Morris v. Massachusetts Maritime Academy

• Decision Date: 17 January 1991
• Parties: , 1991 A.M.C. 1161, 65 Ed. Law Rep. 147 Roger C. MORRIS, administrator, 1 v. MASSACHUSETTS MARITIME ACADEMY et al. 2 (and a companion case 3 ).
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

Page 422

565 N.E.2d 422

409 Mass. 179, 1991 A.M.C. 1161, 65

Ed. Law Rep. 147

Roger C. MORRIS, administrator, ¹ v. MASSACHUSETTS MARITIME ACADEMY et al. ²

(and a companion case ³).

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts,

Suffolk.

Argued Oct. 4, 1990.

Decided Jan. 17, 1991.

Jon S. Hartmere, Asst. Atty. Gen. (Thomas F. Murphy, Jr., Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., with him) for defendants.

Steven L. Hoffman (Lisa L. Locke, Boston, with him), for plaintiffs.

Before LIACOS, C.J., and WILKINS, ABRAMS, NOLAN and O'CONNOR, JJ.

ABRAMS, Justice.

On December 22, 1981, a fire aboard the Bay State, a training vessel used by the Massachusetts Maritime Academy (academy), killed Cadet Rodney C. Morris, and severely injured Cadet Stephen A. Bianco. Bianco and Morris's estate brought actions in the Superior Court against the Academy, its board of trustees, the Board of Regents of Higher Education, and the Commonwealth. ⁴ They allege (1) violation of the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C.App. § 688 (1982 & Supp. III 1985); (2) negligence, gross negligence and unseaworthiness under general admiralty law, and (3) negligence and wrongful death as to Morris under State law, including G.L. c. 229 (1988 ed.). The defendants moved to dismiss the complaints for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and failure to state a claim. They contended that the plaintiffs' claims are barred by sovereign immunity, that State courts lack jurisdiction over the admiralty claims under the saving to suitors clause, 28 U.S.C. § 1333 (1988), and that State courts lack jurisdiction over the Jones Act claims because the cadets are neither "seamen" nor "employees" under the Jones Act. The Superior Court judge denied the motions to dismiss and reserved and reported her decision to the Appeals Court pursuant to G.L. c. 231, § 111 (1988 ed.), and Mass.R.Civ.P. 64, 365 Mass. 831 (1974). We transferred the case on our own motion. We affirm.

1. Sovereign immunity. The defendants contend that admiralty claims against the Commonwealth or its agencies are barred by sovereign immunity. The plaintiffs claim that the defendants may not assert sovereign immunity against admiralty claims in State court. They further argue that, even if sovereign immunity may be asserted, the Commonwealth has waived its immunity under the Massachusetts Tort Claims Act, G.L. c. 258 (1988 ed.). The plaintiffs also contend that the $100,000 cap on recovery imposed by the Act cannot be applied to limit their Federal Jones Act or maritime remedies. Because the questions relating to waiver and the Massachusetts Tort Claims Act depend, in part, on the issue of sovereign immunity, we discuss each issue in turn.

a. State sovereign immunity against admiralty claims. The saving to suitors clause, 28 U.S.C. § 1333, provides State courts with concurrent jurisdiction over certain admiralty claims. (See infra.) In Offshore Logistics, Inc. v. Tallentire, 477 U.S. 207, 222-223, 106 S.Ct. 2485, 2494-2495, 91 L.Ed.2d 174 (1986), the United States Supreme Court ruled that the extent to which State courts may apply State law to remedy maritime injuries is limited by a so-called "reverse-Erie doctrine." Thus, "a state, 'having concurrent jurisdiction, is free to adopt such remedies, and to attach to them such incidents, as it sees fit' so long as it does not attempt to ... make changes in the 'substantive maritime law.' " Id. at 222, 106 S.Ct. at 2494, quoting Madruga v. Superior Court, 346 U.S. 556, 560-561, 74 S.Ct. 298, 300-301, 98 L.Ed. 290 (1954). As the United States Supreme Court explained in Southern Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 216, 37 S.Ct. 524, 529, 61 L.Ed. 1086 (1917), State law may not be applied in maritime cases if "it contravenes the essential purpose expressed by an act of Congress or works material prejudice to the characteristic features of the general maritime law or interferes with the proper harmony and uniformity of that law in its international and interstate relations."

The plaintiffs contend that the Commonwealth may not claim sovereign immunity in this case because application of immunity would defeat the uniformity of admiralty law and would deprive the plaintiffs of a Federal right of recovery to which they are otherwise entitled. They argue that the case is controlled by Workman v. New York City, 179 U.S. 552, 21 S.Ct. 212, 45 L.Ed. 314 (1900), in which the Supreme Court refused in a maritime case to apply a local law conferring immunity on municipalities because of its negative impact on uniformity and the Federal admiralty right of recovery.

