Morris v. State
Decision Date | 29 January 1980 |
Docket Number | No. 779S183,779S183 |
Citation | Morris v. State, 399 N.E.2d 740, 272 Ind. 467 (Ind. 1980) |
Parties | J. W. MORRIS, Appellant (Defendant below), v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee (Plaintiff below). |
Court | Indiana Supreme Court |
Irma Hampton Nave, Anderson, for appellant.
Theodore L. Sendak, Atty. Gen., Stephen J. Cuthbert, Deputy Atty. Gen., Indianapolis, for appellee.
Defendant, J. W. Morris, was convicted by a jury of murder, Ind.Code § 35-42-1-1(Burns1979 Repl.), and sentenced to forty years' imprisonment.He now appeals raising several issues.However, because of our disposition of defendant's Fourth Amendment claim, we need consider only that issue.
In fairness to the state, it appears that on this occasion defendant voluntarily accompanied police to the police station for questioning.Another Muncie police officer, Steven Stanley, in response to defense counsel's questioning, testified in the following manner:
Q."You didn't advise him of his right not to even go with you?"
A."Who?"
Q."My client?"
A.
Q."Did you tell him he didn't have to talk to you?"
A.
Although defendant was at the police station for nearly three hours before being questioned and up to seven hours total, he did not give an inculpatory statement.Therefore, any Fourth Amendment violation by Muncie police associated with defendant's first trip to the police station had, in and of itself, no effect on the trial.Besides, defendant's statement indicates he voluntarily accompanied the police.
However, the very next morning police picked up defendant for questioning again.The state, in its brief, states only that "defendant was transported to the police station again."The record does not indicate that this trip was voluntary.The examination of Sergeant Shane McClellan included the following:
Q."He was picked up by the police department and brought down there?"
A."He was picked up by 2 investigators, yes."
There is no testimony as to what was said to defendant at the time he was picked up the second time.However, Sergeant McClellan stated:
"And when we met the next morning that's when we decided to pick J. W. and Dana up, John Jones up, (to) reinterview them about the statements that had already been made."
This statement indicates that the decision to bring defendantJ. W. Morris in was made by the police and was not a voluntary decision made by defendant.Within three hours of his arrest 1defendant signed a rights waiver, made inculpatory statements and led police to physical evidence.Defendant was then placed in jail.The next day at approximately 11:00 a. m., defendant asked to talk to another police officer and modified his previous statement, placing more blame on his alleged accomplice.
At no time during the above events did police have an arrest warrant.Prior to defendant's second statement there is no indication that the police had probable cause to obtain an arrest warrant.Indeed the evidence reveals that police used the arrest and detention of defendant as an investigatory tool.Again we quote from the testimony of Sergeant McClellan:
Q."Was he under arrest at that time?"
A."He was advised he was a suspect."
Q."But was he under arrest?"
A."He hadn't been charged."
Q."Did you have any grounds for charging him at that time he signed the rights waiver?"
A."The investigation was still on and going at that time."
Q.
A."Yes."
Q."What did he say."
A.
Q.
A.
Q."At the time he was arrested did you have an arrest warrant?"
A."No."
Q."Did you attempt to get an arrest warrant?"
A."No."
Q."Why not?"
A."Case was still under investigation."
A warrantless arrest not supported by probable cause is unlawful.Morgan v. State(1926)197 Ind. 374, 151 N.E. 98.
The evidence is not in dispute regarding the proper advisement of defendant's rights under Miranda v. Arizona(1966)384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694, prior to all questioning in this case.However, even if a confession is voluntary under the Fifth Amendment and Miranda and its progeny, that confession must be suppressed if it is the product of an unlawful arrest or detention.Brown v. Illinois(1975)422 U.S. 590, 95 S.Ct. 2254, 45 L.Ed.2d 416;Williams v. State(1976)264 Ind. 664, 348 N.E.2d 623.
In Brown v. Illinois, supra, the United States Supreme Court was unanimous in the conclusion that the Illinois Supreme Court was incorrect in holding that Miranda warnings, per se, rendered the defendant's statements admissible.Rather, when an arrest is unlawful, as in the case at bar, the Supreme Court will look to whether any subsequent statement or production of evidence "was sufficiently an act of free will to purge the primary taint of the unlawful invasion."Wong Sun v. United States(1963)371 U.S. 471, 486, 83 S.Ct. 407, 416-7, 9 L.Ed.2d 441, 454.Justice Brennan framed the issue in Wong Sun as follows:
371 U.S. at 488, 83 S.Ct. at 417, 9 L.Ed.2d at 455.
Justice Blackmun, writing the opinion of the Court in Brown v. Illinois, supra, indicated that in rejecting the Illinois Court's per se rule, the Supreme Court would not adopt a per se or "but for" rule of its own.
422 U.S. at 603-4, 95 S.Ct. at 2261-2, 45 L.Ed.2d at 427.(Citations and footnotes omitted.)
The facts in the Brown case are remarkably similar to those in the case at bar.Brown gave his first statement less than two hours after the unlawful arrest and there were no intervening circumstances of significance.Furthermore, the Court noted:
"The illegality here, moreover, had a quality of purposefulness.The impropriety of the arrest was obvious; awareness of that fact was virtually conceded by the two detectives when they repeatedly acknowledged, in their testimony, that the purpose of their action was 'for investigation' or for 'questioning.'. . . The arrest, both in design and in execution, was investigatory.The detectives embarked upon this expedition for evidence in the hope that something might turn up.The manner in which Brown's arrest was effected gives the appearance of having been calculated to cause surprise, fright, and confusion.422 U.S. at 605, 95 S.Ct. at 2262, 45 L.Ed.2d at 428.
In this case, defendantJ. W. Morris turned over evidence and gave an inculpatory statement, all within three hours of his arrest on November 26, 1978.2The arrest was made with neither a warrant nor probable cause.There were no intervening circumstances of significance between the arrest and production of evidence and statement.There was no "quality of openness" about defendant's detention and defendant had no contact with the outside world as in Fortson v. State (1979) Ind., 385 N.E.2d 429.We are cognizant
"that a distinction should be made between flagrant violations by the police, on the one hand, and technical, trivial, or inadvertent violations, on the other."Brewer v. Williams(1977)430 U.S. 387, 414n, 97 S.Ct. 1232, 1247n, 51 L.Ed.2d 424, 446n.(Justice Marshall concurring.)
But the violations by the police in this case are not technical or trivial, but rather, as in Brown, the violations had a "quality of purposefulness."Concerning the purpose of the interrogation of defendant when he voluntarily accompanied police, Deputy Chief Hahn testified, "Yes, we were pursuing an investigation, that's what we were all there for."Sergeant McClellan indicated that investigation was the purpose of defendant's arrest on November 26.
The burden of showing admissibility of evidence rests with the state.Brown v. Illinois, ...
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...Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 99 S.Ct. 2248, 60 L.Ed.2d 824, (1979); Stevens v. Wilson, 534 F.2d 867 (10th Cir. 1976); Morris v. State, 399 N.E.2d 740 (Ind.1980); State v. Olson, 287 Or. 157, 598 P.2d 670 (1979); Hart v. Commonwealth, 269 S.E.2d 806 We have followed Brown v. Illinois, ......
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