Morris v. State
| Decision Date | 03 June 1968 |
| Docket Number | No. 249,249 |
| Citation | 4 Md.App. 252,242 A.2d 559 |
| Parties | George MORRIS v. STATE of Maryland. |
| Court | Court of Special Appeals of Maryland |
Harold Buchman, Baltimore, for appellant.
Thomas N. Biddison, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen., with whom were Francis B. Burch, Atty. Gen., William B. Whiteford, Asst. Atty. Gen., Charles E. Moylan, Jr., and Allan B. Lipsom, State's Atty. and Asst. State's Atty. for Baltimore City, on the brief, for appellee.
Before MURPHY, C. J., and ANDERSON, MORTON, ORTH and THOMPSON, JJ.
The Appellant was convicted of obtaining money under false pretenses from the Baltimore City Welfare Department on the basis of testimony which established that while he was receiving Welfare payments under the name of George Chesnut, he failed to notify the Department that he was at the same time receiving income from gainful employment under the name George Morris.
As a part of its proof that the Appellant on occasion had used the name George Morris, the State offered in evidence several statements which were produced by an attorney who had formerly represented the Appellant in a civil matter, which statements bore the signature, George Morris. Also, the attorney's receptionist was permitted to testify, over objection, that the Appellant was known to her both as George Morris and as George Chesnut and that the office files indicated that he used both names. The Appellant asserted that his real name was George Chesnut and he denied ever having used the name George Morris. He admitted, however, that the attorney who produced the statements had previously represented him in a civil matter.
In this appeal, it is contended that the introduction of statements bearing the signature George Morris and the testimony of the receptionist identifying the Appellant as George Morris and George Chesnut were in violation of the confidential relationship between attorney and client. The statements were offered not for their substance but solely for the purpose of identifying the Appellant as a client who had represented his name to be George Morris. Thus, the question for determination is whether the identity of a client is protected by the privilege which ordinarily attaches to communications arising out of the attorney-client relationship. While the issue appears to be one of first impression in this State, it has been the subject of decision in a number of jurisdictions throughout the Country.
The principle of the attorney-client privilege is grounded in the common law, and, according to Professor Wigmore, its history goes back at least to the reign of Elizabeth I. See 8 Wigmore, Evidence, Sec. 2290 (McNaughton, rev. 1961). In some States the privilege has been recognized and regulated by statute; but by and large, the common law principle has remained unchanged even in those states which have enacted specific statutes since they have been interpreted as simply reflecting the common law doctrine. Professor Wigmore phrases the principle as follows (supra, Sec. 2292):
'(1) Where legal advice of kind is sought (2) from a professional legal advisor in his capacity as such, (3) the communications relating to that purpose, (4) made in confidence (5) by the client, (6) are at his insistence permanently protected (7) from disclosure by himself or by the legal adviser, (8) except the protection be waived.'
It is apparent from the foregoing statement that what is sought primarily to be protected are the communications between the client and the attorney, the modern theory being that an individual in a free society should be encouraged to consult with his attorney whose function is to counsel and advise him and he should be free from apprehension of compelled disclosures by his legal adviser. Miller, The Challenge to the Attorney-Client Privilege, 39 Va.L.R. 262, 268 (1963). However, since resort to the...
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Harrison v. State
...(emphasis added) In overruling objection to the proffered testimony of Daneman, Judge Harris, noting the holdings in Morris v. State, 4 Md.App. 252, 242 A.2d 559 (1968), was of the view that although communications with counsel were privileged, the lack of communications was not and ruled t......
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Andresen v. State
...The court ruled, again quite properly, that there was no such privilege in this case. The appellant now urges upon us Morris v. State, 4 Md.App. 252, 242 A.2d 559, and Bieber v. State, 8 Md.App. 522, 261 A.2d 202, which hold that the attorney-client privilege extends to the employees of the......
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...language which does not presently appear in the Code, but is a common law principle that has been long established. Morris v. State, 4 Md.App. 252, 254, 242 A.2d 559 (1968) ; Bris Realty v. Phoenix, 238 Md. 84, 89–90, 208 A.2d 68 (1965).12 Harborview and Zalco also argue that an interpretat......
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