Morris v. Tanner, CV 99-82-M-DWM.
| Decision Date | 28 October 2003 |
| Docket Number | No. CV 99-82-M-DWM.,CV 99-82-M-DWM. |
| Citation | 288 F.Supp.2d 1133 |
| Parties | Thomas Lee MORRIS, a minor child, by and through his guardians, his natural parents, Elizabeth S. Morris and Roland J. Morris, Sr., Plaintiffs, v. Judge TANNER, Judge of the Confederated Salish and Kootenai Indian Tribal Court for the Flathead Reservation, Defendant, and United States of America, Intervenor. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Montana |
Before the Court are the United States' motion to dismiss and Plaintiff's and Defendant's motions for summary judgment. The State of Montana has filed an amicus curiae brief on behalf of the defendant.
Plaintiff Thomas Lee Morris and his parents Elizabeth and Roland challenge the constitutionality of the 1990 amendments to the Indian Civil Rights Act (ICRA), 25 U.S.C. § 1301(2), which affirm tribal court jurisdiction over all Indians, not just Indians who are members of the prosecuting tribe.1
Morris is an enrolled member of the Chippewa Tribe from the Leech Lake Reservation in Minnesota. On June 13, 1999, he was cited for speeding near Ronan, Montana, on the Flathead Indian Reservation. Morris was ordered to appear in the Flathead Reservation Tribal Court. The Flathead Reservation is the home of the Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes ("CSKT" or the "Tribes"), in which Morris is not enrolled. Morris filed a motion to dismiss the tribal action against him. The motion was denied. He also filed an action for declaratory and injunctive relief in federal court, claiming the Tribes had no jurisdiction over him. The tribal defendants in the federal action filed a motion to dismiss, which was granted by this Court on October 5, 1999. This court's brief order relied on the 1990 Indian Civil Rights Act amendments. Morris appealed to the Ninth Circuit. On July 24, 2001, the Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded.
The Ninth Circuit's Memorandum states that this Court erred in not considering Morris' constitutional arguments regarding the 1990 Indian Civil Rights Act amendments. This Court did not fully consider whether the amendments violated Morris' equal protection rights under the Due Process Clause, and whether they violate the principle of separation of powers. The Ninth Circuit remanded for consideration of these issues, as well as of whether there is a due process claim aside from equal protection. The heart of the Ninth Circuit's direction reads "the district court should consider whether the term `Indian' as used in the 1990 amendments amounts to a political or racial classification." If the classification is racial, the amendments must pass strict scrutiny. If it is political, the amendments are subject to rational basis review. "The district court should further consider the reach of the 1990 amendments, and whether the amendments apply to `Indians' who are not enrolled in, or otherwise affiliated with, any tribe." The 9th Circuit further directed this court to consider whether the amendments violate the doctrine of separation of powers under its ruling in United States v. Enas, 255 F.3d 662 (9th Cir.2001).
Plaintiff's Complaint includes the following counts: Count I (Federal Common Law), that CKST lacks retained inherent sovereign jurisdiction over non-members of the Tribes for criminal prosecution; Count II (Constitutional Due Process), that the prosecution, whether derived from the amendments or federal common law, violates Morris' right to due process, because the tribal court is not subject to the Bill of Rights; Count III (Constitutional Equal Protection), that the prosecution violates Morris' equal protection rights because it is based on race distinctions; and Count IV (Separation of Powers), that the amendments are unconstitutional because Congress' affirmation of tribal jurisdiction violates the separation of powers doctrine.
The U.S. entered this case as an Intervenor following the remand from the Ninth Circuit, in order to argue on behalf of the constitutionality of an Act of Congress. The U.S.'s motion to dismiss tracks the questions posed by the Ninth Circuit. In sum, the motion states that the ICRA amendments are reviewed under rational basis, since Indians2 are a political and not racial classification; there is a rational basis for the law; and therefore, there is no constitutional infirmity.
First, Acts of Congress are presumed constitutional. U.S.'s Mot. to Dismiss Br., 10-11. Acts of Congress relating to Indian affairs are given particular deference. Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 551-555, 94 S.Ct. 2474, 41 L.Ed.2d 290 (1974). The U.S. Supreme Court has upheld the constitutionality of Congressional acts that distinguish Indians from other groups. United States v. Antelope, 430 U.S. 641, 645, 97 S.Ct. 1395, 51 L.Ed.2d 701 (1977).
