Morris v. Northrop Grumman Corp.

Decision Date17 February 1999
Docket NumberNo. CV 95-3335 ADS.,CV 95-3335 ADS.
Citation37 F.Supp.2d 556
PartiesJohn MORRIS, Miles G. Merritt, and Dolores McCall, Plaintiffs, v. NORTHROP GRUMMAN CORPORATION, Grumman Aerospace Corporation, Andrew Ballow, in his official and individual capacities, Anthony Jessen, in his official and individual capacities, James Gabreski, in his official and individual capacities, Paul Siegel, in his official and individual capacities, William Trillo, in his official and individual capacities, Lillian Dubois, in her official and individual capacities, Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — Eastern District of New York

Law Offices of Frederick K. Brewington, NY, Hamburger, Maxson & Yaffe LLP, Melville, NY by David N. Yaffe, of counsel, for plaintiffs.

Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP, NY by Christopher A. Parlo, Vincent E. Bauer, Anita W. Coupe, of counsel, for defendants.

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION AND ORDER

SPATT, District Judge.

Approximately three and a half years after the complaint was filed in this case, and after what can only be referred to as a contentious period of discovery including the filing of 251 docket entries, the Court is now prepared to rule on the seven pending motions submitted by the defendants.

On August 14, 1995, John Morris ("Morris"), Miles Merritt ("Merritt"), and Dolores McCall ("McCall") (collectively, the "plaintiffs"), filed their complaint against Northrop Grumman Corporation ("Northrop"), Grumman Aerospace Corporation ("Grumman Aerospace" or "Grumman"), Andrew Ballow ("Ballow"), Anthony Jessen ("Jessen"), James Gabreski ("Gabreski"), Paul Siegel ("Paul Siegel"), William Trillo ("Trillo"), and Lillian Dubois ("Dubois") (collectively, the "defendants").

This lawsuit arises from the plaintiffs' claims of employment discrimination in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 ("ADEA"), 29 U.S.C. § 621, et seq., Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII"), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq., the New York Human Rights Law (the "Human Rights Law"), N.Y. Exec. Law § 296, and common law. The plaintiffs allege that the defendants "negligently, wantonly, recklessly, knowingly and purposefully ... sought to deprive [them] of employment, position, title and pay through a pattern of discrimination, retaliation, misrepresentation, misinformation, fraud, harassment, character assassination, abuse and manipulation of laws, rules and regulations." (Am. Compl.¶ 2.) The plaintiffs claim that this unlawful activity was undertaken knowingly with the intent to punish, silence, isolate, remove, and retaliate against them in violation of their constitutional, statutory and common law rights.

Presently before the Court are seven separately filed motions by the defendants. First, the defendants move pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure ("Fed. R. Civ.P.") ("Rule 12(b)(6)") to dismiss the Title VII claim of the plaintiff Miles G. Merritt's ("Merritt") on the basis that it is time-barred. Second, the defendants move pursuant to Rule 56 of the Fed. R. Civ.P. ("Rule 56") and Local Civil Rule 56.1 ("Local Rule 56") for an Order striking certain portions of affidavits filed in conjunction with the plaintiffs' opposition to the defendants motions for summary judgment. Third, the defendants move pursuant to Rule 56 for summary judgment dismissing the claims of Merritt. Fourth, the defendants move pursuant to Rule 56 for summary judgment dismissing the claims of Morris. Fifth, the defendants move pursuant to Rule 56 for summary judgment dismissing the claims of McCall. Sixth, the defendants move to strike the economic damage allegations of McCall. And seventh, the defendants move to sever and/or for separate trials pursuant to Rules 20, 21, and 42 of the Fed. R. Civ.P.

I. BACKGROUND

Many of the facts alleged in the plaintiffs' second amended complaint are outlined in the March 21, 1998 Memorandum of Decision and Order by this Court. While familiarity with the Court's prior opinion is presumed, a brief recitation of the facts alleged by the plaintiffs follows.

All three plaintiffs are African-Americans. Morris and Merritt are male, while McCall is a female. At the time the complaint was filed, the ages of Morris, Merritt, and McCall were 45, 51, and 48, respectively.

