Morrison v. Carbide & Carbon Chemicals Corp.
| Citation | 129 S.W.2d 547,278 Ky. 746 |
| Parties | MORRISON v. CARBIDE AND CARBON CHEMICALS CORPORATION. |
| Decision Date | 30 May 1939 |
| Court | Court of Appeals of Kentucky |
Appeal from Circuit Court, Boyd County; Watt M. Pritchard, Judge.
Action by Frank H. Morrison against the Carbide and Carbon Chemicals Corporation to recover damages because of his discharge by the defendant contrary to an alleged oral agreement made in connection with agreement whereby the plaintiff had agreed to accept certain compensation for injuries arising out of and in the course of his employment. From a judgment in favor of the defendant, the plaintiff appeals.
Judgment affirmed.
E. Poe Harris, of Catlettsburg, for appellant.
Martin & Smith, of Catlettsburg, and Blue, Dayton & Campbell, of Charleston, W. Va., for appellee.
CREAL Commissioner.
Frank H. Morrison is appealing from a judgment sustaining a demurrer and upon his failure to further plead dismissing his petition as amended against the Carbide and Carbon Chemicals Corporation. In the original petition it is alleged in substance that appellant was employed by appellee and both had agreed to and were operating under the Workmen's Compensation Law, Ky. St. § 4880 et seq.; that on or about November 18, 1936, while engaged in his work as a carpenter he sustained an accidental injury arising out of and in the course of his employment resulting in hernia; that he and appellee thought he was permanently, partially incapacitated for carpenter's work but that he was able to work as a member of appellee's electrical force; that in settlement of all claims that he might have against appellee they entered into an agreement in form approved by the compensation board whereby he accepted compensation at the rate of $15 per week for a period of 7 weeks, which agreement was approved by the board; that in addition thereto appellee agreed to employ him in its electrical department so long as he was able to work, at the prevailing rate of wages; that under such additional agreement he did work for appellee in its electrical department until about May 4, 1937, when appellee refused to furnish him other work or employment or pay him further compensation or wages; that he had made diligent efforts to obtain other employment but had been unable to do so or to earn wages except a total of approximately $40; that since appellee had breached the contract it had been paying employees in its electrical department 91 cents per hour with time and a half for overtime; that by reason of matters alleged he was entitled to recover partial or temporary damages or compensation at the rate of 91 cents per hour from May, 1937, to the time of the filing of the action or a total of $1201.20 less a credit of $40 for which sum he prayed judgment.
In his amended petition he alleged that at the request of appellee he submitted to a hernia operation performed by a doctor furnished by it; that because of improper diagnosis and treatment upon the part of the physician furnished by appellee he was forced to and did undergo two other operations which delayed his recovery so that he was unable to resume work for 13 weeks instead of the 7 weeks as assumed by the parties when they entered into the agreement, approved by the Compensation Board; that it was in adjustment or settlement of his claims for compensation under the provisions of the compensation act and in adjustment compromise and settlement of his right of action at law for damages that he and appellee executed the writings that were submitted to and approved by the board and made the compromise settlement mentioned in the original petition the basis of his action.
It is not alleged in the petition as amended that the collateral oral agreement sued on was submitted to or approved by the compensation board.
The question presented for determination is whether an action at law may be maintained upon the alleged oral, collateral agreement. It is the contention of appellant in effect that such a contract is not expressly or impliedly forbidden by the compensation law and that it does not run contrary to any decisions of this court nor to public policy; and that appellant has a right of action at law for its enforcement. Counsel for appellee take the contrary view and maintain that such contracts are forbidden by the Workmen's Compensation Law and have come under condemnation of this court as being against the express provisions of the law and the public policy thereby declared. Most, if not all, of the cases cited and relied on by counsel for appellee relate to contracts, agreements or compromises whereby the liability of the employer to the employee was attempted to be lessened in violation of section 4889, Kentucky Statutes, which reads: "No contract or agreement, written or implied, no rule, regulation or other device, shall in any manner operate to relieve any employer in whole or in part of any obligation created by this act, except as herein provided."
Counsel for appellant argues, however, that those cases are inapplicable and do not sustain appellee's contention because the...
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S.J.L.S. v. T.L.S.
...public policy must originate there and not with the Judiciary. Sluder, 134 S.W.3d at 17; see also, Morrison v. Carbide & Carbon Chemicals Corp., 278 Ky. 746, 129 S.W.2d 547, 549 (1939)("If a change in that policy is desired, application must be made to the Legislature, and not to the judici......
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Simmons v. Clark Const. Co.
...caused by a compensable accident were permitted. Sturgill's Adm'r v. Howard, 218 Ky. 57, 290 S.W. 1048; Morrison v. Carbide & Carbon Chemicals Corporation, 278 Ky. 746, 129 S.W.2d 547.' We reject both contentions and hold that the Workmen's Compensation Act is a bar to the claims made again......
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Fann v. McGuffey
...constitutional attack. To get to the real issue in Wells, we must consider the purpose of workmen's compensation. In Morrison v. Carbide, 278 Ky. 746, 129 S.W.2d 547, in discussing the purpose of the Workmen's Compensation Act, we 'For a proper understanding of the questions presented for d......
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McDowell v. Jackson Energy Recc, 2000-SC-0218-WC.
...rights and liabilities are henceforth to be measured by the terms of the act." Id. at 698; see also Morrison v. Carbide and Carbon Chemicals Corp., 278 Ky. 746, 129 S.W.2d 547, 549 (1939). A constitutional challenge on equal protection grounds presupposes that a statute is discriminatory, t......