Acts singling out Indians are therefore subject to rational review, based on Indians as a political class, rather than strict scrutiny based on Indians as a racial group. U.S.'s Mot. to Dismiss Br., 12; Antelope, 430 U.S., at 645-650, 97 S.Ct. 1395; Fisher v. District Court, 424 U.S. 382, 391, 96 S.Ct. 943, 47 L.Ed.2d 106 (1976); Mancari, 417 U.S. at 555, 94 S.Ct. 2474. "Indian" is defined in ICRA as the same as under 18 U.S.C. § 1153, which has been interpreted in common law as membership in or affiliation with a federally recognized tribe. LaPier v. McCormick, 986 F.2d 303, 305 (9th Cir.1993); U.S.'s Mot. to Dismiss Br., 13-14. The ICRA amendments are rationally related to the government's goals of Indian self-governance and law enforcement on the reservations. U.S.'s Mot. to Dismiss Br., 15-16. In addition, so many non-member Indians live on reservations and partake of tribal services that it is rational for the criminal laws to apply to them as well, in a comprehensive scheme of reservation life. U.S.'s Mot. to Dismiss Br., 16.
The United States' second argument is that Morris fails to state a claim because the ICRA amendments do not violate due process. U.S.'s Mot. to Dismiss Br., 17-18. By being a tribal member, one chooses to be subject to ICRA in tribal court, not the Bill of Rights.
The United States' final argument is that the ICRA amendments do not violate separation of powers because Congress had the power, due to its control over federal common law, to enact legislation that contradicted the decision of the Supreme Court. Congress has also always had plenary authority over Indian affairs. U.S.'s Mot. to Dismiss Br., 19.
The Tribal Defendant, Judge Winona Tanner, has moved for summary judgment. Her argument contains five parts: 1.) the Tribes may prosecute Morris as a function of their retained inherent sovereign powers; 2.) the comprehensive tribal, state, and federal criminal prosecution scheme is consistent with the U.S. Constitution and reflects the unique status of Indian tribes' sovereignty; 3.) the Ninth Circuit has determined Morris' claim is a facial challenge to the statute, and he can not meet the burden of proving such a claim; 4.) Morris cannot bring an as-applied challenge because he has not exhausted his tribal remedies, it is beyond the scope of federal judicial review of tribal courts, and he has failed to submit his claim to the President for arbitration as required by his tribe's treaty with the U.S.; and 5.) justice in Indian country is best served by this jurisdictional scheme. Def.'s Sum. Judg. Br., 2.
Judge Tanner starts out by clarifying the procedural posture of Morris' claims before this Court, following remand from the Ninth Circuit. The Tribes conclude that Morris' fourth claim, regarding the Tribal Court's inherent jurisdiction over him as a non-member Indian and whether such jurisdiction violates the doctrine of separation of powers, was decided by the Ninth Circuit's opinion in U.S. v. Enas; therefore, Morris' claim is moot in this Court. Def.'s Sum. Judg. Br., 5.
The Tribes' substantive arguments are as follows. First, the Tribes possess an inherent sovereign power to prosecute Morris. This power comes from two sources. First, the Tribes retained the power to prosecute by the terms of the Hellgate Treaty. Def.'s Sum. Judg. Br., 6. The Tribes possessed a form of judicial function prior to the Hellgate Treaty, and the Treaty preserved to them their exclusive use and benefit of the Flathead Reservation. Treaties were a grant of rights from the Tribes, not an assignment of rights to them. United States v. Washington, 157 F.3d 630 (9th Cir.1998); United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371, 380-82, 25 S.Ct. 662, 49 L.Ed. 1089 (1905). Therefore, the Tribes never gave up their judicial authority over the Flathead Reservation.
Second, federal law affirms the right of the Tribes to prosecute Indians. Def.'s Sum. Judg. Br., 7. Powers not explicitly withdrawn from tribes by Congress are retained, unless those powers are withdrawn by implication as a necessary result of the Tribes' dependent status. Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians, 526 U.S. 172, 202-03, 119 S.Ct. 1187, 143 L.Ed.2d 270 (1999); United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 322, 98 S.Ct. 1079, 55 L.Ed.2d 303 (1978). In Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 110 S.Ct. 2053, 109 L.Ed.2d 693 (1990), the United States Supreme Court held that tribes' sovereign powers did not include the authority to prosecute non-member Indians, while acknowledging that Congress has ultimate authority over Indian affairs. Duro, at 698, 110 S.Ct. 2053. Congress responded to this decision by passing the 1990 amendments to the Indian Civil Rights Act, finally enacted as P.L. 102-137, 105 Stat. 646 (1991); 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1303. With this amendment, Congress chose to "recognize and affirm" tribal misdemeanor prosecutorial authority over "all Indians on their respective reservations." H.R. Conf. Rep. 101-938, 101st Cong.2d Sess. 132 (1990). Defendant claims that by drafting the law this way, Congre...
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...to the constitutionality of the prosecution of a nonmember Indian in accordance with the Indian Civil Rights Act) Morris v. Tanner, 288 F. Supp. 2d 1133 (D. Mont. 2003) (same). 330. Solem v. Bartlett, 465 U.S. 463, 470 (1984). 331. 455 U.S. 130 (1982). 332. 462 U.S. 324 (1983). 333. 480 U.S......