Morris v. Prince George's County

• Decision Date: 31 May 1990
• Docket Number: No. 121,121
• Citation: 319 Md. 597,573 A.2d 1346
• Parties: Daniel L. MORRIS et al. v. PRINCE GEORGE'S COUNTY, Maryland et al. Sept. Term 1989.
• Court: Maryland Court of Appeals

Page 597

319 Md. 597

573 A.2d 1346

Daniel L. MORRIS et al. v. PRINCE GEORGE'S COUNTY, Maryland et al.

No. 121 Sept. Term 1989.

Court of Appeals of Maryland.

May 31, 1990.

Karl G. Feissner (Eugene Muskus, both on brief), Marlow Heights, for appellants.

Stephen M. Silvestri (Gary B. Eidelman, Semmes, Bowen & Semmes, Baltimore, and Michael P. Whalen, Michael O. Connaughton, J. Michael Dougherty, Jr., Upper Marlboro, all on brief), for appellees.

J. Joseph Curran, Jr., Atty. Gen., Ralph S. Tyler, Asst. Atty. Gen., Omar Melehy, Staff Atty., Baltimore, amicus curiae, for State of Md.

Argued before ELDRIDGE, COLE, RODOWSKY, McAULIFFE, ADKINS and CHASANOW, JJ., and CHARLES E. ORTH, Jr., Associate Judge of the Court of Appeals of Maryland (retired), Specially Assigned.

ADKINS, Judge.

Article 73B, § 32(a), Maryland Code (1957, 1988 Repl.Vol., 1989 Cum.Supp.), declares:

If a member transfers from a retirement or pension system operated on an actuarial basis where accumulated contributions are deducted on all earnable compensation to a retirement or pension system where accumulated contributions are deducted on all earnable compensation, the member shall receive service credit in the system into which the member transfers for and in the amount of benefits accumulated in the system from which the member transfers. The transfer of credit shall occur upon the deposit, within 1 year of the member's transfer, of the total accumulated contributions to the member's credit in the annuity or other corresponding fund of the system from which the member transferred to the fund of the system into which the member transferred.

The case before us involves two contributory retirement or pension systems, each operated on an actuarial basis. The question is whether, under § 32(a), a transferee carries with him, to the second system, his actual years of service in the first system for the purpose of computing eligibility for retirement, or carries the years of service in the first system merely for the purpose of computing mandatory benefits under the second. Appellants Daniel Morris (Morris) and Eric Olsen (Olsen) contend for the former construction; appellees Prince George's County and Trustees, Prince George's County Police Pension Fund, (collectively the County) argue for the latter. We read the statute in light of the legislative policy favoring "portability" of retirement benefits and conclude that Morris and Olsen are entitled to credit for their actual years of service in the first system in order to compute their eligibility for retirement from the second.

I.

We summarize the factual backdrop of the controversy. When Morris joined the Prince George's County Police Department in 1982, he had spent 11 years as a deputy sheriff in Prince George's County. During the nine years immediately prior to his move to the police department, he contributed to the Maryland State Retirement System (MSRS). Olsen had spent eight years as a deputy sheriff (during all of which he contributed to MSRS) when he became a Prince George's County policeman in 1984.

In 1987, the Prince George's County Pension Plan Administrative Review Board decided that neither man could count his actual years of service as a deputy sheriff for the purpose of computing the date upon which he would become eligible for retirement from the police department. That decision stemmed from provisions of the Prince George's County Police Pension Plan that require 20 years of services as a police officer before one becomes eligible for retirement under that plan. ¹

Aggrieved by that ruling, Morris and Olsen sought declaratory relief from the Circuit Court for Prince George's County, but the court agreed with the board. ² When the two potential retirees appealed to the Court of Special Appeals, we issued a writ of certiorari before any proceedings were had in that court. Morris v. Prince George's County, 317 Md. 609, 565 A.2d 1033 (1989).

II.

Whether Morris and Olsen will be eligible to receive retirement benefits in the last decade of the twentieth century or whether they will have to wait until the early years of the twenty-first depends on the interpretation of § 32. That interpretation also will decide matters of fiscal importance both to individuals like Morris and Olsen and to pension plan administrators. An actuary estimated that "the increase in the present value of benefits under the Police Pension Plan as of July 1, 1988" would be $40,675 for Morris and $36,250 for Olsen, if they prevail on their contention as to dates of eligibility for retirement. Additionally, should appellants succeed, they will become eligible to retire after somewhat shorter total service than if they had remained deputy sheriffs. In that job, eligibility does not occur until after 25 years of service or attainment of the 60th birthday.

