Morrison v. Davis

• Decision Date: 28 March 2000
• Docket Number: No. C2-97-1305.,C2-97-1305.
• Citation: 88 F.Supp.2d 799
• Parties: James MORRISON, Plaintiff, v. Karl DAVIS, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Ohio

88 F.Supp.2d 799

James MORRISON, Plaintiff, v. Karl DAVIS, et al., Defendants.

No. C2-97-1305.

United States District Court, S.D. Ohio, Eastern Division.

March 28, 2000.

Alphonse Adam Gerhardstein, Laufman & Gerhardstein, Cincinnati, OH, for plaintiff.

Todd Marti, Columbus City Attorney's Office, Carol Anne Hamilton O'Brien, John H. Jones, Ohio Attorney General-2, Corrections Litigation, Columbus, OH, William R. Kirschner, US Department of Justice, Civil Division/Federal Programs, Washington, DC, for defendant.

OPINION & ORDER

MARBLEY, District Judge.

This matter comes before the Court on Plaintiff's Motion for Attorney Fees and Expenses. The Plaintiff moves the Court for an award of attorney fees and expenses in the amount of $137,395.21 against Defendants Karl Davis and Jeffery Felts for services provided in this case. Plaintiff also challenges the constitutionality of 42 U.S.C. § 1997e, the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 ("PLRA"), as it limits attorney fees awards. For the following reasons, the Court finds that § 1997e(d) is constitutional and GRANTS Plaintiff's Motion for Attorney Fees and Expenses in the amount of $22,499.

I. Introduction

Plaintiff James Morrison was incarcerated in 1991 for an aggravated drug trafficking. He is currently serving a sentence of two and a half to ten years. In March of 1997, Plaintiff was housed at the Ross Correctional Institute ("RCI"), where Defendants are currently employed as corrections officers. On December 2, 1997, Plaintiff filed suit, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that he was beaten by a correction officer at the Ross Correctional Institute ("RCI") on March 31, 1997, in violation of his rights under the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution. On July 2, 1999, the jury returned a verdict in favor of Plaintiff, finding that Defendants Felts and Davis used excessive force and violated their duty to protect Plaintiff. The jury awarded Plaintiff a total of $15,000 ($12,000 in actual damages and $3,000 in punitive damages).

As the prevailing party in the § 1983 action, Plaintiff petitions under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 for an award of attorney fees and litigation costs and expenses in the amount of $137,395.21. Pursuant to § 1988, Plaintiff claims that he is entitled to recover attorney fees and litigation expenses for all time reasonably spent on this matter. Plaintiff documents that his attorney, Mr. Gerhardstein, spent 149.89 hours on the case and that Ms. Branch, Mr. Gerhardstein's associate, allocated 533.49 hours.¹ Plaintiff requests hourly rates of $250 for the services of Mr. Gerhardstein and $180 for Ms. Branch.

Moreover, Plaintiff acknowledges that the PLRA lowers the amount of attorney fees permitted to be recovered by prison inmates following a successful civil rights suit. Plaintiff argues, however, that the PLRA's restraints are an unconstitutional exercise of congressional power. Specifically, Plaintiff claims that the PLRA is "an unconstitutional denial of rights secured by the equal protection clause."

Defendants counter that the PLRA is constitutionally sound because it is rationally related to the government interests of limiting excessive fee awards in prisoner cases and of limiting the disruptive impact of prison litigation. Defendants urge that Plaintiff's Motion should be denied for two reasons. First, assuming that the PLRA fee cap is constitutional, the amount that Plaintiff seeks is far in excess of what the PLRA allows. Second, even if the PLRA fee cap is constitutionally debatable, Defendants aver that other provisions of the PLRA limit the hourly rates that may be used in calculating the fee awards in prisoner cases. Finally, Defendants claim that § 1997e(d)(1)(B)(i) of the PLRA, requires fees to be proportional to the relief that the plaintiff obtains. In this case, Plaintiff recovered against only two of the three Defendants, and, therefore, Defendants contend that the attorney fees award should be reduced by one-third.

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2403(a), this Court has granted the United States' Motion to Intervene. The United States argues that no fundamental right or suspect classification is involved in this case, and that a rational basis standard applies. Under the rational basis analysis, the United States argues that Congress has a legitimate interest in discouraging frivolous lawsuits by prisoners, standardizing fee rates, and protecting states and local jurisdictions from the imposition of excessive fees. Therefore, the statute is rationally related to that legitimate government interest. The United States urges the Court to deny Plaintiff's request to declare the PLRA's attorney fees provisions unconstitutional.