Workman, however, was directed to a local law conferring immunity on municipalities, not on the State itself. The United States Supreme Court distinguished the New York law from sovereign immunity laws that operate as a jurisdictional bar. See id. at 566, 21 S.Ct. at 217. Indeed, later Supreme Court decisions hold that States are entitled to sovereign immunity against admiralty claims, at least in Federal court. See Ex parte State of N.Y., 256 U.S. 490, 499-500, 41 S.Ct. 588, 590, 65 L.Ed. 1057 (1921) (Supreme Court rejected the argument that the sovereign immunity claim should be analyzed for its consistency with admiralty law as the municipal immunity law was in Workman ). See id. at 499-500, 41 S.Ct. at 590. The plaintiffs at bar nevertheless contend that State of N.Y. is inapposite because the holding was based on the Eleventh Amendment ⁵ to the United States Constitution, which they argue provides immunity for States only in Federal courts, not in State courts.

It is true that the language of the Eleventh Amendment is directed only to the "judicial power of the United States" rather than to the judicial power of the States. However, the Supreme Court's interpretation of the constitutional principles underlying the amendment is not limited by the language. For example, although the amendment addresses only suits between States and citizens of another State or foreign states, the Supreme Court construes the principle of sovereign immunity to extend nevertheless to suits between a State and one of its own citizens. See Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 10 S.Ct. 504, 33 L.Ed. 842 (1890). See also Ex parte State of N.Y., supra (Eleventh Amendment bars suits in admiralty against a State even though the language of the amendment only mentions suits in law or equity).

The Supreme Court's interpretation of the amendment is derived from its reading of the history of the amendment's passage. According to the Supreme Court, the Eleventh Amendment was intended to overrule the decision in Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 1 L.Ed. 440 (1793), in which art. III, § 2, of the United States Constitution was interpreted to permit Federal court suits brought against nonconsenting States by citizens of another State. The popular outrage at the Chisholm decision and the quick response in the form of the Eleventh Amendment indicated to the Supreme Court that the Constitution was adopted with the implicit assumption that States were to enjoy sovereign immunity in Federal courts. See Hans, supra 134 U.S. at 11, 10 S.Ct. at 505-506. ⁶

More recently, the Supreme Court has held that this immunity may be abrogated by an act of Congress. See Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 109 S.Ct. 2273, 105 L.Ed.2d 1 (1989) (congressional abrogation of State immunity pursuant to commerce clause power); Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 96 S.Ct. 2666, 49 L.Ed.2d 614 (1976) (congressional abrogation of State immunity pursuant to enforcement power of § 5 of Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution). However, the Supreme Court has stressed that, "Congress may abrogate the States' constitutionally secured immunity from suit in Federal court only by making its intention unmistakably clear in the language of the statute." Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 242, 105 S.Ct. 3142, 3147, 87 L.Ed.2d 171 (1985). The Jones Act, according to the Supreme Court, does not contain sufficiently explicit language to constitute such an abrogation. See Welch v. Texas Dep't of Highways & Pub. Transp., 483 U.S. 468, 474-476, 107 S.Ct. 2941, 2946-2948, 97 L.Ed.2d 389 (1987).

Although the Supreme Court never has addressed the question whether States may claim immunity in their own courts when the Eleventh Amendment bars suit in Federal court, ⁷ we think that, absent congressional command to the contrary, they may. The Hans line of cases indicates that the Constitution was ratified with the implicit assumption that States would retain their sovereign immunity. The only logical interpretation of this implicit constitutional principle is that it must apply regardless of the court in which the State is being sued. Any conclusion to the contrary would decimate the force of the Eleventh Amendment and demote it into nothing more than a choice of forum clause: either the State must consent to be sued in Federal court or it will be unwillingly subjected to process in its own courts. We think the Supreme Court's Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence demonstrates a greater respect for the principle of State sovereign immunity.

Although concerns for Federal-State comity--the unseemly notion of one sovereign being hauled into the courts of another--arise in many of the Eleventh Amendment cases, those federalism concerns are no less present in this type of case. Although here it is not a question of a State being hauled into the courts of another sovereign, it is a question of a State being hauled into its own courts by the laws of another sovereign. Moreover, those laws are alleged to require the payment of retrospective damage awards out of a State's coffers. If there is any area of State sovereignty which the Supreme Court is particularly hesitant to invade, it is State citizens' settled decisions about State budgetary allocations. See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 94 S.Ct. 1347, 39 L.Ed.2d 662 (1974) (Eleventh Amendment bars suits against State officers seeking...