Morris v. United States
| Decision Date | 17 September 2013 |
| Docket Number | CIVIL ACTION NO. 5:10-cv-00828 |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of West Virginia |
| Parties | MATTHEW P. MORRIS, Petitioner, v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Respondent. |
The Court has reviewed Petitioner's Application for Writ of Habeas Corpus by a Person in Federal Custody Under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (Document 1), memorandum in support (Document 2), and his Amended Section 2241 Petition (Document 10) together with the entire record. By Standing Order (Document 3) entered June 16, 2010, this action was referred to the Honorable R. Clarke VanDervort, United States Magistrate Judge, for submission to this Court of proposed findings of fact and recommendation for disposition, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B).
On July 31, 2013, the Magistrate Judge submitted his Proposed Findings and Recommendation ("PF&R") (Document 17), wherein he recommended that this Court dismiss Petitioner's Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus by a Person in Federal Custody under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (Documents 1 and 10) and remove this matter from the docket. Petitioner timely filed his objections to the PF&R on August 13, 2013. (Document 18.)
On June 16, 2010, Petitioner, acting pro se, filed an "Emergency Application under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 for Writ of Habeas Corpus by a Person in Federal Custody" (Document 1) andMemorandum in Support (Document 2). Petitioner alleged that there was an unlawful detainer lodged against him and that "he was denied due process of law, by Okeechobee County, Florida." (Document 1 at 5 and 7; Document 2 at 1.) Petitioner explained that he had been incarcerated since his arrest on November 17, 2007. (Document 2 at 2.) Therefore, he contends that "[t]he prosecutor of Okeechobee County, Florida, knew or should have known of [his] arrest and were abouts [sic] since Nov of 2007." (Id.) However, Petitioner states that he did not receive notice of intent to seek indictment from the Office of the Grand Jury until August 28, 2009, around the time he agreed to testify on behalf of John Gotti Jr. (Id.) (Document 10 at 2.) Petitioner further states that he received the notice of indictment on October 26, 2009, while in New York for Mr. Gotti's trial. (Document 2 at 2.) Petitioner alleges that he then "asked the prosecutor's office for an attorney and a copy of the indictment and some sort of discovery information" and did so, again, in January of 2010, but did not receive any response to either request. (Id.)
Petitioner states that on June 4, 2010, a detainer was lodged against him by Okeechobee County, Florida. (Id.)1 Afterwards, he contends that a detainer was lifted or deferred by Orangeburg County, South Carolina. (Id.) Petitioner alleges that the foregoing "amounts to vindictive prosecution and abuse to the process." (Id.) He also insinuates that Florida has violated § 3161(j) of the Speedy Trial Act.2 (Id. at 1-2) (quoting 18 U.S.C. 3161(j)). Moreover, hecontends that the State of Florida has violated the Interstate Agreement on Detainers ("IAD") and his due process rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments by: (1) "[f]ailing to lodge a detainer, when they knew petitioner was incarcerated and serving a sentence in the FBOP [Federal Bureau of Prisons]; (2) [f]ail[ing] to seek custody from 2007 thru [sic] early to mid 2009; (3) [f]ail[ing] to notify the Warden of the pending charges; (4) [f]ail[ing] to give petitioner notice of detainer and pending charges with in [sic] a reasonable time to permit proper defense." (Id. at 3.) Petitioner requests that the Court lift the detainer and dismiss the indictment with prejudice. (Id.)3
On January 7, 2011, Petitioner, while incarcerated in the State of Florida, filed an Amended Section 2241 Petition (Document 10) and memorandum in support (Document 11). Petitioner reiterates his argument that the State of Florida lacked the legal authority "to continue to detain petitioner pursuant to an unlawful detainer that was lodged and later executed against petitioner resulting in extradition to the state of Florida from West Virginia." (Document 10 at 1.) He complains that even though he was indicted on October 13, 2009, the state of Florida failed to lodge a detainer until June 6, 2010. (Id. at 2.) Petitioner states that he was to be released from FCI Beckley on June 16, 2010 "and if not for the detainer lodged ten days prior [he] would have returned to his residence . . . [i]nstead [he] was taken to Southern Regional Jail in Beaver, WV and sat there pending extradition." (Id.)
