Morris v. Weinberger

• Citation: 401 F. Supp. 1071
• Decision Date: 29 September 1975
• Docket Number: Civ. No. K-74-165.
• Parties: Joseph A. MORRIS, Individually and on behalf of all similarly situated v. Caspar W. WEINBERGER, Secretary Department of Health, Education and Welfare, et al.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Maryland

401 F. Supp. 1071

Joseph A. MORRIS, Individually and on behalf of all similarly situated v. Caspar W. WEINBERGER, Secretary Department of Health, Education and Welfare, et al.

Civ. No. K-74-165.

United States District Court, D. Maryland.

June 19, 1975.

Supplemental Opinion September 29, 1975.

C. Christopher Brown, Baltimore, Md., for plaintiff.

Jervis S. Finney, U. S. Atty., and Joseph M. Fairbanks, Asst. U. S. Atty., Baltimore, Md., Dorothy R. Fait, Atty., Social Security Division, Dept. of HEW, Baltimore Md., for defendant Weinberger.

Francis B. Burch, Atty. Gen., of Maryland and Paul Walter and William J. Rubin, Asst. Attys. Gen., for defendants Solomon, Pepper and Uhlfelder.

FRANK A. KAUFMAN, District Judge.

Morris seeks, on his own behalf and on behalf of several overlapping classes, injunctive and declaratory relief against the federal defendant and the state defendants herein. Further, Morris seeks the return of sums of money representing all or parts of payments made by the Social Security Administration (hereinafter referred to as "SSA") to the Secretary of the Maryland Department of Health and Mental Hygiene (hereinafter referred to as "DHMH") as "representative payee" of Morris and one of the classes he seeks to represent.¹

Morris has been a patient at a hospital operated by DHMH, the Spring Grove State Hospital, since July 12, 1972 when he voluntarily committed himself as a mental patient for the ninth time. On May 1, 1973, pursuant to an application filled out for Morris by DHMH, Morris was determined by SSA to be eligible for Social Security disability benefits retroactive to January 1, 1973. At the same time as DHMH filled out Morris' application for disability benefits, it also filled out an application for appointment as Morris' representative payee pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(j).² On April 3, 1973, prior to its determination of May 1, 1973 that Morris was eligible to receive benefits, SSA determined that Morris "was incapable of handling his benefits in his own best interest" and certified the Secretary of DHMH as Morris' representative payee. During the period which the Secretary of DHMH served as Morris' representative payee, Morris' monthly benefit checks ranged from $213.30 to $228.30. All of those checks were made payable by SSA to the Secretary of DHMH as Morris' representative payee. During that May 1973 to May 1974 period, approximately $14.00 per month was paid by DHMH into Morris' hospital account for use by Morris for his personal needs. The entire remainder was applied by DHMH to pay the charges made by the hospital for Morris' then current care and maintenance. It would appear that the costs of each month's care and maintenance were reimbursed to DHMH from the SSA benefits check issued during the following month.

On February 15, 1974, Morris instituted this action. On February 26, 1974, Morris filled out Form SSA-11, an application to be designated as his own payee. Subsequently, SSA found Morris to be capable of managing his own benefits. Accordingly, since June 1974, SSA has issued to Morris all of his monthly checks as his own payee.

William B. Watson seeks to intervene as of right in this action pursuant to Rule 24(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. In oral argument counsel for Watson asked in the alternative to intervene pursuant to Federal Civil Rule 24(b) (2). Watson has been a patient at Spring Grove State Hospital continuously since 1959 except for a few short "leaves". SSA on November 23, 1964 found Watson entitled to receive disability benefits based on a mental disability. At that time Watson's father was appointed representative payee for his son. Since Watson had and has no earnings record of his own, his benefits were and are based on his father's eligibility. For reasons which do not appear in the record Watson's father was ineligible for any Social Security benefits between 1964 and 1967. Accordingly, his benefits as his father's son were interrupted during that period. When the son again became eligible for benefits based on his father's renewed eligibility in November 1967, the father but not the son stated in writing that he would "prefer the hospital to file for him".

Seemingly, the Secretary of DHMH became the son's representative payee thereafter. On June 14, 1974, Watson, the son, moved for leave to intervene in this action. On July 8, 1974, Watson, the son, applied to SSA to be selected as his own payee. On October 29, 1974 he was informed by SSA that his benefits as his father's son would shortly be paid to him as his own payee. Since December 1974, Watson, the son, in fact has been his own payee.

