris v. Dollar Tree Store, 869 So.2d 704, 706-07 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004); Smith v. U.S. Sugar Corp., 624 So.2d 315, 319 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993). In this regard, we reiterate that unsworn res......
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Jennings v. Habana Health Care Ctr., No. 1D15–1749.
...standard." See Moore v. Hillsborough Cty. Sch. Bd., 987 So.2d 1288, 1289 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008) (citing Morris v. Dollar Tree Store, 869 So.2d 704, 707 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004) ); see also Hernandez v. Manatee Cty. Gov't, 50 So.3d 57, 58 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010). To the extent an award of costs presents......
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Begley's Cleaning Service v. Costa, No. 1D04-4087.
...1246 an injury but not paying any benefits or compensation. Our standard of review is de novo. See, e.g., Morris v. Dollar Tree Store, 869 So.2d 704, 705 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004) ("Because the JCC's interpretation is one of law, our review standard is de novo."); Lanham v. Dep't of Envtl. Prot.,......
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Lane v. Workforce Bus. Servs., Inc., No. 1D14–0959.
...discretion standard.” Moore v. Hillsborough Cnty. Sch. Bd., 987 So.2d 1288, 1289 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008) (citing Morris v. Dollar Tree Store, 869 So.2d 704, 707 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004) ). Failure to apply the correct legal standard is grounds for reversal. Village of N. Palm Beach v. McKale, 911 So......
-
Hale v. Shear Express, Inc., No. 1D05-3636.
...what to him seemed reasonable"). Accord Marshall v. City of Miami, 920 So.2d 107, 108 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006); Morris v. Dollar Tree Store, 869 So.2d 704, 706-07 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004); Smith v. U.S. Sugar Corp., 624 So.2d 315, 319 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993). In this regard, we reiterate that unsworn res......
-
Jennings v. Habana Health Care Ctr., No. 1D15–1749.
...standard." See Moore v. Hillsborough Cty. Sch. Bd., 987 So.2d 1288, 1289 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008) (citing Morris v. Dollar Tree Store, 869 So.2d 704, 707 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004) ); see also Hernandez v. Manatee Cty. Gov't, 50 So.3d 57, 58 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010). To the extent an award of costs presents......
-
Begley's Cleaning Service v. Costa, No. 1D04-4087.
...1246 an injury but not paying any benefits or compensation. Our standard of review is de novo. See, e.g., Morris v. Dollar Tree Store, 869 So.2d 704, 705 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004) ("Because the JCC's interpretation is one of law, our review standard is de novo."); Lanham v. Dep't of Envtl. Prot.,......
-
Lane v. Workforce Bus. Servs., Inc., No. 1D14–0959.
...discretion standard.” Moore v. Hillsborough Cnty. Sch. Bd., 987 So.2d 1288, 1289 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008) (citing Morris v. Dollar Tree Store, 869 So.2d 704, 707 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004) ). Failure to apply the correct legal standard is grounds for reversal. Village of N. Palm Beach v. McKale, 911 So......