Petitioner asserts six claims against the State of Florida: (1) that the unlawful detainer lodged against him violates his Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights; (2) that his requests for a speedy trial have been circumvented and ignored in violation of the Fifth, Sixth, and FourteenthAmendments; (3) that the delays in prosecuting his case amount to violations of due process under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments; (4) that the conditions of his confinement imposed as a result of the detainer and his extradition amount to a violation of the Eighth Amendment; (5) that the prejudicial treatment he has received violates his right to equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment; and (6) that the refusal "to give [him] access to legal materials, books, and law library and his own legal materials through the mail amount to violation of right of access to Courts under the 14th Amendment." (Id. at 5-6.) He alleges that this Court has jurisdiction to intervene pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241(d) and "by virtue of petitioner being a resident of the State of West Virginia, in federal custody in West Virginia at the time the unlawful detainer was lodged, and wrongfully extradited from West Virginia because of this unlawful detainer." (Id.) He prays that the Court: (1) declare the acts and omission herein as violations of his constitutional right, (2) issue an injunction ordering the State of Florida to stop violating his rights and (3) issue an order dismissing with prejudice the detainer, fugitive warrant, and indictment. (Id. at 6.)
This Court "shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made." 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). However, the Court is not required to review, under a de novo or any other standard, the factual or legal conclusions of the magistrate judge as to those portions of the findings or recommendation to which no objections are addressed. Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 150 (1985). In addition, this Court need not conduct a de novo review when a party "makes general and conclusory objections that do not direct the Court to a specific error in the magistrate's proposed findings and recommendations." Orpiano v. Johnson, 687 F.2d 44, 47 (4th Cir.1982). When reviewingportions of the PF&R de novo, the Court will consider the fact that Plaintiff is acting pro se, and his pleadings will be accorded liberal construction. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976); Loe v. Armistead, 582 F.2d 1291, 1295 (4th Cir.1978).
The Magistrate Judge found that because Petitioner has been released from custody, his Section 2241 Application must be dismissed as moot. (PF&R at 2-3.)4 The Magistrate explained that federal courts may only adjudicate live cases or controversies. (PF&R at 2) (citing Lewis v. Continental Bank Corp., 494 U.S. 472, 477 (1990); Nakell v. Attorney General of North Carolina, 15 F.3d 319, 322 (4th Cir.1994), cert denied, 513 U.S. 866 (1994). In other words, "a litigant must have suffered, or be threatened with, an actual injury traceable to the defendant and likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision." (PF&R at 2) (quoting Lewis, 494 U.S. at 477.) The Magistrate Judge noted that in the context of a habeas corpus proceeding, the writ "does not act upon the prisoner who seeks relief, but upon the person who holds him in what is alleged to be unlawful custody." (PF&R at 2) (citing Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court of Kentucky, 410 U.S. 484, 494-95 (1973)). The Magistrate Judge found that because Petitioner has been released from custody, the Respondent can no longer provide the requested relief. (PF&R at 3.) Therefore, he concluded that this Court can no longer consider Petitioner's Application under Section 2241. (Id.) In support, he quoted a portion of the Supreme Court's opinion in Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 7 (1998):
An incarcerated convict's (or parolee's) challenge to the validity of his conviction always satisfies the case-or-controversy requirement, because the incarceration (or the restriction imposed by the terms of the parole) constitutes a concrete injury, caused by the conviction and redressable by invalidation of the conviction. Once the convict's sentence has expired, however, some concrete and continuing injury other than the now-ended incarceration or parole - some 'collateral consequence of the conviction- must exist if the suit is to be maintained.
The Magistrate Judge found that Petitioner's Section 2241 Petition must be dismissed because his claims are moot by virtue of his release from custody and the lack of collateral consequences of his federal conviction. (PF&R at 2-3.) Accordingly, he recommended that the Court dismiss Petitioner's Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus by a Person in Federal Custody under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 and remove this matter from the docket.
Petitioner objects to the Magistrate Judge's finding that his Application is moot. (Document 18 at 1.)5 Petitioner argues that this Court has proper jurisdiction to hear his claims because his "[Petition] was initiated in th[is] district when [he]was in federal custody, [he] is a native of the State of West Virginia, and has been extradited to the State of Florida unlawfully and contrary to the United States, and the violation of [his] rights...
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