During the preparation of this opinion, well after the filing of this action and well after the receipt of Watson's motion to intervene, a motion to intervene in this case was filed on behalf of Charlie Jones. Jones would appear to be a member of the class certified infra. Accordingly, there would appear to be no need to resolve the question of whether Jones should be allowed to intervene as of right or otherwise in this action.

Although similar considerations may also be present in the case of the intervenor Watson, in view of the period of time that has elapsed since the latter's initial motion to intervene was filed herein and in view of the absence of any prejudice or delay caused by his intervention, his motion to intervene is hereby granted pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 24(b)(2).³

Morris and intervenor Watson challenge the procedures employed by SSA (1) to determine incapability and (2) to select representative payees. Specifically, they contend that any person entitled to receive benefits has a right to have SSA conduct a hearing before SSA makes any lack of competency determination pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(j)⁴ and also has a right to have a hearing before SSA selects a representative payee. Since, as discussed supra, both Morris and Watson are presently their own payees, the question arises as to whether Morris and Watson lack standing at this time to challenge SSA's procedures regarding incapability and representative payee determinations or whether their respective challenges have become moot.

In Indianapolis School Commissioners v. Jacobs, 420 U.S. 128, 95 S.Ct. 848, 43 L. Ed.2d 74 (1975), in which six plaintiffs challenged certain regulations promulgated by the School Commissioners, the Supreme Court, in a per curiam opinion, wrote (420 U.S. at 129, 95 S.Ct. at 850, 43 L.Ed.2d at 77):

* * * At oral argument, we were informed by counsel for petitioner that all of the named plaintiffs in the action had graduated from the Indianapolis school system; in these circumstances, it seems clear that a case or controversy no longer exists between the named plaintiffs and the petitioners with respect to the validity of the rules at issue. The case is therefore moot unless it was duly certified as a class action pursuant to Rule 23, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a controversy still exists between petitioners and the present members of the class, and the issue in controversy is such that it is capable of repetition yet evading review. Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 95 S.Ct. 553, 42 L.Ed.2d 532. Because in our view there was inadequate compliance with the requirements of Rule 23(c), we have concluded that the case has become moot.

In Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 95 S. Ct. 553, 43 L.Ed.2d 532 (1975), the plaintiff was a wife whose divorce suit was dismissed by a court of the State of Iowa because she had not been a resident of that state for one year before she instituted such suit. The wife sought injunctive relief on behalf of herself and others similarly situated in an Iowa federal district court alleging that Iowa's residency requirement was unconstitutional. That federal court certified the case as a class action, and then rejected her said contention seemingly both before she had satisfied Iowa's one-year residency requirement before she obtained a divorce elsewhere. Mr. Justice Rehnquist wrote (419 U.S. at 399, 95 S. Ct. at 557, 43 L.Ed.2d at 540):

If appellant had sued only on her own behalf, both the fact that she now satisfies the one-year residency requirement and the fact that she has obtained a divorce elsewhere would make this case moot and require dismissal. * * * But appellant brought this suit as a class action and sought to litigate the constitutionality of the durational residency requirement in a representative capacity. When the District Court certified the propriety of the class action, the class of unnamed persons described in the certification acquired a legal status separate from the interest asserted by appellant.8 We are of the view that this factor significantly affects the mootness determination. Citations omitted.

8. The certification of a suit as a class action has important consequences for the unnamed members of the class. If the suit proceeds to judgment on the merits, it is contemplated that the decision will bind all persons who have been found at the time of certification to be members of the class. Rule 23(c) (3); Advisory Committee Note, 39 F. R.D. 69, 105-106. Once the suit is certified as a class action, it may not be settled or dismissed without the approval of the court. Rule 23(e).

And later in his opinion, the Justice commented (419 U.S. at 402, 95 S.Ct. at 559, 43 L.Ed.2d at 542):

Our conclusion that this case is not moot in no way detracts from the firmly established requirement that the judicial power of Art. III courts extends only to "cases and controversies" specified in that Article. There must not only be a named plaintiff who has such a case or controversy at the time the complaint is filed, and at the time the class action is certified by the District Court pursuant to Rule 23,11 but there must be a live controversy at the time this Court reviews the case. * * * The controversy may exist, however, between a named defendant and a member of the class represented by the named p

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