The defendant Northrop, is the successor corporation to the Grumman Corporation. The defendant, Grumman Aerospace is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Northrop Grumman. The defendant Ballow, is a Caucasian male employed by both Northrop and Grumman Aerospace as a Director of Material Operations. The defendant Jessen, is a Caucasian male employed by Northrop and Grumman Aerospace as a Director of Material Distribution. The defendant Gabreski, is a Caucasian male employed by Northrop and Grumman Aerospace as a Traffic Manager in the Traffic and Shipping Department of Material Distribution in the Material Operations Division. The defendant Siegel, is a Caucasian male employed by Northrop and Grumman Aerospace as a Director of Business Office Facilities Engineering. The defendant Trillo, is a Caucasian male employed by Northrop and Grumman Aerospace as a Manager in the Facilities Engineering Department. The defendant DuBois, an African-American female is employed by Northrop and Grumman Aerospace as the EEO director in the their EEO office and is responsible for the administration of their equal employment opportunity and affirmative action plans.

A. Miles Merritt

Merritt was hired by Grumman in August 1962 as a Saw Operator and Warehouseman in the Receiving Stores Department. In 1967, Merritt was promoted to a Staff Assistant in the Receiving and Stores Department. Subsequently, Merritt obtained a Bachelor of Arts degree in Economics and, in 1976, was promoted to the position of Facilities Analyst in the Material Handling Systems Department. Thereafter, Merritt was promoted to the position of Senior Facilities Analyst.

In 1977, Merritt applied for the open position of Manager of Receiving and Warehousing. The position was ultimately given to a Caucasian who Merritt asserts had less education. In 1986, Merritt applied for the open position of Manager of Receiving in the Receiving and Stores Department and participated in the interview process. Although Merritt believed he was eminently qualified for the position, as he claimed to have written most of the Department's procedures, he was not awarded the job. Rather, the position went to the defendant Jessen.

As a result of this incident, Merritt filed a charge of discrimination with the company's Human Resources office. No action was ever taken in response to this charge. According to Merritt, in 1988 or 1989, he was then transferred to the Shipping Department in retaliation for filing the charge.

From 1988 to 1993, Merritt claims to have received "excellent appraisals." During this period, Merritt consistently sought promotions for positions which were ultimately filled, he claims, by less qualified, less senior Caucasian applicants, including employees who were originally trained by Merritt.

In July 1993, Merritt was instructed by the defendant Gabreski to train Jack Schnurr ("Schnurr") so that Schnurr could take over his job duties. Merritt trained Schnurr as instructed, believing that he would be terminated if he failed to comply. In February 1994, Merritt's duties were transferred to Schnurr. Merritt was given "kitting" duties in the Distribution Department which required manual labor. He was allegedly advised that although his job title would remain the same, he might have to take a cut in pay and eventually, his title would be reduced.

On March 20, 1994, Merritt filed a charge of discrimination based on race, color, and age with the EEOC. Sometime in March 1995, Merritt was offered and accepted the position of Subcontract Property Controller. On March 12, 1995, the EEOC issued to Merritt a right to sue letter.

B. John Morris

Morris was originally hired in January 1978 as a Traffic Analyst in the Traffic Department in the Warehouse and Distribution Directorate of Grumman Aerospace. At that time, he had a Bachelor of Science Degree in Business Administration. In 1980, Morris obtained a diploma from the Academy of Advanced Traffic located in Manhattan. According to Morris, throughout his employment he received numerous compliments regarding his work both from his superiors and from companies doing business with his employer. Despite these accolades, he claims to have been repeatedly denied promotions, and title and skill code changes which would make him eligible for a wider variety of jobs, in favor of younger Caucasian employees with less formal training, education, and seniority.

While Morris asserts that at the time he was hired, he received training in a number of traffic-related fields, he claims that he was consistently denied training in the areas of International Shipping and Household Goods, as well as managerial training. In 1982, Harry Milne ("Milne"), a Caucasian employee who is seven years Morris' junior, received this training and was promoted to the position of Assistant Traffic Manager. Neither Ballow, Jessen, nor Gabreski participated in the selection of Milne. At the time of Milne's promotion, Thomas Lashinsky ("Lashinsky") was the manager of the Traffic Department. Lashinsky supervised both Milne and Morris for the four years prior to the 1982 promotion selection.

Subsequently, Milne decided to leave Grumman and it is alleged that he recommended Morris as his successor. Morris allegedly raised the issue of his promotion with both Robert Byrnes ("Byrnes"), the Director of Warehouse and Distribution overseeing the Traffic Department, and Lashinsky, the Traffic Manager of the Traffic Department. Morris was advised by both that the position would not be filled.

Morris continued to seek educational and departmental training in order to advance his career. Defendant Gabreski,...

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