The trial judge avoided all these possibilities by applying what he took to be the plain language of § 32. He noted the use of the phrase "creditable service" in § 11 of Article 73B as referring both to time spent in employment and to the amount of monetary benefits earned. But when he turned to the somewhat similar phrase "service credit" in the critical clause of § 32(a)--"the member shall receive service credit ... for and in the amount of benefits accumulated in the system from which the member transfers"--he said only the monetary benefits meaning could have been intended. He reasoned:

There is nothing in Article 73B to indicate that [the bifurcated use of "creditable service"] was what the legislature had in mind. It is more reasonable to conclude that service credit can refer either to a credit of years toward retirement or to credit for purposes of determining amount of retirement allowance. Indeed, the latter conclusion squares much more comfortably with a "plain language" reading of Section 32(a). This is especially evident if the "and in the amount of" clause is removed, leaving "member shall receive service credit for ... benefits accumulated...." It is anomalous to suggest that the legislature would intend to give credit for time served but state only that the credit was "for benefits accumulated." Given the dual role of "creditable service" in Section 11, the language "for benefits accumulated" implies that service credit is being used for the purpose, and only for the purpose, of calculating benefits of members in the transferee system [emphasis in original].

The judge concluded that while it "may be more equitable to have a member's time credit follow him when he transfers," it was "reasonable to conclude that the Legislature meant what it said in Section 32; that 'benefits' follow a member when he leaves MSRS, but that any credit for time is a matter to be determined elsewhere" [emphasis in original]. He believed that the so-called "plain language" rule of statutory construction not only constrained him to come to the result he reached, but also prevented him from searching beyond the statutory language in an effort to determine legislative purpose. He wrote: "Where the language of a statute has a plain and unambiguous meaning, that meaning is conclusively presumed to reflect the intention of the legislature in enacting the statute. Saunders v. [Unemp. Comp. Board], 188 Md. 677, 53 A.2d 579 (1947)."

The judge violated the normal process of statutory construction by deleting from the statute the words "and in the amount of" in order to support his interpretation. What is more important, he misapplied the "plain language" rule. He also failed to view the statute in the full context of statutory language and in the light of its legislative history. As we shall see, that history displays a legislative purpose that illuminates the language of § 32 and requires it to be read in a way quite different from the trial judge's exegesis.

III.

There is no doubt that the beginning point of statutory construction is the language of the statute itself. Brodsky v. Brodsky, 319 Md. 92, 98, 570 A.2d 1235, 1237 (1990). Obviously, " 'what the legislature has written in an effort to achieve a goal is a natural ingredient of analysis to determine that goal.' " ANA Towing v. Prince George's Co., 314 Md. 711, 715, 552 A.2d 1295, 1297 (1989) (quoting Kaczorowski v. City of Baltimore, 309 Md. 505, 513, 525 A.2d 628, 632 (1987)). When we look at the statutory language, we attempt to give effect to all the words in the statute. Dep't of Assess. & Tax. v. Belcher, 315 Md. 111, 121, 553 A.2d 691, 696 (1989). And sometimes it may not be necessary to go further than the scrutiny of statutory language, for the language itself may be sufficiently expressive of the legislative purpose or goal. Davis v. State, 319 Md. 56, 61, 570 A.2d 855, 858 (1990).

But our endeavor is always to seek out the legislative purpose, the general aim or policy, the ends to be accomplished, the evils to be redressed by a particular enactment. Department of Environment v. Showell, 316 Md. 259, 270, 558 A.2d 391, 396 (1989); Harford County v. Edgewater, 316 Md. 389, 397, 558 A.2d 1219, 1223 (1989); Nelson v. State, 315 Md. 62, 66, 553 A.2d 667, 669 (1989). In the conduct of that enterprise, we are not limited to study of the statutory language. The plain meaning rule " 'is not a complete, all-sufficient rule for ascertaining a legislative intention....' " Spratt v. State, 315 Md. 680, 684, 556 A.2d 667, 669 (1989) (quoting Darnall v. Connor, 161 Md. 210, 215, 155 A. 894, 896 (1931)). The "meaning of the plainest language" is controlled by the context in which it appears. Matter of Diane M., 317 Md. 652, 658, 566 A.2d 108, 110 (1989). Thus, we always are free to look at the context within which statutory language appears. Warfield v. State, 315 Md. 474, 499-500, 554 A.2d 1238, 1251 (1989); State v. Runge, 317 Md. 613, 618, 566 A.2d 88, 90 (1989). Even when the words of a statute carry a definite meaning, we are not "precluded from consulting legislative history as part of the...