II. Analysis

A. Entitlement to Fees

Section 1988 provides, in relevant part: "[i]n any action or proceeding to enforce a provision of section[] ... 1983 ... the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs...." 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b).² The purpose of § 1988 "is to ensure effective access to the judicial process for persons with civil rights claims, and to encourage litigation to enforce the provisions of the civil rights acts and constitutional civil rights provisions." Hernandez v. Kalinowski, 146 F.3d 196, 199 (3d Cir.1998). Therefore, although the decision to award fees is left to the trial court's broad discretion, the court's discretion "must be guided by the statutory presumption that fees should be awarded to successful plaintiffs absent unusual situations." Williams v. Hanover Hous. Auth., 113 F.3d 1294, 1300 (1st Cir.1997) (citation omitted).

Under the mandate of § 1988, a prevailing party is entitled to "a reasonable attorney's fee." 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b). In determining the reasonableness of a fee, a court customarily applies the "lodestar" formula. See Blanchard v. Bergeron, 489 U.S. 87, 94, 109 S.Ct. 939, 103 L.Ed.2d 67 (1989). Under the lodestar approach, the proper starting point "is the number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate." Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433, 103 S.Ct. 1933, 76 L.Ed.2d 40 (1983). This figure is presumed to be a reasonable fee; however, the court may adjust it upward or downward based on collateral considerations. See id. at 434, 103 S.Ct. 1933.

In determining the appropriate hourly rate, consistent with the paradigm set forth in § 1988, a court must determine the "prevailing market rates in the relevant community" for services rendered. See Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 895-96 & n. 11, 104 S.Ct. 1541, 79 L.Ed.2d 891 (1984). Courts have determined that "the actual rate that applicant's counsel can command in the market is itself highly relevant proof of the prevailing community rate." National Ass'n of Concerned Veterans v. Secretary of Defense, 675 F.2d 1319, 1326 (D.C.Cir.1982). The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has found that:

[t]he prevailing market rate may be established through affidavits reciting the precise fees that counsel with similar qualifications have received in comparable cases; information concerning recent fee awards by courts in comparable cases; and specific evidence of counsel's actual billing practice or other evidence of the actual rates which counsel can command in the market.

See Spell v. McDaniel, 824 F.2d 1380, 1402 (4th Cir.1987) (citations omitted).

Section 1988 governs the award of a fee in civil rights cases under § 1983, but in prisoner civil rights cases there is an additional consideration. See Clark v. Phillips, 965 F.Supp. 331, 333 (N.D.N.Y.1997). In prisoner civil rights cases, court must also assess the availability and amount of fees pursuant to § 803 of the PLRA, 42 U.S.C. § 1997e. Section 1997e provides:

(d) Attorney's Fees

(1) In any action brought by a prisoner who is confined to any jail, prison, or other correctional facility, in which attorney's fees are authorized under section 1988 ... such fees shall not be awarded, except to the extent that —

(A) the fee was directly and reasonably incurred in proving an actual violation of the plaintiff's rights protected by a statute pursuant to which a fee may be awarded under section 1988 ...; and

(B)(i) the amount of the fee is proportionately related to the court ordered relief for the violation; or

(ii) the fee was directly and reasonably incurred in enforcing the relief ordered for the violation.

(2) Whenever a monetary judgment is awarded in an action described in paragraph (1), a portion of the judgment (not to exceed 25%) shall be applied to satisfy the amount of attorney's fees awarded against the defendant. If the award of attorney's fees is not greater than 150% of the judgment, the excess shall be paid by the defendant.

(3) No award of attorney's fees in an action described in paragraph (1) shall be based on an hourly rate greater than 150% of the hourly rate established under section 3006A of Title 18, United States Code, for payment of court-appointed counsel.

(4) Nothing in this subsection shall prohibit a prisoner from entering into an agreement to pay an attorney's fee in an amount greater than the amount authorized under this subsection, if the fee is paid by the individual rather than the defendant pursuant to section 1988....

42 U.S.C. § 1997e(d). When reviewing an application for an attorney fees in prisoner civil rights suits, both § 1988 and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e must be analyzed.

The Court must engage in two levels of analysis in this case. First, it will consider whether the fee-limiting and fee-shifting provisions of § 1997e(d) are consistent with Equal Protection clause of the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution. Second, it will consider the proper fee award under §§ 1988 and 1997e.

B. Constitutionality of 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(d)

As a threshold consideration, the Court must determine whether § 1997e(d) denies Plaintiff and other prisoner litigants who have filed § 1983 actions Equal...