Morrisdale Coal Co. v. Pennsylvania R. Co.

• Citation: 183 F. 929
• Decision Date: 17 November 1910
• Docket Number: 1,352.
• Parties: MORRISDALE COAL CO. v. PENNSYLVANIA R. CO.
• Court: United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (3rd Circuit)

183 F. 929

MORRISDALE COAL CO. v. PENNSYLVANIA R. CO.

No. 1,352.

United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit.

November 17, 1910

[Copyrighted Material Omitted]

William A. Glasgow, Jr., for plaintiff in error.

Francis I. Gowen, for defendant in error at first argument.

John G Johnson, for defendant in error at second argument.

Before BUFFINGTON and LANNING, Circuit Judges, and BRADFORD District judge.

LANNING, Circuit Judge.

This action was dismissed by the Circuit Court for want of jurisdiction. See 176 F. 748. It is an action by the plaintiff, Morrisdale Coal Company, to recover from the defendant, Pennsylvania Railroad Company, damages for the alleged violation of section 3 of the act to regulate commerce, approved February 4, 1887, which declares that:

'It shall be unlawful for any common carrier, subject to the provisions of this act, to make or give any undue or unreasonable preference or advantage to any particular person, company, firm, corporation, or locality, or any particular description of traffic, in any respect whatsoever, or to subject any particular person, company, firm, corporation or locality, or any particular description of traffic, to any undue or unreasonable prejudice or disadvantage in any respect whatsoever. ' Act Feb. 4, 1887, c. 104, 24 Stat. 380 (U.S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 3155).

The claim of the plaintiff is that the distribution of coal cars amongst the mines of the Clearfield coal region of Pennsylvania, in which the plaintiff's mines are located, and the mines in other coal regions, during the years 1900 to 1905, inclusive, was unduly and unreasonably prejudicial and disadvantageous to the plaintiff. The rule under which that distribution was made was abolished by the railroad company on January 1, 1906, when it adopted and put into operation a new rule of distribution. The action in this case was commenced March 3, 1908, more than two years after the rule of distribution now complained of had been abolished. The judgment of the Circuit Court was based on its understanding of the interpretation of the act to regulate commerce by the Supreme Court in Texas & Pacific Ry. Co. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co., 204 U.S. 426, 27 Sup.Ct. 350, 51 L.Ed. 553, and two or three other cases to be later referred to.

The Abilene Case was one in which an action was instituted to recover from the railroad company a sum of money equal to what the Abilene Cotton Oil Company declared was the excess over a reasonable charge which it had been compelled to pay to the railroad company for the transportation of cotton seed. It was conceded in the opinion of the Supreme Court that at common law such an action would lie, and that the act to regulate commerce should not be construed as taking away the right unless such construction was imperatively required. But taking into consideration the remedial provisions of the act, and the destruction of them which would result from allowing a court and jury, without reference to prior action by the Interstate Commerce Commission, to find an established rate to be unreasonable, it was decided that, if the power existed in both courts and the commission to hear originally complaints in cases of alleged preferences in rates, an established schedule of rates might be found reasonable by the commission and unreasonable by a court, and thus give rise to a conflict which would render the enforcement of the act impossible. Referring to section 9 of the act, which provides that any person claiming to be damaged by any common carrier subject to the provisions of the act may either make complaint to the commission or bring suit for the recovery of damages in any District or Circuit Court of the United States of competent jurisdiction, but that he shall not have the right to pursue both of such remedies, the court said:

'We think that it inevitably follows from the context of the act that the independent right of an individual originally to maintain actions in courts to obtain pecuniary redress for violations of the act conferred by the ninth section must be confined to redress of such wrongs as can consistently with the context of the act be redressed by courts without previous action of the commission, and therefore does not imply the power in a court to primarily hear complaints concerning wrongs of the character of the one here complained of.'

