Morris v. State
| Decision Date | 28 February 2018 |
| Docket Number | No. 08–16–00153–CR,08–16–00153–CR |
| Citation | 554 S.W.3d 98 |
| Parties | Terry Lee MORRIS, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee. |
| Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
Lisa Mullen, 3149 Lackland Rd., Ste. 102, Fort Worth, TX 76116, for Appellant
Debra A. Windsor, Assistant District Attorney, 401 W. Belknap St., Fort Worth, Tx 76196–0201, for State
Before McClure, C.J., Rodriguez, and Palafox, JJ.
When the trial judges of this State don their robes and ascend the bench each morning, those with criminal dockets are often confronted with defendants who are rude, disruptive, noncompliant, belligerent, and in some cases, even murderously violent. In the face of this reality, Texas trial judges shoulder another heavy burden: the burden to tame the chaos before them, impose order, and uphold the dignity of the justice system. "The flagrant disregard in the courtroom of elementary standards of proper conduct should not and cannot be tolerated." Illinois v. Allen , 397 U.S. 337, 343, 90 S.Ct. 1057, 1061, 25 L.Ed.2d 353 (1970). When challenging defendants breach decorum and threaten to tarnish proceedings with bad behavior, we afford trial judges "sufficient discretion to meet the circumstances of each case." Id.
But discretion has its limits.
Appellant Terry Lee Morris was tried and convicted on one count of soliciting the sexual performance of a child. After the jury found enhancing factors true, Morris was sentenced to 60 years in prison. Morris does not challenge the legal sufficiency of his conviction on appeal. Instead, Morris advances four procedural complaints in his brief. One complaint in particular disturbs us.
Because the trial transcript clearly shows that the trial judge, during a heated exchanged with the defendant outside the presence of the jury, ordered his bailiff to electrocute the defendant three times with a stun belt—not for legitimate security purposes, but solely as a show of the court's power as the defendant asked the court to stop "torturing" him—we harbor grave doubts as to whether Morris' trial comported with basic constitutional mandates. As such, we have no choice but to overturn Morris' conviction and remand for a new trial.1
Given Morris' complaints are largely procedural and the facts largely uncontested for purposes of appeal, we will keep our discussion of the factual circumstances surrounding his crime brief. Morris dated the mother of the victim, J.C., who was then fifteen. After Morris and J.C.'s mother ended their relationship, Morris began contacting J.C. online. The conversations turned sexual, and Morris solicited and received nude images of J.C. that lewdly depicted her genitals. Police seized Morris' cell phone, which contained transcripts of the electronic messages as well as lewd photographs of J.C. and Morris.
Morris complains he was harmed by four procedural errors committed by the trial court. In Issue One, Morris argues the trial court erred in its use of a stun belt. In Issue Two, Morris contends the trial court abused its discretion in denying his counsel's motion to withdraw based on a conflict of interest, as Morris had filed a lawsuit against his counsel in federal court. In Issue Three, Morris maintains that the trial court should have conducted a hearing to determine if he was competent to stand trial. Finally, in Issue Four, Morris complains that the trial court erred by failing to grant his motion to suppress, since the arrest affidavit only supported probable cause as to a search for nude images on his cell phone, not a search of non-photographic data.
We will begin and end our discussion of Morris' appellate issues with Issue One.
In Issue One, Morris asserts that the trial court violated his constitutional rights "to a fair trial, to confront the witnesses, to confer with counsel, to be present at trial, [and] to participate in his defense" by repeatedly shocking Morris with a stun belt for failing to answer the trial court's questions regarding compliance with decorum, all in the absence of any valid courtroom security concerns. We agree.
The judicial misconduct of which Morris complains took place on the first day of the guilt-innocence phase of trial. After the prosecutor read the indictment, trial judge George Gallagher asked Morris for his plea, which led to the following exchange in open court:
Outside the presence of the jury, Morris attempted to continue his objections. The trial court warned Morris about any further outbursts. When Morris continued to speak and mentioned his motion to recuse and federal lawsuit against the trial judge, the trial judge asked his bailiff to intervene by activating the stun belt attached to Morris' leg:
After shocking Morris the first time, the trial court again asked Morris if he would adhere to courtroom decorum:
Following the second shock, the trial court repeated the same question to Morris several times over Morris' protestations that he was under medication for mental health problems and that the trial court was "torturing" him. When Morris stated that he was firing his attorney, the trial court apparently took Morris' remarks as an attempt to invoke his Faretta3 right to self-representation. The trial court began asking Morris a question ostensibly related to the Faretta invocation, but when Morris continued to speak about other matters, the trial court persisted in making use of the stun belt:
After electrocuting Morris a third time, the trial court again asked Morris whether he would be obedient. When Morris did not answer with a "yes" or "no," the trial court had Morris physically removed from the courtroom:
Upon Morris' removal from the courtroom, the trial court made findings that the defendant breached decorum and explained that the court's actions were intended to remedy that breach:
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