Morris v. Schlumberger, Ltd.

• Decision Date: 05 May 1983
• Docket Number: No. 82-770,82-770
• Citation: 436 So.2d 1178
• Parties: John MORRIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. SCHLUMBERGER, LTD., et al., Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: Court of Appeal of Louisiana — District of US

Page 1178

436 So.2d 1178

John MORRIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v.SCHLUMBERGER, LTD., et al., Defendants-Appellees.

No. 82-770.

Court of Appeal of Louisiana Third Circuit.

May 5, 1983.

On Rehearing Aug. 1, 1983.

On Rehearing Sept. 6, 1983.

McHale, Bufkin & Dees, Louis D. Bufkin and Michael K. Dees, Lake Charles, for plaintiff-appellant.

Deutsch, Kerrigan & Stiles, Bert M. Cass, Jr., New Orleans, Scofield, Bergstedt, Gerard, Mount & Vernon, Richard E. Gerard, Jones, Tete, Nolen, Hanchey, Swift & Spears, Gregory Massey and Hunter Lundy, Lake Charles, for defendants-appellees.

Before GUIDRY, STOKER and KNOLL, JJ.

STOKER, Judge.

This is an appeal relative to a claim brought in state court pursuant to the Jones Act and general maritime law.The jury awarded the plaintiff $150,000 and apportioned the fault causing plaintiff's injury on a percentage basis among three defendants.The jury found that Transworld Drilling Company(Transworld), plaintiff's employer, was fifty percent at fault, Phillips Petroleum Company(Phillips) was forty percent at fault, and Schlumberger, Ltd., was ten percent at fault.Before trial Schlumberger, Ltd., and Halliburton Company, both originally named as defendants, settled with the plaintiffs and were voluntarily dismissed.It is not clear from the record whether another defendant, Gilley & Associates, Inc., was dismissed, but the defendant was not mentioned in the verdict or the judgment.The trial court signed a judgment against Transworld and Phillips "in solido" for $135,000 ($150,000 less the ten percent attributable to Schlumberger, Ltd.).

APPEALS

The plaintiff appeals, asserting that the failure of the trial court to grant pre-judgment interest on the award was error.Transworld and Phillips answered the appeal urging that the trial court erred in granting legal interest from the date the jury rendered its verdict.They assert that the correct date from which to begin the accrual of legal interest is from the date judgment was signed.Transworld and Phillips also contend in their answer to the appeal that the trial court erred in casting those defendants liable "in solido" in that they were liable to plaintiff only in proportion to their respective degrees of fault.

PRE-JUDGMENT INTEREST

Plaintiff contends that in cases of claims under general maritime law the award of pre-judgment interest lies within the discretion of the judge, and that such interest should not be denied in the absence of some peculiar circumstance.However, in addition to asserting a claim under general maritime law and the doctrine of unseaworthiness against defendant Transworld, plaintiff's claim was also brought pursuant to the Jones Act.Against Phillips, the plaintiff asserted a claim for negligence under general maritime law.

Regarding the claim arising under the Jones Act, this court faced a similar question of law in Morris v. Transworld Drilling Co., 365 So.2d 46(La.App. 3rd Cir.1978).In that casethis court found that the federal law as to interest on a Jones Act judgment is substantive and is therefore controlling and that, in a Jones Act case tried at law (rather than at admiralty), pre-judgment interest is not available.See cases cited therein.See alsoRains v. Diamond M. Company, 396 So.2d 306(La.App.1981), writ denied396 So.2d 623(La.1981), United States cert. denied 455 U.S. 938, 102 S.Ct. 1427, 71 L.Ed.2d 648(1982).This case differs from the cited cases in that this is not a pure Jones Act claim against Transworld.Plaintiff also sues under the doctrine of unseaworthiness and general maritime law.We conclude that pre-judgment interest cannot be awarded on the judgment against Transworld although it is joined with a general maritime law claim.

In Barton v. Zapata Offshore Company, 397 F.Supp. 778(E.D.La., 1975), the court rejected the notion that an unseaworthiness claim when combined with a Jones Act claim retains its status as a claim "at law" and is therefore governed by normal admiralty principles which allow prejudgment interest to be awarded.At page 780the court stated:

"The Supreme Court's opinion in Fitzgerald v. United States Lines Co., 1963, 374 U.S. 16, 83 S.Ct. 1646, 10 L.Ed.2d 720, does not warrant an interest award here.Plaintiff's counsel contends Fitzgerald did not say that an unseaworthiness claim becomes a claim "at law" when joined with a Jones Act claim and sent to a jury; therefore the unseaworthiness claim should be governed by normal admiralty principles, which allow prejudgment interest to be awarded.