The conclusion of the court was that a shipper seeking reparation predicated upon the unreasonableness of an established rate must, under the act to regulate commerce, primarily invoke redress through the Interstate Commerce Commission, which body alone, it was declared, is vested with power originally to entertain proceedings for the alteration of an established schedule.

The plaintiff in the present case has primarily invoked redress through the Circuit Court, and not through the Interstate Commerce Commission. But since the opinion in the Abilene Case dealt with the rule of procedure for the recovery of damages in a case of alleged unreasonable rates, while in the present case we deal with the rule of procedure for redress in a case of an alleged unreasonable regulation for the distribution of cars not in operation when the action was commenced, the question arises whether the construction of the statute which excluded the Abilene Case from the class of cases that may be primarily instituted in a court also excludes such a case as the one now in hand. To answer the question, we must determine, first, whether a distinction exists between the Abilene Case and the present case by reason of the fact that the action in the present case was not commenced until after the rule complained of had been abolished; and, if not, then, second, whether a distinction exists by reason of the fact that in the Abilene Case the rule complained of was one affecting rates, while in the present case it is one concerning the distribution of cars. As to whether the doctrine of the Abilene Case is inapplicable because the present action was not commenced until after the rule complained of had been abolished, it is contended, as we understand the plaintiff's argument, that at common law the Morrisdale Coal Company had a right of action against the Pennsylvania Railroad Company for damages sustained by the former company by reason of the enforcement against it of the old rule, and that the effect of the act to regulate commerce was merely to suspend that right while the rule was operative. Consequently, it is argued, the common-law right of action was revived on January 1, 1906, when the new rule was substituted for the old one. For present purposes, we deem it unnecessary to consider what right at common law, if any, the coal company may have had in the absence of the act to regulate commerce. While section 22 of the act has a clause which declares that 'nothing in this act contained shall in any way abridge or alter the remedies now existing at common law or by statute, but the provisions of this act are in addition to such remedies,' it was held in the Abilene Case that that section could not 'in reason be construed as continuing in shippers a common-law right the continued existence of which would be absolutely inconsistent with the provisions of the act. ' What was really done by the Pennsylvania Railroad Company on January 1, 1906, was to change or modify its rule for the distribution of cars. If a common carrier can defeat the power of the Interstate Commerce Commission to inquire into the reasonableness of its rates or regulations by voluntarily changing or modifying them, frequent changes or modifications would very seriously impair the efficiency of the commission and the purposes of the act. It is clear that Congress intended by the legislation embodied in the act to regulate commerce, and the amendments thereof passed prior to January 1, 1906, to confer upon the Interstate Commerce Commission very large powers in investigating the accounts and regulations of common carriers subject to the provisions of the act, and in requiring obedience to those provisions. So plenary is the administrative power of the commission that in the Abilene Case it was said that:

'Although an established schedule of rates may have been altered by a carrier voluntarily, or as the result of the enforcement of an order of the commission to desist from violating the law, rendered in accordance with the provisions of the statute, it may not be doubted that the power of the commission would nevertheless extend to hearing legal complaints of and awarding reparation to individuals for wrongs unlawfully suffered from the application of the unreasonable schedule during the period when such schedule was in force.'

It does not follow from what has been said that the commission was bound, under the statute as it existed prior to 1906, to investigate every claim for damages against a common carrier founded on a violation of the statute by the enforcement of a rule not in existence when the complaint was made. Section 16 of the act, as amended June 29, 1906, declares that:

'All complaints for the recovery of damages shall be filed with the commission within two years from the time the cause of action accrues, and not after, and a petition for the enforcement of an order for the payment of money shall be filed in the Circuit Court within one year from the date of the order; provided, that claims accrued prior to the passage of this act may be presented within one year. ' Act Feb. 4, 1887, c. 104, 24 Stat. 384 (U.S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 3165) as amended by Act June 29, 1906, c. 3591, Sec. 5 (U.S. Comp. St. Supp. 1909, p. 1159).

Although previous to 1906 there was in the act no express limitation of time within which a proceeding before the commission should be commenced, before ...