Morrison v. Fall

Decision Date04 June 1923
Docket Number3875.
Citation290 F. 306
PartiesMORRISON et al. v. FALL, Secretary of the Interior, et al.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — District of Columbia Circuit

Submitted February 15, 1923.

Appeal from the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia.

Webster Ballinger, of Washington, D.C., for appellants.

C. E Wright, Peyton Gordon, and E. S. Booth, all of Washington D.C., for appellees.

Before SMYTH, Chief Justice, ROBB, Associate Justice, and BARBER Judge of the United States Court of Customs Appeals.

SMYTH Chief Justice.

John G. Morrison, Jr., describing himself as a member of that class of persons called 'all the Chippewa Indians in the state of Minnesota,' filed a bill in the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia, in behalf of himself and all other persons similarly situated, in which he asked for various kinds of relief against the Secretary of the Interior, the Commissioner of the General Land Office, the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, and the Secretary of the Treasury, concerning many subjects mentioned in the bill. The defendants moved to dismiss the bill on several grounds. The motion was sustained, and a decree dismissing the bill, the plaintiff having declined to amend, was entered. The bill is voluminous, and we will give only so much of it as is necessary to illustrate the points raised.

Under an act approved January 14, 1889 (25 Stat. 642), the different bands of Chippewa Indians of Minnesota ceded to the government their title in all their lands constituting their reservations in that state, except a small portion belonging to the White Earth and Red Lake bands. The lands were to be surveyed and classified into pine and agricultural lands, and were to be sold at a price not less than that fixed in the act, the proceeds to be deposited in the Treasury of the United States to the credit of the Chippewa Indians of Minnesota, to draw interest at the rate of 5 per cent. per annum for the period of 50 years. Part of the interest was to be paid annually in cash to heads of families and orphans for their use, part to other classes of Indians, and the remainder, one-quarter, to be devoted exclusively, under the direction of the Secretary of the Interior, to the establishment and maintenance of free schools for the Indians. At the end of 50 years the permanent fund was to be divided and paid to the Indians in equal shares.

The first specific charge of misconduct upon the part of any of the defendants is that the Secretary of the Interior and the Commissioner of the General Land Office illegally caused about 900,000 acres of the ceded lands to be classified as swamp and overflowed lands, and issued patents to the state of Minnesota covering approximately 600,000 acres of those lands, without consideration to the Indians, and it is averred that, unless restrained, they will issue patents to the remaining lands so illegally classified. It is stated in the brief of the appellees, and not denied by the appellant, that the Secretary of the Interior in 1913 ordered that no more patents issue for these lands, and that none has issued since that time. Therefore there is no cause for relief on that account. With respect to the 600,000 acres which it is said have been patented to the state of Minnesota, it is manifest that we have no power to pass upon the legality of that act in the absence of the state of Minnesota, which is not a party to the suit.

It is next complained that Congress by an act approved May 17, 1900 (31 Stat. 179), provided for homestead patents for agricultural public lands acquired prior to the passage of the act, by treaty or agreement, from the various Indian tribes, including the Chippewas, without charge to the patentees, except what was necessary to pay office fees; that none of the lands acquired from the Chippewa Indians were public lands within the meaning of the act, and that notwithstanding this several thousand patents had been issued for the ceded lands without payment therefor being made into the trust fund, as required by the act of 1889. We think the lands acquired from the Chippewa Indians under the act are public lands, within the meaning of the act of 1900. The legal title to them is in the United States, and it has a right to dispose of them. By their disposition in the way provided for in the last-mentioned act the trust fund of the Indians does not suffer, for the act declares that the United States shall pay into the fund a sum of money equivalent to that which it would have received if the land had been sold at the price stated in the act of 1889. Thus the government becomes responsible for the price of the land, as it is responsible for the trust fund.

It is argued, however, that the act of 1900 is invalid, since it worked a change in the method of disposing of the lands provided for in the act of 1889. This might be true if Morrison and those for whom he assumes to speak acquired any vested rights in the method. But they did not. A similar question was presented to the Supreme Court of the United States in Gritts v. Fisher, 224 U.S. 640, 648, 32 Sup.Ct. 580, 56 L.Ed. 928. The act of July 1, 1902 (32 Stat. 716), provided that certain tribal Indians and children of the tribe born before a certain date should be participants in the distribution of lands of the tribe to which they belonged. A later act cut down the amount which they would have received under the first act, by providing for the admission of children born at a later date to participation in the distribution, and it was argued that Congress did not have the power to do this. Speaking of the rights of the plaintiffs under the first act the court said that it--

'did not confer upon them any vested right such as would disable Congress from thereafter making provision for admitting newly born members of the tribe to the allotment and distribution. The difficulty with the appellants' contention is that it treats the act of 1902 as a contract, when 'it is only an act of Congress and can have no greater effect.' * * * It was but an exertion of the administrative control of the government over the tribal property of tribal Indians, and was subject to change by Congress at any time before it was carried into effect and while the tribal relations continued.'

In support of its conclusion the court cites Stephens v Cherokee Nation, 174 U.S. 445, 488, 19 Sup.Ct. 722, 43 L.Ed. 1041, Cherokee Nation v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 294, 23 Sup.Ct. 115, 47 L.Ed. 183, Wallace v. Adams, 204 U.S. 415, 423, 27 Sup.Ct. 363, 51...

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2 cases
  • Morrison v. Work
    • United States
    • U.S. Supreme Court
    • January 5, 1925
    ...moved to dismiss, a final decree of dismissal was entered by the trial court, and it was affirmed by the Court of Appeals of the District. 290 F. 306. The case is here on appeal under section 250 of the Judicial The objections presented by the motions to dismiss include lack of jurisdiction......
  • Ne-kah-wah-she-tun-kah v. Fall
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — District of Columbia Circuit
    • June 4, 1923

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