Morris v. Moller

• Court: United States State Supreme Court of North Dakota
• Citation: 815 N.W.2d 266,2012 ND 74
• Docket Number: No. 20110196.,20110196.
• Parties: Lance Brian MORRIS, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Ceisha Dawn MOLLER, Defendant and Appellee.
• Decision Date: 10 April 2012

815 N.W.2d 266
2012 ND 74

Lance Brian MORRIS, Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.
Ceisha Dawn MOLLER, Defendant and Appellee.

No. 20110196.

Supreme Court of North Dakota.

April 10, 2012.

[815 N.W.2d 267]

Lynn M. Boughey (argued), Bismarck, ND, for plaintiff and appellant.

Mitchell D. Armstrong (argued), and Sandra L. Voller (on brief), Bismarck, ND, for defendant and appellee.

KAPSNER, Justice.

[¶ 1] Lance Morris appeals from a district court judgment awarding Ceisha Moller

[815 N.W.2d 268]

primary residential responsibility of the parties' two children. We conclude the court's judgment was not clearly erroneous, and we affirm.

I

[¶ 2] Morris and Moller were not married but lived together from the latter part of 2004 through February 2009. They had two children—C.M., a son, and J.M., a daughter—before separating. Moller also had a daughter, A.G., from a previous relationship; A.G. resided with the parties and their children. After the parties separated, Morris filed suit for primary residential responsibility of the children. Moller answered, seeking primary residential responsibility herself, and she moved for an interim order awarding her temporary primary residential responsibility. The court entered an interim order granting Moller's motion and allowing Morris reasonable visitation. Following a motion by Moller, the district court ordered the appointment of a parenting investigator.

[¶ 3] On July 22 and 23, 2010, a trial was held to determine parental rights and responsibilities. Both parties alleged the other had abused drugs during their relationship. Morris asserted Moller used methamphetamine during her pregnancies with C.M., who was born in 2005, and J.M., who was born in 2007, which Moller denied. Among the witnesses called at trial were the children's pediatrician and the parenting investigator, the latter of whom Morris claimed was biased toward Moller. After analyzing the best interests and welfare of the children under the factors set forth in N.D.C.C. § 14–09–06.2(1), the district court found it was in the children's best interests for Moller to have primary residential responsibility and for Morris to have reasonable parenting time.

II

[¶ 4] On appeal, Morris argues the district court erred in awarding Moller primary residential responsibility because sufficient evidence was presented to establish Moller used methamphetamine while pregnant with C.M. and J.M., triggering a rebuttable presumption that Moller may not be awarded residential responsibility. Morris also claims several of the best interest factors should have been found to favor him. He finally contends the court erred by relying on the parenting investigator's recommendations, alleging the parenting investigator was biased toward Moller.

[¶ 5] A district court's award of primary residential responsibility is a finding of fact, which will not be reversed on appeal unless it is clearly erroneous. Miller v. Mees, 2011 ND 166, ¶ 12, 802 N.W.2d 153. “A finding of fact is clearly erroneous if it is induced by an erroneous view of the law, if no evidence exists to support it, or, although there is some evidence to support it, on the entire record, we are left with a definite and firm conviction a mistake has been made.” Doll v. Doll, 2011 ND 24, ¶ 6, 794 N.W.2d 425. When applying the clearly erroneous standard of review, we do not reweigh evidence, reassess witness credibility, retry a custody case, or substitute our judgment for the district court's decision merely because we may have reached a different result. Miller, at ¶ 12.

[¶ 6] District courts must award primary residential responsibility of children to the party who will best promote the children's best interests and welfare. Miller, 2011 ND 166, ¶ 11, 802 N.W.2d 153. A district court has broad discretion in awarding primary residential responsibility, but the court must consider all of the relevant factors under N.D.C.C. § 14–09–06.2(1).

[815 N.W.2d 269]

Doll, 2011 ND 24, ¶ 8, 794 N.W.2d 425. The district court also has discretion in deciding what weight to assign to a parenting investigator's conclusion, and the court is not required to follow the parenting investigator's recommendation. Id.

A

[¶ 7] Morris first points to factor j of the best interests factors, which states, in relevant part:

If the court finds credible evidence that domestic violence has occurred, and there exists one incident of domestic violence which resulted in serious bodily injury or involved the use of a dangerous weapon or there exists a pattern of domestic violence within a reasonable time proximate to the proceeding, this combination creates a rebuttable presumption that a parent who has perpetrated domestic violence may not be awarded residential responsibility for the child.

N.D.C.C. § 14–09–06.2(1)(j). “Domestic violence,” as used in factor j, is defined as “physical harm, bodily injury, sexual activity compelled by physical force, assault, or the infliction of fear of imminent physical harm, bodily injury, sexual activity compelled by physical force, or assault, not committed in self-defense, on the complaining family or household members.” N.D.C.C. § 14–07.1–01(2). Morris asks us to hold, as a matter of law, “that meth use by a mother during pregnancy constitutes domestic violence involving the use of a dangerous weapon, and any repeated use during pregnancy constitutes a pattern of domestic violence[.]” He argues “the credible evidence did show repeated use of meth during the pregnancy of both children; such evidence constitutes a pattern of domestic violence directed at the child and creates a rebuttable presumption that a parent who has perpetrated domestic violence may not be awarded residential responsibility for the child.” Moller replies that, in the proceedings below, Morris “never asserted [Moller's] alleged drug use while pregnant was domestic violence triggering the rebuttable presumption,” and claims the argument is therefore waived. Moller also notes the district court did not find sufficient evidence of domestic violence to affect its determination of parental rights and responsibilities.

[¶ 8] It is well established that arguments not raised before the district court cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. See, e.g., S.H.B. v. T.A.H., 2010 ND 149, ¶ 12, 786 N.W.2d 706. In the proceedings before the district court, Morris alleged Moller used drugs while pregnant with C.M. and J.M., and Morris voiced his concern that such drug use may have caused developmental delays in C.M. Yet prior to this appeal, Morris did not assert that a mother's use of drugs during pregnancy constitutes domestic violence under factor j. Morris never specifically raised this issue in any of his district court filings, nor did he argue this issue before the...