"There might be merit to this analysis if either the jury had denied recovery under the Jones Act and found unseaworthiness, or if there were some element of admiralty damage not allowable under the Jones Act.But here the verdict found the employer liable under the Jones Act as well as the general maritime law; the elements and amounts of damage claimed were identical.If the court may not award prejudgment interest on the Jones Act claim, there is no separate "pure" admiralty item on which to allow interest.Furthermore, the reason given by the court in Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc. v. Richardson[295 F.2d 538 (2nd Cir.(1961) ], supra, for denying a right to prejudgment interest in jury-tried Jones Actcases--that the jury considers the delay in making an award--would apply with equal force to a jury-tried unseaworthiness claim.In sum, the plaintiff may not claim the benefits of a jury trial on an unseaworthiness claim completely merged with a Jones Act claim as to quantum and then attempt to unscramble the verdict after he prevails."

In the instant case, the verdict sheet returned by the jury does not indicate whether Transworld, the employer, was found liable under the Jones Act or general maritime law.The verdict merely finds Transworld "at fault".Plaintiff's petition does not apportion damages among the claims.Thus, there are no "pure" admiralty elements which allow an award of pre-judgment interest.The plaintiff is not entitled to pre-judgment interest as to the portion of the judgment representing Transworld's liability.

We also conclude that plaintiff may not be granted pre-judgment interest against Phillips because the parties failed to submit this question to the jury.Whether to grant pre-judgment interest is a question of fact, and if it is not reserved to the court and is not submitted to the jury, it may not be granted by the court.Havis v. Petroleum Helicopters, Inc., 664 F.2d 54(5th Cir.1981) and cases cited therein.Havis involved a diversity action brought pursuant to general maritime law only and tried to a jury.The issue of pre-judgment interest was never submitted to the jury nor reserved to the court even though the granting of pre-judgment interest is a factual issue.The purpose for allowing pre-judgment interest is "maintaining whole the damages granted a claimant".Havis v. Petroleum Helicopters, Inc., supra, at page 55.

As stated above, the granting of pre-judgment interest in these cases is a matter of federal substantive law.The purpose of the federal courts in allowing such interest is to compensate the claimant.The issue is one of fact and should have been presented to the jury for its consideration.The trial court did not err in refusing to grant pre-judgment interest.

LEGAL INTEREST

The trial judge signed the judgment on September 17, 1982, and granted legal interest from June 29, 1982, the date the jury rendered its verdict.If the trial judge intended to give pre-judgment interest he was in error, as discussed above.If the trial court intended to award interest from the date of judgment, the question becomes was the "date of judgment" the date the jury rendered its verdict or the date the judgment was signed?

Title 28 U.S.C. section 1961 provides as follows:

"Interest shall be allowed on any money judgment in a civil case recovered in a district court.Execution therefor may be levied by the marshal, in any case where, by the law of the State in which such court is held, execution may be levied for interest on judgments recovered in the courts of the State.Such interest shall be calculated from the date of the entry of the judgment, at the rate allowed by State law."(Emphasis added).

This statute provides for interest to run from "entry of judgment".Under Louisiana Law, there is no statute which straight-forwardly decrees when post-judgment interest begins to run.However, several statutory provisions in Book II, Title VI,Chapter 3, "Rendition", of the Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure, indicate that the definitive point in time regarding the effectiveness of final judgments is the date that the judgment is signed by the trial judge.The statutory provisions are as follows:

"Art. 1911.Final judgments; signing; appeals

"Except as otherwise provided by law, every final judgment shall be signed by the judge.For the purpose of an appeal as provided in Article 2083, no appeal may be taken from a final judgment until the requirement of this Article has been fulfilled."

"Art. 1912.Final judgment; multi-parish districts, signing in any parish in the state

"A final judgment may be signed in any parish within the state and shall be sent to the clerk of the parish in which the case is pending."

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"Art. 1915.Partial judgment

"A final judgment may be rendered and signed by the court, even though it may not grant the successful party all of the relief prayed for, or may not adjudicate all of the issues in the case, when the court:

(1) Dismisses the suit as to less than all of the plaintiffs, defendants, third partyplaintiffs, third party defendants, or interveners;

(2) Grants a motion for judgment on the pleadings, as provided by Articles 965, 968, and 969;

(3) Grants a motion for summary judgment, as provided by Articles 966 through 969; or

(4) Renders judgment on either the principal or incidental demand, when the two have been tried separately, as provided by Article 1038...