Morrison v. Dist. of Columbia

• Decision Date: 16 November 2022
• Docket Number: 1:22-cv-00456 (TNM)
• Parties: PATRICIA MORRISON, Plaintiff, v. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Columbia

PATRICIA MORRISON, Plaintiff,
v.
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, Defendant.

No. 1:22-cv-00456 (TNM)

United States District Court, District of Columbia

November 16, 2022

MEMORANDUM OPINION

TREVOR N. MCFADDEN, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Proceeding pro se, Patricia Morrison sues the District of Columbia, alleging that it improperly calculated her late husband's disability benefits. This is her third attempt to do so here. The Court dismissed her first Complaint for failing to abide by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a). See Morrison v. District of Columbia, No. 22-cv-00456 (TNM), 2022 WL 1211195, at *2 (D.D.C. Apr. 25, 2022). She then filed an amended Complaint, which the Court dismissed for the same reasons. See Mem. Order ECF No. 21. For both complaints, the Court held that Morrison's filings were insufficient “to put the District on notice as to the nature of [her] claims” because they lacked any explanation of why the many federal authorities she cited support her claims. Id. at 3.; see 2022 WL 1211195, at *1.

The third time is not the charm. Her latest Complaint still lacks sufficient explanation to give notice to the District about the nature of her federal claims. And the Court warned Morrison when it dismissed her second Complaint that this was her last chance to get it right. See ECF No. 21 at 3. The Court will therefore dismiss her the case with prejudice.

1

I.

A complaint must contain “a short, plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). Rule 8 emphasizes “clarity and brevity” and entrusts trial courts with discretion to enforce the pleading requirements. Satterlee v. CIR, 195 F.Supp.3d 327, 334 (D.D.C. 2016). Those requirements make sure that defendants have fair notice of plaintiffs' claims so they can prepare an “adequate defense.” Penkoski v. Bowser, 486 F.Supp.3d 219, 239 (D.D.C. 2020).

While proceeding pro se entitles Morrison to “special solicitude,” Yellen v. U.S. Bank, Nat'l Ass'n, 301 F.Supp.3d 43, 47 (D.D.C. 2018), it does not exempt her from Rule 8(a)'s requirements, Miley v. Hard Rock Hotel & Casino Punta Cana, 537 F.Supp.3d 1, 5 (D.D.C. 2021). More, federal courts have limited jurisdiction; Morrison must prove that this Court has subject matter jurisdiction over her claims. 28 U.S.C. § 1331; District of Columbia v. Elevate Credit, Inc., 554 F.Supp.3d 125, 134-35 (D.D.C. 2021). But because Morrison is pro se, the Court considers all facts alleged in Morrison's operative complaint and opposition when assessing the District's Motion to Dismiss. Brown v. Whole Foods, 789 F.3d 146, 152 (D.C. Cir. 2015).

Morrison gets full marks for making her third Complaint shorter, shaving off 35 pages from both her previous attempts. But that brevity has not translated into clarity. Of the 15 counts she alleges, only Count 1 references federal statutes. Second Am. Compl. (SAC) at 2, ECF No. 22^[1](citing 5 U.S.C. § 8146a, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1981a, 1983, 1985-86, and “Title VII” (presumably referencing the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title VII (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.))).

2

And Morrison has not asserted a claim under any of those statutes that complies with Rule 8(a).

Morrison first lists 5 U.S.C. § 8146a, part of the Federal Employees' Compensation Act (FECA), which requires certain cost-of-living adjustments (COLAs) to disability compensation payments to federal employees. She says that the District failed to give her husband certain COLAs he was entitled to. See, e.g., SAC at 2. But FECA does not apply to District employees anymore; after Congress passed the District of Columbia Home Rule Act, Pub. L. 93-198, 87 Stat. 774 (1973), the District created its own employee compensation system for its employees. District of Columbia v. Thompson, 593 A.2d 621, 630-31 (D.C. 1991).

While Morrison's late husband began work for the District in 1962, the injury that is the focus of his claim occurred in 1985, after the District created its own employment...