Morris-El v. United States, CIVIL ACTION NO.: 2:18-cv-103
Decision Date | 02 November 2020 |
Docket Number | CIVIL ACTION NO.: 2:18-cv-103 |
Parties | JOHN M. MORRIS-EL, Plaintiff, v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al., Defendants. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Georgia |
Plaintiff filed this action, asserting claims under the Federal Tort Claims Act ("FTCA"), 28 U.S.C. § 2671 et seq., 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), contesting certain conditions of his confinement while he was incarcerated at the Federal Correctional Institution in Jesup, Georgia. Docs. 1, 1-1. This matter is before the Court for a frivolity screening under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. For the following reasons, I RECOMMEND the Court DISMISS Plaintiff's Complaint in its entirety. Because I have recommended dismissal of all of Plaintiff's claims, I also RECOMMEND the Court DIRECT the Clerk of Court to CLOSE this case and enter the appropriate judgment of dismissal. I further RECOMMEND the Court DENY Plaintiff leave to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal.1
Plaintiff asserts two separate types of claims in this action, claims arising under the FTCA and claims under Bivens, 403 U.S. 388. Under the FTCA, Plaintiff asserts a negligence claim against the United States of America, the United States Bureau of Prisons, and Unicor in their official capacities, and L.A. Jones, D. Bland, B. Smith, Mr. Stanley, and K. Rewis in their individual capacities due to a slip and fall Plaintiff experienced while working at the Unicor facility at the Federal Correctional Institution in, Jesup, Georgia ("FCI Jesup"), which allegedly caused him injuries to his neck, lower back, left hip, and down his left leg. Doc. 1 at 3. Plaintiff alleges he slipped and fell because of a puddle in the Unicor facility, which formed due to a leaky roof. Plaintiff also asserts an FTCA claim for delayed medical care due to prison medical employees' failure to provide timely medical treatment and an x-ray, MRI, and physical therapy. Id. at 7.
Under Bivens, Plaintiff asserts a failure to protect claim—apparently based on the risk created by the conditions that gave rise to the slip and fall—against L.A. Jones, D. Bland, B. Smith, Mr. Stanley, and K. Rewis. Doc. 1-1 at 1. Plaintiff also asserts deliberate indifference to serious medical needs claims related to his alleged need for an x-ray, MRI, and physical therapy against Defendants H.S.A. Loveless, Ed Marchan, Bolaji Aremu, Griffis, T. Pritchard, and J.A. Keller. Id. at 1-3.
As relief for his various claims, Plaintiff requests $1.5 million in damages from the United States and Unicor based on his FTCA claim, $2 million in compensatory damages and $150,000 in punitive damages from Defendants Jones, Bland, Smith, Stanley, and Rewis for his Eighth Amendment failure to protect claim, and $1.25 million in compensatory damages and $150,000 in punitive damages against Defendants Loveless, Marchan, Aremu, Griffis, Pritchard, and Keller for his Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claims. Docs. 1, 1-1. Additionally, Plaintiff amended his Complaint to include a claim for a preliminary and permanent injunction ordering Defendants to transfer Plaintiff to the Federal Medical Center in Butner, North Carolina, for proper medical care and specialized treatment. Docs. 19, 20.
A federal court is required to conduct an initial screening of all complaints filed by prisoners and plaintiffs proceeding in forma pauperis. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A(a), 1915(a). During the initial screening, the court must identify any cognizable claims in the complaint. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b). Additionally, the court must dismiss the complaint (or any portion of the complaint) that is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or which seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. Id. The pleadings of unrepresented parties are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by attorneys and, therefore, must be liberally construed. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). However, Plaintiff's unrepresented status will not excuse mistakes regarding procedural rules. McNeil v. United States, 508 U.S. 106, 113 (1993).
A claim is frivolous under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) if it is "without arguable merit either in law or fact." Napier v. Preslicka, 314 F.3d 528, 531 (11th Cir. 2002) (quoting Bilal v. Driver, 251 F.3d 1346, 1349 (11th Cir. 2001)). In order to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, a complaint must contain "sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). To state a claim, a complaint must contain "more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not" suffice. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.
The FTCA waives the federal government's sovereign immunity as to negligent or wrongful actions by its employees within the scope of their official duties where a "private person[] would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of the place where the act or omission occurred." 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1). However, Congress created a scheme to compensate inmates for injuries sustained in the course of their penal employment: the Inmate Accident Compensation Act ("IACA"). Cooleen v. Lamanna, No. 05-4751, 2007 WL 2687319, at *4 (3d Cir. Sept. 14, 2007). By statute, the Federal Prison Industries Fund pays "compensation to inmates or their dependents for injuries suffered in any industry or in any work activity in connection with the maintenance or operation of the institution in which the inmates are confined." 18 U.S.C. § 4126(c)(4); see also 28 C.F.R. § 301.301 (regulating such claims).
Federal prisoners seeking compensation for injuries sustained during penal employment are limited to the remedy provided by § 4126, as there "is no indication of any congressional purpose to make . . . 18 U.S.C. § 4126 non-exclusive." United States v. Demko, 385 U.S. 149, 152 (1966). This principle has been uniformly applied. See Pickens v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 113 F.3d 1246 (10th Cir. 1997) ( ); Vaccaro v. Dobre, 81 F.3d 854, 857 (9th Cir. 1996) ( ); Wooten v. United States, 825 F.2d 1039, 1044 (6th Cir. 1987) ( ); Aston v. United States, 625 F.2d 1210, 1211 (5th Cir., Unit B 1980) ( ). The IACA is also the exclusive remedy for "claims alleging improper medical treatment of a work-related injury." 28 C.F.R. § 301.301(b); see also Vander v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 268 F.3d 661, 663 (6th Cir. 2001). Therefore, inmates who suffer a work-related injury or subsequent improper medical treatment for that injury are barred from pursuing tort claims under the FTCA. 28 C.F.R. § 301.301(b) (); see also Demko, 385 U.S. at 151-54 ().
Plaintiff's Inmate Injury Report indicates he slipped on a wrapper and fell in the Unicor 6 working facility and that his injuries were work-related. Doc. 1-4 at 1-2. Plaintiff signed this Report, indicating his agreement that his injuries were work-related. Id. at 1. Additionally, by the Department of Justice Southeast Regional Office's response to Plaintiff's Administrative Claim Number TRT-SER-2018-00909, Plaintiff was informed his claimed injuries were work-related and the IACA procedures were his sole means of recovery for his injuries. Id. at 6-7. Further, Plaintiff alleges in his Complaint he did not receive timely medical care, nor did he receive the x-ray, MRI, and physical therapy he required to treat his work-related injuries. Doc. 1 at 7. Because Plaintiff's injuries stem from a work-related accident, the IACA procedures provide his exclusive remedy. Indeed, district courts have no jurisdiction to entertain a tort claim under the FTCA when a prisoner is covered under the IACA. See Thompson v. United States, 495 F.2d 192, 193 (5th Cir. 1974) ( ). Accordingly, the IACA precludes Plaintiff's attempt to secure relief through the FTCA, and I RECOMMEND the Court DISMISS Plaintiff's FTCA claims. Plaintiff must instead apply for relief under the IACA at the appropriate time.
In addition to compensation for his workplace injury claim against the federal government, Plaintiff asserts Eighth Amendment claims for failure to protect and deliberate indifference to serious medical needs against various Defendants. While the IACA undoubtedly bars Plaintiff's workplace compensation claim, as discussed above, several courts that have considered the issue have determined the IACA does not bar an imate's constutional claim against an individual defendant under B...
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