Morris v. Hamilton Cnty. Assessor
Decision Date | 30 July 2021 |
Docket Number | Cause No. 20T-TA-00019 |
Parties | Eric S. MORRIS, Petitioner, v. HAMILTON COUNTY ASSESSOR, Respondent. |
Court | Indiana Tax Court |
PETITIONER APPEARING PRO SE: ERIC S. MORRIS, Indianapolis, IN
ATTORNEYS FOR RESPONDENT: MARILYN S. MEIGHEN, ATTORNEY AT LAW, Carmel, IN, BRIAN A. CUSIMANO, ATTORNEY AT LAW, Indianapolis, IN
Eric S. Morris challenges the Indiana Board of Tax Review's final determination that dismissed his case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Upon review, the Court affirms the Indiana Board's final determination.
In 2012, Morris purchased a property located in an unincorporated area of Clay Township, Hamilton County, Indiana. (Cert. Admin. R. at 769-70.) The unincorporated area, commonly known as Home Place, is adjacent to the City of Carmel bound by "99th Street to the south, Pennsylvania Street to the west, 111th Street to the north, and Westfield Boulevard to the east." (See Cert. Admin. R. at 737, 769-70, 787.) See also Certain Home Place Annexation Territory Landowners v. City of Carmel, 85 N.E.3d 926, 928 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017).
Over the course of the next seven years, Carmel provided fire protection services, including 911 emergency services, to the residents of Home Place under a series of annual "Contracts for Fire Protection" with Clay Township. (See Cert. Admin. R. at 347-495, 663-90, 776-77 (citing Certain Home Place Annexation Territory Landowners, 85 N.E.3d at 933 ).) The terms of those contracts required Clay Township to pay its proportionate share of Carmel's fire department budget based on the ratio of total assessed valuation of unincorporated property compared to the total assessed valuation of the property within Carmel. (See, e.g., Cert. Admin. R. at 347-50, 363-67, 817.) The contracts further provided that Clay Township would agree to seek Department of Local Government Finance ("DLGF") approval for an appropriation from its Fire Fighting Fund, i.e., Fire Fund 1111, to pay Carmel. (See, e.g., Cert. Admin. R. at 70, 349.)
(Cert. Admin. R. at 496, 500-05.) Clay Township subsequently used monies from its Fire Building Debt Fund (i.e., Debt Fund 1181) to pay for bonds related to the Interlocal Agreement. (See, e.g., Cert. Admin. R. at 75-76, 96, 98, 100, 798.)
(See, e.g., Cert. Admin. R. at 500-01, 647.) In addition, Morris's complaint stated that his claims were based upon "Incorrect Taxation." (Cert. Admin. R. at 647.)
In December of 2018, Clay Township moved to dismiss Morris's complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, asserting that the Tax Court had exclusive jurisdiction over the case, not Hamilton Superior Court No. 4. (See Cert. Admin. R. at 647-49.) In so moving, Clay Township argued that Hamilton Superior Court No. 4 did not have the authority to hear the issues raised in Morris's complaint because it was "directly based upon an allegation of ‘incorrect taxation[,]’ and therefore, " ‘principally involve[d] the collection of a tax[,]’ " a subject within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Tax Court. (See Cert. Admin. R. at 648.) Hamilton Superior Court No. 4 dismissed Morris's case on December 26, 2018. (Cert. Admin. R. at 650.) Hamilton Superior Court No. 4 then denied Morris's subsequent motions for leave to file an amended complaint and to reconsider the order of dismissal. (See Cert. Admin. R. at 651-62.)
(See, e.g., Cert. Admin. R. at 2.)
On January 16, 2020, the Assessor moved to dismiss Morris's appeals, claiming the Indiana Board did not have the authority to hear the appeals because they were not property tax appeals given that they "dispute[d] local budgetary appropriations for, and accounting, of firefighting funds." (See Cert. Admin. R. at 27-32.) Approximately two weeks later, Clay Township moved to intervene because it believed that Morris's appeals had challenged the legality of its actions with respect to the utilization of Fire Fund 1111. (See Cert. Admin. R. at 36-38.) On May 5, 2020, the Indiana Board denied both motions and set Morris's appeals for hearing on June 17, 2020. (See Cert. Admin. R. at 39-40.)
On November 19, 2020, after conducting its administrative hearing, the Indiana Board issued a final determination in the matter. In that final determination, the Indiana Board concluded that it lacked the authority to hear Morris's appeals because Morris stated that he brought his claims under the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act (the "UDJA"), and he did not seek "any specific individual relief" from the Indiana Board. (See Cert. Admin. R. at 759 ¶¶ 22-23.) As a result, the Indiana Board dismissed Morris's appeals. (See Cert. Admin. R. at 759.)
On December 21, 2020, Morris initiated this appeal as a small tax case, claiming the Indiana Board (as well as this Court) has subject matter jurisdiction over his appeals because they seek a "declaration that Clay Township violated the constitution, statutes, fire contracts, and interlocal agreements in appropriating, accounting for, and spending money, which increased [his] taxes." (See Pet'r Pet. Jud. Rev. Final Determination Ind. Bd. Tax Rev., Small Tax Case ("Pet'r Pet.") at 6 ¶ 17.) Morris further explained that the relief he sought entitled him to a refund of property taxes because Clay Township would be required to lower "the amount it [had] charged [him for property taxes] and rais[e] the tax rate in [certain] areas outside" of Home Place. (See Pet'r Pet. at 1 ¶ 2.)
On July 29, 2021, the Court heard the parties’ oral arguments. Additional facts will be supplied if necessary.
The party seeking to reverse an Indiana Board final determination bears the burden of demonstrating its invalidity.
Lowe's Home Ctrs., Inc. v. Monroe Cnty. Assessor, 160 N.E.3d 263, 268 (Ind. Tax Ct. 2020). Consequently, Morris must demonstrate to the Court that the Indiana Board's final determination in this matter is arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law; contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege, or immunity; in excess of or short of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations; without observance of the procedure required by law; or unsupported by substantial or reliable evidence. IND. CODE § 33-26-6-6(e)(1)-(5) (2021).
On appeal, Morris claims that the Indiana Board's final determination must be reversed because it effectively and erroneously reconsidered and reversed its May 2020 decision that his appeals were "ripe for it to hear factually" given that there had been no change in the controlling law. (See, e.g., Pet'r Br. at 1-3; Cert. Admin. R. at 39-40.) (See also Pet'r Pet. at 1 ¶ 5 ( ).) Alternatively, Morris requests that this Court assume jurisdiction over his appeals pursuant to the UDJA. (See, e.g., Pet'r Br. at 3-6; Pet'r Reply Br. ...
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